[Translation]

October 24, 2023

To whom it may concern:

Company name	Cosmo Energy Holdings Co., Ltd.
Representative	Shigeru Yamada Representative Director and Group CEO (Code: 5021, Prime Market in the Tokyo Stock Exchange)
Contact person	Eriko Date General Manager of Corporate Communication Dept. (TEL: 03-3798-3101)

Situation Regarding Responses to Information Lists Sent by the Company to the Large-scale Purchasers

As announced in the "Notice Concerning Receipt of a Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. Regarding Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. of the Company's Share Certificates, etc.," dated July 28, 2023, the Company received a statement of intent for large-scale purchase actions, etc. regarding large-scale purchase actions, etc. of the Company's share certificates, etc. (the "Statement of Intent"), dated July 27, 2023, from Minami Aoyama Fudosan Co., Ltd. and Ms. Aya Nomura (collectively, the "Large-scale Purchasers"; and the Large-scale Purchasers, City Index Eleventh Co., Ltd., and Reno, Inc. collectively, the "Large-scale Purchasers and Others"). Thereafter, based on the "Company's Basic Policies for the Control of the Company Based on the Fact that City Index Eleventh Co., Ltd. and Other Parties Carry Out Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. of the Company's Share Certificates, etc. and Response Policies to Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. of the Company's Share Certificates, etc." (the "Response Policies"), which were introduced by the Company as of January 11, 2023 and continue within the extent necessary for enactment, etc. of the countermeasures approved by the shareholders of the Company at the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders held on June 22 of the same year, the Company has sent Information Lists to the Large-scale Purchasers multiple times since August 3 of the same year. In response, the Company has received responses multiple times from the Large-scale Purchasers since August 15.

As announced in the "Notice Concerning Holding of Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders and Decision on Agenda Submitted Thereto" dated today, the Company will hold an Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders on December 14, 2023. For such meeting, the Company has collected the contents of the responses by the Large-scale Purchasers thus far and hereby releases them in a list (Exhibit) to help shareholders of the Company make decisions.

The Large-scale Purchasers submitted the Statement of Intent in accordance with the Response Policies; however, for subsequent procedures of information provision, the Large-scale Purchasers addressed the matter by not providing specific responses or effectively refuses to provide responses for many of the Company's questions. The Company requested The Large-scale Purchasers to provide sufficient information in order to contribute to reasonable decisions by the Company's shareholders, taking into account the points in the "Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers" (especially, the points made in Principle of Transparency, which is listed as Principle 3) announced by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry on August 31, 2023. However, the Large-scale Purchasers have not provided sincere explanations by declaring that information requested by the Company to be provided was "information unnecessary for the shareholders to make decisions." In addition, regarding the point as to under which policy and plan the Large-scale Purchasers and Others intend to improve the Company's corporate value or shareholders' common interests after implementing large-scale purchase actions, etc. of the Company's share certificates, etc., specified in the Response Policies ("Large-scale

Purchase Actions, etc."), although the Large-scale Purchasers stated in the Statement of Intent that the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. was to "promote improvement of the corporate value and shareholder value as shareholders," in the responses, the Large-scale Purchasers "listed" only contents that are abstract and general "merely as possibilities as extensively and specifically as possible to the extent presumable at the moment" and have not provided any response regarding specific policies or plans.

In light of the contents of those series of responses, as announced in the "Notice of Finalization of the Evaluation and Analysis Results of the Board of Directors of the Company Concerning the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. of the Company's Share Certificates, etc. by the Large-scale Purchasers and of the Agenda for the Company's Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders to Confirm Shareholders' Will Concerning Enactment of Countermeasures" dated today, the Company believes that implementation of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. will harm the Company's corporate value or the Company's shareholders' common interests.

The Company would like to ask its shareholders to continuously pay close attention to the information to be disclosed by the Company.

End

Exhibit

Summary of Inquiries to and Responses from the Large-scale Purchasers

This summary compiles inquiries posed in the letters of inquiry that the Company sent to the Large-scale Purchasers in accordance with the Response Policies and responses thereto from the Large-scale Purchasers.

The dispatch and receipt dates for the following documents are all those of 2023.

Date of Dispatch/Receipt of the Company	the Company → Large-scale Purchasers	Large-scale Purchasers → the Company
July 27		"Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc." dated July 27
August 3	"Information List" dated August 3 ("Information List")	
August 15		"Response" dated August 14 ("Response (1)")
August 30	"Information List (2)" dated August 30 ("Information List (2)")	
September 8		"Response" dated September 8 ("Response (2)")
September 22	"Information List (3)" dated September 22 ("Information List (3)")	
October 10		"Response" dated October 10 ("Response (3)")

The Information List and the Response (1)

[Noted: translated by the Company]

Part 1 Details of the Large-scale Purchasers and their group

<table>
<tr><th>No.</th><th>The Company's Inquiries</th><th>The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses</th></tr>
<tr><td>1</td><td>Please provide the following matters regarding Minami Aoyama Fudosan (it is not necessary to respond again about the information indicated in the Statement of Intent):
(i) details of business actually conducted (including whether Minami Aoyama Fudosan conducts business other than shareholding, and if 'yes,' the details thereof);
(ii) status of financial results over the past three years (contents of the balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements);
(iii) capital structure and investment ratio (including the capital relationship chart);
(iv) number of employees;
(v) outline of each office (location, scale, etc.);
(vi) name of each officer (including, in addition to officers under the Companies Act, executive managing officers) and the officer's history over the past ten years (including the records of positions at the companies and the like to which the officer belonged and any rewards or punishments; "History");
(vii) outline of major investors (Kabushiki Kaisha Office Support) (including governing law for incorporation, capital structure, investees, investment ratio at the investees, name of the representative, and the History of the representative over the past ten years);</td><td>(i) The Statement of Intent is as set forth below.
(Content of the Statement of Intent)
B. Purpose of the company
The Purpose of the company [the Company's note: Minami Aoyama Fudosan; hereinafter the same] is to engage in the following businesses.
1. Real property etc. investment, ownership, leasing, management, and sale and purchase
2. Investment business
3. Management consulting
4. Any businesses incidental to any foregoing
(ii) The balance sheet and profit and loss statement for the most recent 3 accounting period is as set forth in Exhibit 1.
(iii) As set forth in the Statement of Intent
(Content of the Statement of Intent)
<table><tr><th>Amount of capital (yen)</th><th>Aggregate number of issued shares (shares)</th></tr><tr><td>200,000</td><td>90</td></tr></table>(iv) Operated by officer and one employee.
(v) The location of the company is 3-22-14 Higashi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo. For the company's size and other matters, please refer to responses to other items.
(vi) As set forth in the Statement of Intent. There are no rewards or punishment.
(As set forth in the Statement of Intent)</td></tr>
</table>

(viii) if there is any entity effectively controlling the Large-scale Purchasers, an outline of such entity (including the specific mode of control over the Large-scale Purchasers, specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, investees, investment ratio at the investees, name of the representative, and the History of the representative over the past ten years);

(ix) main partner financial institutions and/or main lenders, as well as the balance of borrowings therefrom;

(x) investees, investment ratio at the investees, funds effectively controlled or operated by Minami Aoyama Fudosan, (regardless of whether they are established under Japanese law or any foreign law and regardless of legal form; the "Funds"), as well as an outline of their partners or investors (regardless of whether direct or indirect) and executive partners and those who continuously offer investment advice ("Partners, etc.") (including the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, investees, investment ratio at the investees, name of the representative, and the History of the representative over the past ten years; the "Outline of the Partners, etc."), details of the investment policy, and details of the investment and lending activities over the past ten years; and

(xi) whether falling under a "foreign investor" ("Foreign Investor") specified in Article 26, paragraph (1) of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (the "Foreign Exchange Act") and information serving as the basis thereof (including the status of direct or indirect holders of the voting rights of the Large-scale Purchasers and the existence of an address or residence in Japan of the Large-scale Purchasers' officers).

Title	Occupation	Name	Date of birth	History		Number of held shares (1,000 shares)
Representative Director	—	Tatsuya Ikeda	September 23, 1960	April 1984	Joined Tanseisha Co., Ltd.	—
				March 1988	Joined Nikkei Business Publications, Inc.	
				August 2001	Joined Kabushiki Kaisha M&A Consulting	
				March 2016	Representative Director of Kabushiki Kaisha Rebuild (current)	
				March 2016	Representative Director of the company	

					(current)	

(vii) The following is an overview of Kabushiki Kaisha Office Support

- Address: 3-22-14 Higashi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
- Governing law for incorporation: Laws of Japan
- Investee and investment ratio at the investees: Currently held shares, the sole holding ratios set forth in the most recent tender offer statement, statement of large-volume holdings (including the change report), and the investees; timely disclosure documents disclosed on an electronic disclosure system ("EDINET") concerning securities reports and other disclosure documents of the Financial Services Agency pursuant to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act are as follows. The holding ratios referred to in the statement of large-volume holdings (including the change report) are ratios against the aggregate number of issued shares.

  Chugoku Marine Paints, Ltd. (1.69%)

  Content other than what is disclosed in the statement of large-volume holdings is not public information; thus, the Purchasers refrain from making further responses.
- The name and history of the past 10-years of the representative is set forth below. There are no rewards or punishment.

Title	Occupation	Name	Date of birth	History		Number of shares held (1,000 shares)
Representative Director	—	Tatsuya Ikeda	September 23, 1960	April 1984 March	Joined Tanseisha Co., Ltd. Joined Nikkei	—

					1988	Business Publications, Inc.	
					August 2001	Joined Kabushiki Kaisha M&A Consulting	
					March 2016	Representative Director of Kabushiki Kaisha Rebuild (current)	
					March 2016	Representative Director of the company (current)	

(viii) The "entity effectively controlling" Minami Aoyama Fudosan is Kabushiki Kaisha Office Support, its wholly-owning parent company.

(ix) MUFG Bank, Mizuho Bank

(x) Investees and investment ratio at the investees: With respect to currently held shares, the sole holding ratios set forth in the most recent statement of large-volume holdings (including the change report) disclosed on EDINET are as follows. The holding ratios are ratios against the aggregate number of issued shares.

The Company (6.80%), Arcland Service Holdings Co., Ltd. (3.17%), Sumitomo Mitsui Construction Company, Ltd. (4.88%).

Content other than what is disclosed in the statement of large-volume holdings is not public information; thus, the Purchasers refrain from making further responses.

There are no funds that are effectively controlled or operated by Minami Aoyama Fudosan (it is not a business that engages in self-offering of interests in collective investment schemes or self-management of assets invested or contributed).

		(xi) It falls under a Foreign Investor specified in Article 26, Paragraph 1, Item (5) of the Foreign Exchange Act, but why, despite the fact the Purchasers have already explained that advance notification has already been submitted, is such a question being asked? It seems that the Company is not considering the necessity of providing information to shareholders, but instead is mechanically asking many questions.
2	Please provide the following information on Ms. Nomura (it is not necessary to provide again the information contained in the Statement of Intent): (i) address (all); (ii) contact information in Japan; (iii) place of tax payment; (iv) main banks and/or main lenders, as well as the balance of borrowings therefrom; (v) History over the past ten years; (vi) investees, the investment ratio in the investees, and positions of the investees; (vii) funds effectively controlled or operated by Ms. Nomura, as well as the Outline of the Partners, etc., details of the investment policy, and details of the investment and lending activities over the past ten years; and (viii) whether falling under a "Foreign Investor" and information serving as the basis thereof (including the existence of an address or residence in Japan).	(i) The Purchasers respond within the scope of the statement of large-volume holdings and the change report for the same. Nassim Road, Singapore. (ii) The Purchasers have already provided her e-mail address. (iii) Singapore (iv) The Purchasers refrain from making responses regarding personal information. (v) Please confirm the Statement of Intent (Content of the Statement of Intent) April 2011, joined Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities June 2013, joined Kabushiki Kaisha Rebuild June 2015, Representative Director of C&I Holdings August 2016, Representative Director of General Incorporated Association the Murakami Family Foundation (vi) With respect to listed companies in which the holding ratio with joint holders exceeds 5%, please confirm the statement of large-volume holdings and the change report for the same. On other matters, the Purchasers refrain from making further responses because they concern personal information. (vii) There are no applicable matters. (viii) Falls under Foreign Investor specified in Article 26, Paragraph 1, Item (1) of the Foreign Exchange Act.
3	Not only does the Company group's business fall into the designated business sector in terms of national security, etc. under the Foreign Exchange Act, but	Purchasers can acquire shares based on the advance notification for inward direct investment, etc. only within six months from the acceptance date of the advance notification.

	also many areas of the business fall under the core business, which requires careful examination in terms of national security, etc. Specifically, crude oil mining (0531), oil refining (1711), warehousing related to petroleum storage, excluding cold warehousing (4711) and cold warehousing (4721), petroleum wholesale (5331), gas stations (6051), petroleum-related fuel retail, excluding gas stations (6051), filling of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) and other business service that is related to the business of conducting storage of liquified petroleum gas and is not classified as others (9299), power plants (3311), and the like are handled as designated business sectors. Among these, all of crude oil mining (0531), oil refining (1711), warehousing related to petroleum storage (excluding cold warehousing) (4711), cold warehousing (4721), filling of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) and other business service that is related to the business of conducting storage of liquified petroleum gas and is not classified as others (limited to specified petroleum gas importers, etc.), and power generation related to power generators with power plants of at least 50,000 kilowatts fall under the core business sectors. In this regard, regarding the acquisition, etc. of share certificates, etc. of the Company, please inform us specifically about the details indicated on the advance notification for inward direct investment under the Foreign Exchange Act by the Large-scale Purchaser Group (defined in 4. below) (including entities planned to acquire share certificates, etc. of the Company, as well as the limit of share certificates, etc. to be acquired by each entity, acquisition period, and matters indicated on the notification, etc. as pledges upon acquisition) and the current status of the procedures, as well as (while on the Statement of Intent, performance of the procedures of the advance notification for inward direct investment, etc. under the Foreign Exchange Act is indicated as a condition for the Large-scale	Purchasers provided such advance notification to the Company's shareholders (the upper limit of acquisition is 9.9% of the voting rights, respectively), but the purchase availability period of Minami Aoyama Fudosan terminates on October 3, 2023 and that of City [the Company's note: City Index Eleventh; the same applies hereinafter] and Ms. Nomura terminates on October 20, respectively. The current advance notification was provided before submitting the Statement of Intent this time, and if purchasing occurs after the procedures of the takeover defense measures, the Purchasers may make a purchase only to the extent stated in the statement and thus, the Purchasers believe that the above response is sufficient for details of the current advance notification. It is regrettable that despite City Index Eleventh's notice to the Company that no advance notification regarding Reno, Inc. will be made, the Company ignored the notice, and with respect to the advance notification of the Purchasers and Reno, Inc., the convocation notice for the 8th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders erroneously stated that "under the Foreign Exchange Act, an effective acquisition permit of 39.96% has been given." City Index Eleventh will not make the advance notification regarding the acquisition of shares after completion of the above purchase availability period, and Ms. Nomura and Minami Aoyama Fudosan will do so in line with the details of the Statement of Intent.

	Purchase Actions, etc.,) any procedures planned in the future by the Large-scale Purchaser Group. In particular, the material titled "Cosmo Energy Holdings Co., Ltd.'s Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders," dated May 29, 2023, prepared by City Index Eleventh Co., Ltd. ("City Index Eleventh"), claimed that "the effective upper limit in our advance notification under the Foreign Exchange Act is merely 22.9%." While it is claimed that "the effective upper limit is 22.9%," please inform us specifically how this relates to the ratio of the voting rights to be 24.56% for the Large-scale Purchasers and Others after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., planned under the Statement of Intent. Further, while we understand that the claim of "the effective upper limit" is based on the movement of the shares within the Large-scale Purchaser Group, indicated in 8. below, please specifically inform us, with respect to "the effective upper limit" here, of the intention to add "effective," rather than merely indicating "upper limit."	
4	Please provide the following matters with respect to the Large-scale Purchasers' joint holders and specially related parties under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (the "FIEA") concerning the share certificates, etc. of the Company, as well as the Large-scale Purchasers' parent companies, subsidiaries, and affiliated companies, those that have a direct or indirect capital relationship with the Large-scale Purchasers, groups of individuals or relatives who may exercise effective influence over the Large-scale Purchasers, and those falling under joint holders under the FIEA concerning share certificates, etc. of other companies with those parties. Under the change report submitted by City Index Eleventh regarding share certificates, etc. of the Company so far, the Large-scale Purchasers and Reno, Inc. ("Reno") are indicated as "joint holders." Please provide us with the following matters for, in addition to the	As set forth above, the definition of "Large-scale Purchaser Group" in the Company's question is inappropriate, and from the perspective of the necessity of providing information to shareholders as well, it is determined that it will suffice if answers concerning the Purchasers are given. In addition, the Purchasers have already provided responses regarding purchasers that are the Purchasers; please refer to the relevant sections. The following is an overview of City Index Eleventh Co., Ltd. ・ Location of head office: Same as Minami Aoyama Fudosan ・ Contact information in Japan: Same as Minami Aoyama Fudosan ・ Governing law for incorporation: Laws of Japan ・ Number of employees: 2 ・ Overview of business locations: Same as Minami Aoyama

four parties of City Index Eleventh, Minami Aoyama Fudosan, Ms. Nomura, and Reno (the four parties are collectively referred to as the "Large-scale Purchasers and Others"), the parties objectively acknowledged to have close relationships with the Large-scale Purchasers, regardless of whether they fall under any of the above: Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami ("Mr. Murakami"), Mr. Takateru Murakami, Mr. Yukihiro Nomura, Kabushiki Kaisha Office Support ("Office Support"), S-Grant. Co., Ltd. ("S-Grant"), Kabushiki Kaisha ATRA ("ATRA"), C&I Holdings Co., Ltd. ("C&I"), Kabushiki Kaisha MI2, City Index Holdings Co., Ltd., Kabushiki Kaisha Fortis, Kabushiki Kaisha M Investments, City Index Twelfth Co., Ltd., and Mr. Fuminori Nakashima. The Large-scale Purchasers and the parties indicated in this paragraph are collectively referred to as the "Large-scale Purchaser Group"):

(1) when a party is a corporation, in addition to (i) the location of the head office, (ii) contact information in Japan, and (iii) the governing law for incorporation, the matters designated in 1. above and the following matters with respect to its representative:

A) address;

B) contact information in Japan;

C) place of tax payment;

D) main banks and/or main lenders, as well as the balance of borrowings therefrom;

E) History over the past ten years;

F) investees, the investment ratio at the investees, and position at the investees;

G) funds effectively controlled or operated by the party, as well as the Outline of the Partners, etc., details of the investment policy,

・ Name of officers and history over the past ten years: As set forth in the Statement of Intent. There are no rewards or punishment.

(Content of the Statement of Intent)

Title	Occupation	Name	Date of Birth	History		Number of held shares (1,000 shares)
Representative Director	—	Hironaho Fukushima	July 13, 1959	October 1999	Orix Corporation Investment Bank Headquarters Managing Director	—
				October 2008	Orix Corporation Risk Management Headquarters Deputy Manager	
				October 2013	Joined Reno Co., Ltd.	
				September 2014	City Index Co., Ltd.,	

and details of the investment and lending activities over the past ten years; and

H) whether falling under a “Foreign Investor” and information serving as the basis thereof (including the existence of an address or residence in Japan); or

(2) when a party is an individual, the matters from (A) through (H) above.

				December 2014 September 2016 September 2016	Outside Director Reno Co., Ltd. Representative Director (current) City Index Co., Ltd. Representative Director (current) the company [the Company’s note: City Index Eleventh Co., Ltd.] Representative Director (current)	

・ Major investors: As set forth in Statement of Intent

(Content of the Statement of Intent)

Name	Address or location	Number of held shares (shares)	Ratio of number of held shares against the aggregate

			number of issued shares (excluding own shares)
City Index Co., Ltd.	3-22-14 Higashi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo	197,990	―
Reno Co., Ltd.	3-22-14 Higashi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo	671	33.38
Kabushiki Kaisha Fortis	3-22-14 Higashi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo	671	33.38
Aya Nomura	Nassim Road, Singapore	320	15.92
Kabushiki Kaisha M Investments	3-22-14 Higashi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo	200	9.95
City Index Twelfth Co., Ltd.	3-13-2 Kuramae, Taito-ku, Tokyo	148	7.36
Total	―	200,000	100.00

- Entity with effective control: Reno Co., Ltd. and Kabushiki Kaisha Fortis each hold 33.38%.
- Main bank: MUFG Bank
- Investees and the investment ratio at the investees: With respect to shares currently held, the sole holding ratios set forth in the statement of large-volume holdings (including the change report), disclosed on EDINET are as follows. The holding ratios referred to in the statement of large-volume holdings (including the change report) are ratios against the aggregate number of issued shares.

  The Company (8.85%), Arcland Service Holdings (6.48%), Chugoku Marine Paints, Ltd. (4.52%), Toa Construction Corporation (8.40%), Ryosan Company, Limited

		(8.62%), Yorozu Corporation (9.46%), Daiho Corporation (7.12%), Restar Holdings Corporation (1.81%) Please note that content other than what is disclosed in the statement of large-volume holdings is not public information; thus, the Purchasers refrain from making further responses.
5	In relation to 4. above, in the tender offer statement regarding the shares of Japan Asia Group Limited, Minami Aoyama Fudosan was indicated as ATRA's wholly-owned subsidiary, holding 100 shares of the 200 issued shares of City Index Eleventh (voting rights ratio: 50%), while according to the Large-scale Purchasers' letter dated May 1, 2023, at present, there has been a change to that indication; specifically, Minami Aoyama Fudosan is ATRA's wholly-owned subsidiary, holding no shares of City Index Eleventh, and City Index Eleventh holds 33.4% of the voting rights of ATRA. With respect to that change in the capital structure, please specifically inform us about the reason, situation, and timing for making the determination, and the facts serving as the basis thereof. In addition, while City Index Eleventh holds 33.4% of the voting rights of ATRA (total number of issued shares: 595), please provide the matters indicated in 4.(1) and (2) above for the holders of the other voting rights of 66.6%.	The change of capital structure was because of the state of each company's finances and shareholders, and other circumstances. ATRA ceased to be a shareholder of City Index Eleventh in September 2021, and City Index Eleventh became a shareholder of ATRA in August 2022. The Purchasers do not believe that the remaining matters constitute information that is necessary for decision-making by shareholders.
6	Please provide an outline of the Funds, corporations, partnerships, and any other group decision-making bodies (if there are any people who give instructions, advice, and the like to a decision-making body, including those people; hereinafter the same applies) included in the Large-scale Purchaser Group (the name of each decision-making body, as well as its specific authority and decision-making procedures). In addition, please provide, when a decision-making body is an individual, the individual's specific position, name,	The Purchasers are not Funds. Decision-making for the Purchasers is done by its Directors or at general meetings of shareholders. The Purchasers do not believe that matters such as specific authority constitute information that is necessary for decision-making by shareholders.

	and History, and when it is a meeting body, the extent and number of people qualified to participate therein, respectively. Further, please inform us specifically whether, other than the Large-scale Purchaser Group, there are any parties involved in the decision-making of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., and if 'yes,' of the specific name, outline, role of those parties, as well as an outline of that decision-making body (its name, specific authority, and decision-making procedures).	
7	Please inform us specifically (i) about the number of share certificates, etc. of the Company held by each member of the Large-scale Purchaser Group (including the share certificates, etc. of the Company effectively held through borrowed stocks, equity swaps, and any other derivatives, "Held Share Certificates, etc."), (ii) if there are any share certificates, etc. of the Company effectively held through equity swaps or any other derivatives among the Held Share Certificates, etc. about the number of such share certificates, etc., details of such derivatives, etc., and provide an outline of the counterparty to the agreement on such derivatives and any other related parties (including the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, and name of the representative), (iii) about the number of share certificates, etc. pledged as security, etc. among the Held Share Certificates, etc. and provide an outline of those entities that have the security right, etc. (including the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, and name of the representative), and (iv) about the status of transactions of the share certificates, etc. of the Company, including the Held Share Certificates, etc., in the last 60 days by the Large-scale Purchaser Group.	Please refer to the Statement of Intent in regard to the number of share certificates, etc. of the Company held by the Purchasers. There are no share certificates, etc. of the Company that are effectively held through equity swaps or any other derivatives, etc. There are no share certificates, etc. pledged as security, etc. among the held share certificates, etc. Please refer to the statement of large-volume holdings and the change report for the same regarding the status of transactions of the share certificates, etc. of the Company by the Purchasers. (Content of the Statement of Intent) The numbers of shares of the Company held by the company and others [the Company's note: Minami Aoyama Fudosan, Ms. Aya Nomura, and their specially related parties] as of this date [the Company's note: July 27, 2023] are as follows. Minami Aoyama Fudosan: 6,007,900 shares Ms. Aya Nomura: 3,854,025 shares City Index Eleventh Co., Ltd.: 7,818,600 shares Total: 17,680,525 shares
8	According to the change report No. 12 dated April 14, 2023, for the statement of large-volume holdings submitted by City Index Eleventh, **on April 7, 2023,**	Share transfer was carried out based on fund demand of each group company. At this point in time, no transfer of shares within the group is planned (City Index Eleventh's letter dated May 1,

	all of the 6,007,900 shares of the Company held by Reno, which is City Index Eleventh's joint holder, were moved off-market to Minami Aoyama Fudosan, which is also City Index Eleventh's joint holder. While it is considered that there is little necessity for a share transfer within the same group, please provide us with the reason, situation, and timing for making the determination, and the facts serving as the basis thereof. In addition, in this regard, according to the letter dated May 1, 2023, to the Company from City Index Eleventh, **with respect to the upper limit of share certificates, etc. to be acquired as indicated in the advance notification under the Foreign Exchange Act by Large-scale Purchasers and Others (so-called acquisition limit), 6.8% in terms of the investment ratio was used to move such shares**. On the other hand, City Index Eleventh has declared that the remaining acquisition limit may also be used to move the shares of the Company within the Large-scale Purchaser Group. If the shares of the Company are moved within the Large-scale Purchaser Group in the future, please inform us specifically when what type of event occurs or what types of conditions are met the Large-scale Purchaser Group expects a party belonging to the Large-scale Purchaser Group to move the shares that that party holds to another party within the same group.	2023 merely mentions the abstract possibility to explain the nature of the acquisition framework).
9	Please specifically inform us of each of the following matters: the name of the shareholders of the share certificates, etc. of the Company held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group on the Company's shareholder register, the number of the shares held by these parties on the Company's shareholder register, under which agreement or in which other relationship (if any) these parties are the shareholders on the Company's shareholder register; and if there are any plans	The purpose of the inquiry is unclear, but entries in the shareholder register reflect the general shareholders notification from the Japan Securities Depository Center to the Company, and the general shareholders notification is given based on shareholder information provided by security companies, etc. to the Japan Securities Depository Center and information on the reference date based on information regarding the number of shares. The information on shares and information regarding the number of shares of securities company where the Purchasers have trading accounts match the names of the owners and the beneficial owners,

	to change the names of the shareholders on the Company's shareholder register, the names after the change.	and there are no beneficial owners that differ from the beneficial owners under any agreement or any other relationship.
10	Please inform us about the ratio of the value of the share certificates, etc. of the Company for each of the Large-scale Purchasers and Others to its total assets.	The Purchasers don't believe that it is important information for the shareholders' decision.
11	Please inform us about the ratio of the value of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's shares certificates, etc. of the Company to its total assets.	The Purchasers don't believe that it is important information for the shareholders' decision.
12	The Statement of Intent indicates that Minami Aoyama Fudosan and City Index Eleventh have no experience in the business the same as that of the Company and its group companies, while there is no such indication regarding Ms. Nomura. Please specifically inform us of the details of the knowledge and experience of the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members (including main shareholders or investors and important subsidiaries and affiliated companies; hereinafter the same applies) concerning the business operated by the Company's group, such as the petroleum business, petroleum development business, petrochemical business, and renewable energy business (collectively, the "Company Business").	The Purchases have no experiences in the business the same as that of the Company and its group companies.
13	Please inform us specifically whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members have experience in effectively managing a company and being involved in such company's actual operations in Japan, and if 'yes,' of the specific details thereof (including the ratio of the voting rights owned by the Large-scale Purchaser Group and the form of actual management or involvement in the operations). Especially, if they have experience in being	The Purchasers do not intend to control or manage the Company; thus, this is a inquiry that does not need to be answered.

	involved in the management or operations of a company with a business the same as the Company Business (however, excluding cases of merely holding shares), please specifically inform us of the details thereof.	
14	Please respond whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members have experience in effectively managing a company operating a business the same as the Company Business through acquiring shares, seconding officers, and the like in countries other than Japan. If they have such experience, please specifically inform us of each of the following matters: the name of the company managed by the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members, such company's governing law for incorporation, the country or area where its office(s) (if there are multiple offices, the main ones) is/are located, details of business, history, capital structure and financial situation, the ratio of voting rights of such company held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members, and the method of management of the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members (e.g., whether they sent managers, what type of support for growth, etc. the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members provided to such company).	There are no relevant facts.
15	Please specifically inform us of each of the following matters with respect to the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members at present or over the past ten years: whether there are any facts of violation of the Laws (regardless of whether they are laws of Japan or foreign countries; including laws, government ordinances, regulations, orders, rules, guidelines, notices, administrative guidance, regulations of a financial instruments exchange, and other regulations; hereinafter the same applies) (if there are, the specific facts thereof), whether they have been found guilty (including those decisions that are not final and binding) (if 'yes,' the name of the offense and the sentence),	There are no relevant facts.

	and whether they have received any judgement, decision, order, punishment (including tax sanctions), guidance, indication (including any indication by the tax authorities regarding omission of withholding tax), or the like acknowledging acts of violation of the Laws (the "Judgement, etc.") from judicial bodies, administrative bodies, or the like (regardless of whether those bodies are situated in Japan or foreign countries), or whether they have been subject to judicial proceedings, administrative proceedings, or the like for such Judgement, etc. (regardless of whether those proceedings took place in Japan or foreign countries) (if 'yes,' specific details of such Judgment, etc. and such proceedings).	
16	Please provide us, concerning the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members, with the specific details of lawsuits or any other judicial proceedings currently pending in Japan or overseas (including the court in which the case is pending, the date when such judicial proceedings were instituted, related parties, main issue, and amount in controversy).	There are no relevant facts.
17	If the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members have/had any kind of relationship (including personal relationships and financial relationships) with antisocial forces or terrorist-related organizations at present or in the past, please specifically provide us with an outline of such antisocial forces or terrorist-related organizations, the name of those with relationships with such antisocial forces or terrorist-related organizations, and the retainerships with such antisocial forces or terrorist-related organizations.	There are no relevant facts.
18	Please inform us, with respect to the Funds controlled or operated by the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members in the past, or corporations, partnerships, or other organizations to which they belonged, or their group companies or members (including people who execute business), at present or	There are no relevant facts.

	over the past ten years, whether there are any facts of violation of the Laws (if there are, the specific facts thereof), whether they have been found guilty (including those decisions that are not final and binding) (if 'yes,' the name of the offense and the sentence), and whether they have received any Judgement, etc. acknowledging acts of violation of the Laws from judicial bodies, administrative bodies, or the like, or whether they have been subject to judicial proceedings, administrative proceedings, or the like concerning such Judgement, etc. (if 'yes,' specific details of such Judgment, etc. and such proceedings).	
19	Regarding the cases where the Large-scale Purchaser Group has acquired or held share certificates, etc. of listed companies in Japan, if they made, through means such as meeting with the management, and for purposes such as share price increases or returning profits to shareholders, specific proposals such as selling or separating businesses, etc. other than the existing core business, disposing of surplus assets, dividend increases, share buybacks, advising that a person recommended by the Large-scale Purchaser Group be appointed as a director, please inform us specifically of each of the following matters: the specific details of such proposals, responses of the target company that received such proposals, how the share price of the target company developed, including over the medium to long term, following its implementation of such proposals, and the details of the profits received by the Large-scale Purchaser Group thereby.	First, the Purchasers believe that a listed company has a responsibility as a public institution of society to all of its stakeholders such as its employees, transaction counterparties, business partners and shareholders, and needs to improve ROE by strengthening the competitiveness of its business and enhancing asset efficiency, and increase its share prices continuously over the medium-to long-term. As for retained earnings held by a listed company, the Purchasers believe that it is necessary to clearly explain the level of funds that needs to be reserved, and that other unnecessary retained earnings should be used to improve ROE or returned to shareholders. The Purchasers believe that it is a major premise that a listed company, by committing to a medium term-business plan and otherwise, needs to grow and steadily improve profitability to continue to increase its corporate value, and based on communication and a relationship of trust with shareholders, improve shareholder value. Based on such philosophies, the Purchasers informed management of all investees with whom they met that excess retained earnings were not necessary, and have sought to improve shareholder value by improving ROE. As a result, the Purchasers believe , ROE improved for many companies, and with the heightened tension among managers, corporate governance has improved. For details regarding specific cases, please refer to the other responses; the Purchasers are proud

		that by making proposals such as those below to investees, the Purchasers have been able to make a slight contribution to increasing the shareholder value of each company. Specifically, measures that were implemented include structural reforming of the glass business and reduction of cross-shareholdings at Central Glass Co., Ltd., partnership with another company and sale of REIT of real property that do not contribute to improving ROE at Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd., and implementation of an MBO at Kuroda Electric Co., Ltd..
20	In the cases where the Large-scale Purchaser Group has invested in listed companies in Japan, please inform us specifically of whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group conducted any proxy fights to realize its proposals and of their results.	There are no relevant matters with respect to the Purchasers.
21	Please provide specific details about the Large-scale Purchaser Group's internal control system (including a corporate group internal control system) to comply with the Laws, as well as their effectiveness.	Of the Purchasers, City Index Eleventh falls under a "large company" under the Companies Act, and therefore City Index Eleventh has decided on the following systems to ensure proper operations. (i) System to ensure that performance of duties by the company's director and employees does not violate laws or regulations, or the company's articles of incorporation Stipulate guidelines that clarify a sense of value and a code of conduct to be shared by all officers and employees, provide regular education, ensure compliance and disseminate compliance awareness, and ensure effectiveness through reviews by directors. (ii) System related to retention and management of information concerning performance of duties by directors Retain and maintain written decisions of directors and information concerning performance of duties by directors pursuant to internal rules. Provide such information for perusal when requested by each director or each auditor. (iii) Rules on management of risk of loss to the company, and other systems With respect to risks involving compliance, when necessary, establish rules and guidelines, designate managers, and prepare and distribute manuals. If it becomes

		necessary to respond to a risk that newly arises, have a manager report to the directors, and improve the risk management system. (iv) System to ensure that the duties of the company's directors are efficiently carried out To engage in a multifaced examination of and make appropriate decisions on important matters that will impact the entire company, specify administrative authority and decision-making procedures. (v) System to ensure proper operations of the company Designate emergency contact points in case of a disaster, etc., and provide appropriate and proper advice and support. (vi) Matters concerning employees if an auditor requests employees to assist with duties If there is such a request, with the consent of the auditor, appoint employees to assist the auditor. (vii) Matters concerning ensuring effectiveness of instructions to employees of (vi) above An employee that is to assist an auditor with duties must not work in another department, and must follow the directions and orders of the auditor. (viii) Matters concerning the independence of employees of (vii) from directors. The prior consent of the auditor must be obtained for any reassignment, evaluation or disciplining of an employee who assists an auditor. (ix) System for the company's directors, employees, and persons who receive reports from directors and employees to report to statutory auditors, and other systems to report to auditors of the company When necessary, ensure attendance at meetings by auditors, and have auditors meet with directors regularly. (x) System to ensure that a person who makes a report of (ix) above is not treated unfairly because of making such a report Prohibit unfair treatment of any officer or employee who makes a report to auditors of the

		company for making such a report, and ensure that there is thorough awareness of such prohibition. (xi) Procedures for prepayment and reimbursement of costs that arise from performance of auditors' duties, and other matters concerning policies for handling costs and obligations that arise from the performance of such duties. If an auditor requests from the company any prepayment, etc. of costs that arise in the performance of duties pursuant to Article 388 of the Companies Act, handle such costs or obligations related to such request promptly unless it is determined that such costs or bills are not necessary for the performance of such auditor's duties. Note that the Purchasers are mindful about legal compliance, and by seeking the support and advice of attorneys and other outside professionals, are making effort to maintain the lawfulness of business activities.
22	Please inform us whether each stock company included in the Large-scale Purchaser Group performs its obligation to announce its financial results under the Companies Act. In addition, please provide copies of the balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements of each company included in the Large-scale Purchaser Group over the last three years (it is not necessary to provide again the balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements disclosed in the Statement of Intent).	For balance sheets and profit and loss statements of Minami Aoyama Fudosan and City Index Eleventh for the latest three accounting periods, please refer to Exhibits 1. and 2. of the Response. As for Minami Aoyama Fudosan, financial results were not announced due to an administrative error, and currently, procedures are being carried out for such announcement.
23	Among the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members' past acts of investment in listed companies, if there are any cases where, after acquiring shares of a target company, they had a return or attempted to have a return on investment by causing company-related parties, such as the target company itself, large shareholders of the target company, or the management thereof, to acquire such shares (including the cases of causing acquisition through a TOB by an issuer and ToSTNeT-2/3), please provide the consequences leading to	When there was a request from an investee and we determined that it would contribute to improvement of the investee's shareholder value, we responded to the request (for a specific example, please see the response to the inquiry in Part 10.), but the Purchasers have never demanded it.

	those acts, specific details thereof, and the like.	
24	Regarding the investments in listed companies in Japan conducted so far by the corporations or Funds that have been controlled or operated by the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members or to which they have belonged, please inform us individually and specifically about, among other matters, the name of each investee, the reason for deciding on each investee (including specific details of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's investment standards), the timing to commence acquiring share certificates, etc., purpose of acquiring share certificates, etc., investment policy, method and period for having a return on investment, acts to make proposals to the investee, if the Large-scale Purchaser Group conducted any activity contributing to the improvement of the investee company's corporate value, specific details of such activities, details of participation in the management after the investment, existence of sales or other disposals of material property after the investment, method of acquiring share certificates, etc. of each investee, method and period for having a return on investment, developments of the business results of the investee company after the investment, and whether it was possible to establish an amicable relationship with the management and employees of the investee company.	Please refer to the response to 19. above.
25	At the Company's Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, held on June 22, 2023, the Large-scale Purchaser and Others submitted a shareholder proposal (the "Shareholder Proposal"), which proposed to appoint Ms. Yoko Atsumi ("Ms. Atsumi"), who had a transactional relationship with the Large-scale Purchaser Group, which was a "Foreign Investor," and could fall under a "related party" as "a person that has received a large amount of money or any other property" (Article 2, paragraph (1), item (ii)(e) of the Order on Inward	Ms. Yoko Atsumi does not fall under a 'related party' and thus this question lacks premise. The Company requested that the Purchasers provide answers, such as the reason why they determined that Ms. Yoko Atsumi does not fall under a related party, but the party claiming that she falls under a related party (your company) should provide the reason why you think so.

	Direct Investment) from the Large-scale Purchaser Group, as a director of the Company, and exercised its voting rights to approve the proposal. Please provide the details indicated on the advance notification by the Large-scale Purchaser Group in this regard and the current status of the procedures. In relation to the above, if the Large-scale Purchaser and Others determines that Ms. Atsumi does not fall under a "related party" as she is not "a person that has received a large amount of money or any other property," please specifically provide the reason and the facts serving as the basis for making such determination.	

Part 2. Details of Share Purchase Conducted

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Please provide details of the reason for your designating the Company as the investee for commencement of the Share Purchase Conducted.	The Purchasers expect the Company's net profits will fluctuate widely because of losses and gains in inventory valuation and crude oil future prices will surge due to supply concerns because of the situation in Ukraine, but sufficient gains in inventory valuation will be recorded for the Company, and the Company's business results will improve significantly. In addition, the Purchasers believe that if the Company's business performance is strong, its equity capital reaches 400 billion yen, the target in its Medium-Term Management Plan, and its equity capital is sufficiently recorded, there is a possibility that decisions will be made to carry out dividend increases and share buybacks that contribute to improving shareholder value. Amidst such circumstances, on March 9, 2022, a decision was made to sell the Company's shares which was held by the sovereign wealth fund Abu Dhabi ("Abu Dhabi"), which was the largest shareholder of the Company, overseas, then on March 10, 2022, it was decided that the sale price would be 2,450 yen, a 16.21%

		discount from the closing market price of March 9, 2022 of 2,924 yen, and the share price of the Company fell close to the offering price. It is determined that in light of the true value of the Company, specifically the improvement in its business performance in conjunction with the recording of gains in inventory value from a steady rise in crude oil future prices, expectations regarding a policy on shareholder returns, and the Company's competitiveness, the share price of the Company was significantly discounted. As a result, the Purchasers began acquiring the shares of the Company.
2	Please inform us of the period when you started considering the Share Purchase Conducted in detail and the results thereof, the reason that you determined that you might conduct the Share Purchase Conducted and the background and period thereof, and the facts serving as the basis for making such determination.	The Purchasers started considering the Share Purchase Conducted in detail around January 2022. The reasons and background of events that led the Purchasers to determine that the Purchasers might conduct the Share Purchase Conducted are as set forth above. As a result, the Purchasers commenced with purchasing the shares of the Company on February 16, 2022.
3	Please provide specific details of the expected investment yield, the payback period, the amount of return on investment, basic approach to other investment policies of the shares of the Company, in the Large-scale Purchaser Group.	No specific yield is expected, but the Purchasers believe that if the shareholder value improvement measures they propose are taken, the investment yield will rise. Contrary to funds, etc. that receive funds from external sources, no payback period is specified by the Purchasers, and thus, there is no payback period. The amount of return on investment will depend on the investment yield. Further, in making investments, the Purchasers are pursuing an ideal of what they believe a Japanese listed company should be, and seeking to instill an understanding of corporate governance in Japanese listed companies. The Purchasers believe that a listed company has a responsibility as a public institution of society to all of its stakeholders such its employees, transaction counterparties, business partners and shareholders, and needs to improve ROE by strengthening the competitiveness of its business and enhance asset efficiency, and continuously increase its share prices.

		Moreover, the Purchasers believe that it is necessary to secure retained earnings necessary to properly and continuously manage business, and if there are any unnecessary retained earnings, that need to be invested to help grow the Company or that capital policies be implemented to improve corporate value or shareholder value.
4	Please inform us of the management or financial indicators that the Large-scale Purchaser Group took seriously when it invested in the Company and standards of indicators that the Large-scale Purchaser Group considers desirable.	The important indicator is the ROE (return on equity). Once an ROE that exceeds capital costs is generated, additional value will be created economically, indicating a rise in corporate value. Based on the capital costs of Japanese listed companies, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's "Competitiveness and Incentive Structures for Sustainable Growth-Building Favorable Relationships between Companies and Investors" Project (Ito Report), states that an 8% ROE is necessary. Despite the Company realizing an ROE of 13.8% in its March 2023 term due to the impact from the rise in crude oil prices and other factors, according to the Seventh Medium-Term Management Plan announced by the Company in March 2023, the Company is aiming for a stable ROE of 10% or more from fiscal year 2023 to fiscal year 2025, setting a target value that is below past performances. The Purchasers believe that this is due to a deterioration in capital efficiency, the cause of which was that the Company had continued to accumulate equity capital even after having reached, in the March 2022 term, an equity capital of 400 billion yen which had been the Company's target for the last 13 years before that term, and then the Company had suddenly increased the target to 600 billion yen in its Seventh Medium-Term Management Plan. Since the announcement of the Seventh Medium-Term Management Plan, the Purchasers have been seeking from the Company explanations on the equity capital levels the Company should have that are reasonably satisfactory to the market, but at the point in time of submission of this Response, no such explanations have been given by the Company. Further, PBR (price-to-book ratio) is an indicator to measure whether corporate value is being created. Recently, the Tokyo Securities Exchange has been demanding that

		listed companies take initiative to raise awareness regarding capital costs and aggregate share prices/market prices. In particular, listed companies that have continuously had a PBR of less than one are strongly requested to disclose the details and status of their initiatives, and instead of responding superficially to such demands, the Purchasers believe that listed companies need to proceed with intrinsic initiatives to increase corporate value promptly instead of responding to the request in a superficial manner. In addition, the Purchasers believe that a listed company continuously having a PBR of less than one over the medium and long term means that the market is continuing to send to a "failure notice" to the managers of the listed company.
5	Please inform us of the average cost per share for acquiring the shares of the Company by the Share Purchase Conducted by the Large-scale Purchaser Group so far.	The acquisition prices and the number of held shares were disclosed in the April 7, 2023 change report to the statement of large-volume holdings, and the unit price per share equal to the acquisition prices divided by the number of owned shares is 3,489 yen.
6	The Share Purchase Conducted reduced the liquidity of shares of the Company as well as the number of shareholders, number of negotiable shares, rate of negotiable shares, and market capitalization of negotiable shares of the Company. Considering these situations of the shares of the Company, please inform us of your specific understanding, as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, with respect to (i) effects on an appropriate share price formation function of the shares of the Company in the market, (ii) effects on the investment motivation of potential investors of the Company (institutional investors), and (iii) other effects on the corporate value and shareholders' profits of the Company, caused by the Share Purchase Conducted by the Large-scale Purchasers and Others. In addition, please provide specific details of the reason why you are proceeding to purchase share certificates, etc. of the Company and its true aim, even though liquidity of the shares of the Company will be lost in such a way.	The Company's April 20, 2022 letter to City Index Eleventh states, "At this point in time, on the basis of the statement of large-volume holdings, we do not expect that you will hold 20% or more of our shares, and ask that you do not purchase any more than 20% of our shares"; however, if the Company is concerned about the liquidity of the Company's shares, why did the Company not convey such concerns to the Purchasers by discussing them before the implementation of the Shares Purchase Conducted? In the first place, in the past the Company's shares were diluted when roughly double the number of issued shares held by Abu Dhabi was sold and released into the market, and when convertible bonds were converted. The total number of such shares exceeds the number of the Share Purchase Conducted. At the time of the sale by Abu Dhabi in March 2022, the Company should have prevented the sudden drop of its share price by means of a share buyback, and as for the convertible bonds as well, the Company should have purchased all of them to avoid a capital increase under conditions that were

		extremely unfavorable to existing shareholders at a PBR of one (or less) Further, from the perspective of liquidity, the turnover volume for the one-year period before February 2022 when the Purchasers started purchasing the Company's shares was 1.09 times of the total number of issued shares (using the average number of issued shares at the end of each month), but the turnover volume for the following one-year period was 2.47 times, and it appears that liquidity has risen. In the first place, the share price of the Company is determined by the conduct of market participants, but if the Company implements measures to improve corporate value and the shareholder value of all shareholders, and makes effort to have shareholders and the market correctly understand the same, the Purchasers believe that such measures will be reflected and share prices can be expected to increase. In light of the foregoing, the Purchasers respond as follows. (i) The Purchasers believe that there has been no adverse impact on the function to establish appropriate share prices. Appropriate share prices are decided by the conduct of market participants based on the Company's measures going forward, and the efforts to sincerely explain such measures to its shareholders and the market. (ii) As explained in (iii) below, the share price of the Company has markedly risen since the Purchasers started purchasing them, and because shareholder value is expected to improve from the Purchasers' initiatives with respect to the Company, the Purchasers believe that there has been a positive impact on investors' potential appetite for investment. Please note that as set forth above, demand for the Company's shares has risen following an evaluation of its share price increase measures. The Purchasers believe that the impact is not only from their purchase of the Company shares, but also from the Company actively taking sufficient measures to encourage investments by domestic and overseas institutional

		investors. (iii) The Purchasers' shareholding ratio of the Company shares is roughly 20%, which resulted merely from absorbing Abu Dhabi's holdings, and the Purchasers believe that the Share Purchase Conducted by the Purchasers will have no material impact on corporate value or the interests of shareholders. However, the share price of the Company has markedly risen from the closing market price of 2,577 yen on March 10, 2022, the next business day after the sale by Abu Dhabi was announced, to the closing market price on 4,625 yen on August 10, 2023, the business day before the submission date of the Response, and it is our understanding that the Purchasers' approach to the Company had some impact on such rise in price.
7	Please inform us of the specific reason that you chose the market purchase method for the Share Purchase Conducted (i.e., the reason that you selected the market purchase, even though a TOB and other methods were available). Further, **in the Share Purchase Conducted, as shown by the fact that the Large-scale Purchaser Group increased its holding ratio of share certificates, etc. by 8.28% during a period of only 26 days (17 business days) from March 10, 2022 to April 4, 2022, and increased its holding ratio of share certificates, etc. by 7.64 % during a period of only 80 days (54 business days) from July 26, 2022 to October 13, 2022, the Large-scale Purchaser Group purchased a large amount of the Company's share certificates, etc. during short periods of time both before and after the period in which it had no choice but to suspend the purchase of the Company's share certificates, etc. due to the advance notification procedures pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Act**. Please inform us of your specific understanding in regard to the adverse effects on general shareholders caused by these rapid purchases of the	The Purchasers have no intent to obtain control of the Company, and accordingly, market purchase was selected because it is the most economically rational planned purchase method. Further, as set forth above, the Company's April 20, 2022 letter to City Index Eleventh states, "At this point in time, on the basis of the statement of large-volume holdings, we do not expect that you and others will hold 20% or more of our shares, and ask that you do not purchase any more than 20% of our shares," and there is no guidance from the Company regarding the rapid purchase of the Company's share certificates, etc. mentioned in this question. Please note that since the holding ratio of shares of the Company obtained as a result of the Share Purchase Conducted is approximately 20%, and considering that they were not purchases made to acquire control of the Company or a veto on matters requiring a special resolution in ordinary general meetings of shareholders, the Purchasers do not recognize such purchases as having an adverse effect on general shareholders.

	Company's share certificates, etc. from the market, which were conducted without providing sufficient information.	
8	Please inform us of the specific reason that the Large-scale Purchasers and Others' intention and policy regarding acquisition of the Company's shares have changed significantly during the course of the Share Purchase Conducted, as detailed below. (i) In response to the Company's letter dated April 20, 2022 which requested that City Index Eleventh do not purchase additional shares of the Company in excess of 20%, in a meeting held on April 26, 2022, City Index Eleventh **responded as follows: "Assuming that your company will announce a path to improve your corporate value and shareholder value that is satisfactory to the shareholders, at present, we hereby inform you that we have no plans to acquire 20% or more of your shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis the Company's note: refers to the basis for the holding ratio of share certificates, etc. under the FIEA; the same applies hereinafter."** Thereafter, **in meetings held on May 25 and August 22, 2022, and in a letter dated November 14, 2022, City Index Eleventh and Mr. Murakami** stated that **they had no plan to acquire 20% or more of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis**. (ii) However, **in a meeting on November 18, 2022 between the Company, City Index Eleventh, and Ms. Nomura, after the Large-scale Purchasers and Others came to hold 19.81% of the Company's shares, etc., as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis, Ms. Nomura made a remark to the effect that they desired to hold 30% of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis, which was a**	In the first place, in response to the Company's request that the Purchasers not purchase additional shares of the Company in excess of 20%, the Purchasers, believing the statement of Yamada, the Company's Director and Senior Executive Officer (at that time), that improving corporate value and shareholder value is being discussed, the Purchasers responded as set forth in (i) above "assuming that the Company will announce a path to improve your corporate value and shareholder value that is satisfactory to the shareholders." Since the Purchasers started purchasing the Company's shares in March 2022, with respect to the 60-billion-yen 2022 Euro-Yen convertible bonds with equity-purchase warrants that are maturing in December 2022 ("Convertible Bonds"), the Purchasers proposed to the Company that in light of such good performance results, because the increase in the aggregate number of issued shares from conversion of the Convertible Bonds will not help improve shareholder value, it ought to purchase all of the Convertible Bonds. However, the Purchasers only purchased 24.1 billion yen of the 60 billion yen in the Convertible Bonds. The Purchasers proposed that the Company use the 32 billion yen converted to shares to purchase the Company shares at a price that was temporarily low because of the drop in crude oil prices and other factors because it would lead to an increase in shareholder value for the medium and long term, but the Company did not take any initiative to improve shareholder value. The foregoing is one example where the Company failed to take any serious initiatives to improve shareholder value, and the Company never followed through with the statement that "improving corporate value and shareholder value is being discussed"; thus, the Purchasers had no choice but to conclude that the assumption that "the Company will announce a path to improve your corporate value and shareholder value

	sudden reversal of the intention the Large-scale Purchasers and Others conveyed in their previous remarks and letters. (iii) Thereafter, **in a meeting between the Company, City Index Eleventh, Ms. Nomura, and Mr. Murakami held on November 22, 2022, Mr. Murakami made a remark to the effect that he desired to dispatch an Outside Director to the Company, as well as other remarks.** Further, **in a meeting between the Company, City Index Eleventh, Ms. Nomura, and Mr. Murakami on November 25, 2022, Mr. Murakami made a remark to the effect that they desired to have a person recommended by Mr. Murakami be a Director candidate proposed by the Company at the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders next year (i.e., in 2023), and in exchange they would not acquire 30% of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis. Mr. Murakami went on to make a remark to the effect that not acquiring 20% or more of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis and the dispatch of the Director recommended by Mr. Murakami mentioned above were a "package" deal, and if the Company does not accept the dispatch of the director mentioned above, he would seek to acquire 30% of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis.** (iv) Thereafter, on December 13, 2022, in a meeting between the Company, City Index Eleventh, Ms. Nomura, and Mr. Murakami, Mr. Murakami again stated that City and Other Parties would not acquire 20% or more of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis. However,	that is satisfactory to the shareholders" did not apply, and consequently the Purchasers indicated their intent to purchase 20% or more of the Company's shares.

	on December 27, 2022, in a meeting between the Company, City Index Eleventh, Ms. Nomura, and Mr. Murakami, such policy was again reversed, and instead an intention was expressed to the effect that if the Company did not decide by January 6, 2023 to buy back the shares (8,899,262 shares) allocated for conversion through the exercise of share options concerning the convertible bonds issued by the Company before the Company settles its accounts for the third quarter of fiscal year 2022 ("Share Buy-back"), the Large-scale Purchasers and Others would acquire 20% or more of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis. (v) Thereafter, **on January 6, 2023, in a meeting between the Company, City Index Eleventh, Ms. Nomura, and Mr. Murakami**, the Company told Mr. Murakami that as the appropriateness of the Share Buy-back was related to the Company's medium-term management strategy, the Company planned to explain necessary equity capital in the Medium-Term Management Plan, scheduled to be announced in March 2023, and could not give a definite answer regarding the implementation of the Share Buy-back as of January 6, 2023. In response, **Mr. Murakami made a one-sided announcement that the Large-scale Purchasers and Others would acquire 20% or more of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis as the Share Buy-back was not promised as of the meeting date of January 6, 2023, and expressed an intention that there was no room for discussion regarding this point**.	

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Please provide the specific reason why you chose the Large-scale Purchasers (from the Large-scale Purchaser Group) as the entity of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. In particular, the Statement of Intent states that Minami Aoyama Fudosan will "encourage your company to improve the corporate value and the shareholder value as a shareholder." Please specifically provide the proactive reason why you chose Minami Aoyama Fudosan as the entity of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., even though Minami Aoyama Fudosan (we understand that Mr. Tatsuya Ikeda serves as the Representative Director and there are no other directors other than him) had never been involved in previous discussions between the Company and the Large-scale Purchasers and Others (discussions had been conducted between City Index Eleventh, Mr. Nomura, and Mr. Murakami).	Minami Aoyama Fudosan made joint investments with City Index Eleventh and Ms. Nomura in the past, and as a result of the consultation between purchasers, it was deemed desirable for Minami Aoyama Fudosan and Ms. Nomura to be the entity to make the Purchase. Except for the responses above, the Purchasers do not believe that it is necessary information for the shareholders' decision.
2	If the Large-scale Purchasers conduct the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., the liquidity of shares of the Company will decrease, as will the number of shareholders, number of negotiable shares, rate of negotiable shares, and market capitalization of negotiable shares of the Company. Considering these circumstances of the shares of the Company, please inform us of your specific understanding, as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, with respect to (i) effects on an appropriate share price formation function of the shares of the Company in the market, (ii) effects on the investment motivation of potential investors of the Company (institutional investors), and (iii) other effects on the Company's corporate value and shareholders' profits of the Company, caused by the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. by the Large-scale Purchasers. In addition, please provide specific details of the reason why you desire to conduct the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. and its true aim, even though liquidity of the shares of the Company will be lost in such a way.	Please see the response in 6. of **Part 2**. If the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. are carried out by the purchaser and even if a purchase is made for the purchase ceiling of 4 million shares, the ratio of increase in voting rights will be just 4.5%, which is below the rate of increase in the number of issued shares resulting from the conversion of convertible bonds that was brought about by the Company.
3	If the Large-scale Purchasers conduct the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. as	We cannot make a definitive statement about the share price; but if the senior

	indicated above and the liquidity of shares of the Company decreases, as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, please inform us how and to what extent you expect the share price to increase in the future and the effects on the profits of the Company's general shareholders, as well as the basis therefor.	management of the Company starts to listen to what the Purchasers have to say, sincerely learns from the mistakes of paying little attention to the shareholders and leaving the share price low, and begins to endeavor to enhance shareholder value, we believe it will serve the shareholder interests, and this will in turn have a positive impact on the share price.
4	Please provide specific details of whether you might make a proposal or provide advice to the Company on management of the Company after the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., and what types of proposals or advice you may make or provide when what type of event occurs or what types of conditions are met.	Please see our response in 17 of **Part 7** below.
5	Please inform us of the period when you started considering the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. in detail and the results thereof, the reason that you determined that you might conduct the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. and the background and period thereof, and the facts serving as the basis for making such determination.	After the Company's Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, the Purchasers engaged in a dialogue with the Company about measures for enhancing shareholder value. On June 29, the Purchasers made a "certain proposal" to the Company designed to help enhance shareholder value for all shareholders. On July 7, the Company responded that, after the matter was discussed by its Directors, the Company wanted to be in contact with the relevant party in the proposal. However, no specific progress was made subsequently, and in a letter dated July 14, the Purchasers informed the Company that, if the Company did not have any concrete measures for enhancing shareholder value, given that the Company's share price was left undervalued, the Purchasers intended to submit the Statement of Intent.
6	Please provide the specific reason why you chose now, which is immediately after the Shareholder Proposal was rejected by a wide margin in the 2023 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, in order to implement the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.. In addition, **before the 2023 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, we understand that the Large-scale Purchasers and Mr. Murakami did not state at all to commence the process for the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., immediately after termination of the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders**. Please	As answered in 5. above.

	provide the specific reason why you did not state the intention to commence the process for the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., before the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders.	
7	Please inform us of the specific reason why you indicated the method of purchase in and outside the market as the purchasing method (the reason why you indicated the purchase in and outside the market, even though there were TOB and other methods).	The purchaser does not anticipate to acquire control of the Company through the Purchase, nor does it plan to acquire over one-third, which would require a tender offer/TOB, and so there is no economic rationale for choosing a TOB (in terms of information disclosure to shareholders, the responses in this Information List provide a wider range of information than required in a TOB).
8	**In the Statement of Intent, regarding the planned number of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., it is stated that you intend to acquire 24.56% of the shares as the voting rights ratio; however, considering the ratio of voting rights exercised at the Company, the planned number of purchases is sufficient to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution by a small number of shareholders acting in cooperation with one another at the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders and there will be a structural coercion in the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.** (if the shareholders of the Company think that the corporate value of the Company will be lost under the strong influence of the Large-scale Purchaser Group, rather than remaining a minority shareholder of such a company, they may be forced to consider immediately selling their shares of the Company in the market). While the Large-scale Purchasers stated "there is no coercion in purchase by the Company and others" in the Statement of Intent (we understand that such statement is related to the Share Purchase Conducted), there are no statements in the Statement of Intent about your understanding of the structural coercion related to the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. that may be conducted in the future. In regard to this point, please inform us why you made no statements about the coercion related to the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. and of your specific	As set forth in the Statement of Intent, the number of shares to be purchased in the Purchase is capped at 4 million shares. Even if our Purchase reaches the ceiling of 4 million shares, the number of shares held by the Purchasers would total, in this case, 21.68 million shares for a voting rights ratio of 24.56%, far short of one-third, the threshold triggering a mandatory tender offer and the ratio granting veto rights to special resolutions at shareholders meetings. Based on the fact that the ratio of voting rights exercised was about 87.5% at the Company's Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, the ratio of the Purchasers' voting rights at the Company's shareholders meetings would come only to 28.1% (24.56% ÷ 87.5% = 28.1%), meaning it would remain a far cry from veto rights for special resolutions at the Company's shareholders meetings. This makes it clear that there is absolutely no room for coerciveness that would justify MoM resolutions when voting on the Purchase at the Company's meetings for confirming intentions of the shareholders on takeover defense measures ("Takeover Defense Measures"). The Company states, "the planned number of purchases is sufficient to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution by a small number of shareholders acting in cooperation with one another at the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders and there will be a structural coercion in the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.," but this

	understanding as the Large-scale Purchaser Group in regard to the above structural coercion. In addition, please inform us of measures that the Large-scale Purchaser Group is taking or plans to take in order to avoid or mitigate such coercion.	assertion has no factual or legal grounds and is entirely incorrect. The Purchase is not aimed at a so-called corporate acquisition or acquisition of control through obtainment of a majority of voting rights. As discussed earlier, given that the price of shares of the Company has been left undervalued by the Company's senior management who prefer self-protection to the improvement of shareholder value, the Purchase has a reasonable purpose of pure investment, and at concurrently its purpose also is to encourage the Company to improve shareholder value. The Company asserts that the Purchasers might erode its corporate value; but in the first place, no shareholder would want to erode the corporate value of a company in which the shareholder holds a large number of shares.
9	Please inform us, if the Large-scale Purchaser Group increases the voting rights ratio in the Company to 24.56% through the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., whether it will contribute to the medium- to long-term the Company's corporate value, particularly a continuous increase in profits of general shareholders of the Company. In addition, if you understand that it will contribute to the medium- to long-term the Company's corporate value and continuous profits of general shareholders of the Company, please provide the specific basis therefor.	The Purchasers plans to improve the corporate value and all shareholder value. However, since the price of shares of the Company has been left undervalued by the Company's senior management who prefer self-protection to the improvement of shareholder value, we intend to acquire shares of the Company. Then, the purchaser will continue to ask the Company's management to continuously improve the profit of all shareholders of the Company.
10	**Is it correct that there is no possibility that the Large-scale Purchaser Group will purchase additional share certificates, etc. of the Company exceeding 24.56% of the shares as the voting rights ratio, which you expect to acquire in the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.** If there is such a possibility, please explain specifically when what type of event occurs or what types of conditions are met, you will start purchasing the share certificates, etc. of the Company exceeding 24.56% as the voting rights ratio.	Since the purchase period of the Purchase will not end until one year after the submission of the Statement of Intent, nothing has been determined at this time. If we intend to acquire additional shares of the Company after the completion of the purchase period, it would be acceptable for the Company to re-confirm the intentions of shareholders regarding whether the additional acquisition is appropriate, if necessary at the time.
11	If the Company proceeds with the process for confirming intentions of the shareholders of the Company, please answer whether the Large-scale Purchasers intend to cooperate with the process. For example, if the Company submits a	If a resolution of a General Meeting of Shareholders for confirming shareholders' intentions about triggering takeover defense measures for the Purchase is approved in an ordinary resolution that is not an MoM resolution, the purchaser will not carry out

	proposal on the appropriateness of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. to the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders and the proposal for opposing the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. and requesting that the Large-scale Purchasers suspend it is approved in the in the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, please answer whether the Large-scale Purchasers intend to suspend the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. in accordance with a resolution of the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders.	the Purchase. If the above resolution was made as a MoM resolution, and if it is approved as a MoM resolution but rejected as an ordinary resolution (not MoM resolution), the purchaser intends to file a petition for provisional injunction against share option gratis allocation under takeover defense measures ("Triggering of Takeover Defense Measures" to seek a court judgment on the validity and appropriateness of the MoM resolution. If the foregoing petition for provisional injunction against the Triggering of Takeover Defense Measures is not approved, the purchaser will not carry out the Purchase.
12	Please provide specific details of transactions (including transactions within the Large-scale Purchaser Group) related to the share certificates, etc. of the Company (timing, counterparty, method, and prices, etc. of transactions) that the Large-scale Purchaser Group has conducted.	The Purchasers have acquired Company shares primarily in and outside of the market. The Purchasers have also purchased convertible bonds issued by the Company and acquired Company shares by exercising the conversion rights, as well as acquired Company shares outside the market through block trades. We have disclosed any information required under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in our statement of large-volume holdings and the relevant change reports, so please see them for details.
13	If 12., 13., or 14. of **Part 1.** above applies to you, please provide specific details of what types of experience you have with which company, and how the experience will be useful for which part of management of the Company.	The Purchasers do possess knowledge and experience regarding the general theory of company management, but our purpose is not to obtain the majority of the Company's voting rights nor do we plan to acquire management rights of the Company. Accordingly, the Purchasers intend to continue providing support and advice, as a shareholder of the Company, to the Company's senior management. We would like to provide an outline of efforts on Mr. Murakami's part for the management integration between leading oil wholesaler Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. ("Idemitsu") and Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K. ("Showa Shell"). The two companies began discussing in July 2015 a management integration, but due to opposition by Idemitsu's founding family, a large shareholder, the management of Idemitsu and the founding family ended up suspending relations at one point. In the fall of 2017,

		Mr. Murakami was approached by a business leader who is close to the founding family, asking him to provide advice to the founding family. Mr. Murakami, having engaged in the oil industry for about two years during his time at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and having been acutely aware that overcrowding of oil wholesalers had led to oversupplies of oil products, which in turn had resulted in issues such as excess inventories being sold as no-brand products, started making contact with Idemitsu management in around February 2018 and served as a bridge between the founding family and management. Subsequently, thanks to Mr. Murakami's serving as the bridge, on July 10, 2018, Idemitsu and Showa Shell formally announced their integration agreement, and then-Chairman Takashi Tsukioka of Idemitsu told a news conference: "Mr. Murakami, a renowned investor, served as a consultant for the founding family and, from a fair perspective, advised them on the need for the integration for enhancement of the common interests of all stakeholders, including the founding family, and this helped improve our company's relations with the founding family. We thank Mr. Murakami for his selfless efforts," in an unusual expression of gratitude.
14	Please provide specific details of regulations under the Foreign Exchange Act or other Laws that may apply to implementation of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., approval or permit under the Antimonopoly Act or other Laws that should be acquired from a government or a third party in and outside the country, and the status of acquisition, implementation, or compliance therewith.	We recognize that as regulations applicable to the Purchase, prior filing under the Foreign Exchange Act is necessary, and we will carry out such prior filing as necessary. Naturally, if there are any other applicable regulations, the Purchaser intends to comply with such laws and regulations, and if the Company has any concerns, please let us know in concrete terms.
15	If you recognize the possibility of maintaining a permit in and outside the country necessary for management of the Company's group after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. and the possibility of regulatory compliance with various Laws in and outside the country, please provide specific details.	The Purchasers do not recognize that completion of the Purchase would have any impact on the ability to maintain permits in and outside the country necessary for management of the Company or the ability for regulatory compliance in and outside the country. If the Company has any concerns, please let us know in concrete terms.
16	Please provide us with an overview of investment banks, securities companies, or other	The Purchasers are individuals and private companies who are not required to disclose

	financial institutions with which the Large-scale Purchasers and Others have executed an advisory agreement for the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., and other advisors that lawyers, accountants and tax accountants, PR agencies, and other Advisers that the Large-scale Purchasers and Others have employed for the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (including the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, and name of the representative), respectively.	details of any advisory agreements, and we do not believe such information is necessary for shareholder decision-making. Meanwhile, we believe the Company has retained advisors for the inappropriate MoM resolution at the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders and for this Information List, paying a large amount of expenses to these advisors. The Company is a publicly traded company, whose shareholders have entrusted management to [the Board of Directors]. The large amount of expenses required for this comes from shareholders' equity. Please promptly disclose an overview of these expenses.
17	Please provide details on the purpose and future policy for holding share certificates, etc. of the Company that are already held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group and/or those to be acquired via the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. In addition, if there is a possibility of disposing of such share certificates, please inform us of the presently expected purpose, timing, transaction conditions (including the expected disposal price), number of shares, counterparty (including whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group may cause the Company or its major shareholders or management etc. to acquire such share certificates, etc.), and method. In particular, if there is a possibility of causing the Company or its major shareholders or management, etc. to acquire those share certificates, etc. of the Company, please inform us of the specific method (whether via a TOB by an issuer or ToSTNeT-2/3, etc.), the expected acquisition price, and the number of share certificates, etc. of the Company to be acquired, and if the Company or its major shareholders or management, etc. decline, other methods to gain a return on investment and the details thereof, as well as their economic rationality, feasibility, timing, etc.	The purpose of shareholding is investment as well as to provide advice or make material proposals to management depending on the situation. The Purchasers aim to enhance the Company's corporate value and the shareholder value of all shareholders. We believe public companies have a duty to enhance business competitiveness and asset efficiency to increase the ROE, and to thereby sustainably improve their share price. We will support the Company if, as a management decision of the management team, the Company implements appropriate measures for sustainably enhancing the Company's corporate value and the shareholder value. At this point in time, the Purchasers have not made any decision about sale of the Company shares; but if and when the Company's PBR goes above one or there are other developments that enable us to determine that the Company's shareholder value has improved sufficiently, we expect to consider a sale.

Part 4. Basis for Calculation of Prices of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., and Financial Support

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	For implementation of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., please inform us specifically what the Large-scale Purchasers think about the range of prices of the shares of the Company per share for purchase (the share prices with which you may conduct purchases in transactions in the market). In addition, please inform us specifically of the basis for calculation of such a range and the background of calculation (including facts and assumptions on which the calculation is based, calculation method, calculation agent and information on the calculation agent, numerical information used in calculation, the amounts of synergies and dis-synergies expected to arise from a series of transactions in connection with the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., and basis for the calculation).	The purchase prices are market prices at the time of each purchase or comparative prices, and there is no particular basis for calculation; but the Purchase is planned because the Company's management has left the share price undervalued, and we believe we will make the Purchase at the price range deemed undervalued due to the Company's PBR being less than one, etc. Even if the Purchase reaches the upper limit of 4 million shares, the Purchasers' total voting rights will amount to no higher than 24.56% and no control of the Company will be obtained, we do not expect synergies or dis-synergies to arise from the Purchase.
2	If part or all of the funds pertaining to the Share Purchase Conducted and the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., are funds on hand of individuals, funds, corporations, unions, or other organizations of the Large-scale Purchaser Group, please provide specific details regarding the funds on hand (including the name of the owner of the funds and ownership form, the amount of funds, the ratio of funds on hand and external funds). In addition, please present materials indicating that you have these funds on hand.	The Purchase will be made using the purchaser's own funds (including funds of the purchaser's group companies). We believe that it is clear only by reference to the shares held that were disclosed by the purchaser and its group companies in the statement of large-volume holdings and its change report that funds necessary and sufficient for the Purchase can be prepared.
3	If part or all of the funds of the purchase pertaining to the Share Purchase Conducted and the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., are external funds, please inform us specifically of the external funds (including the specific name of the provider of the funds (whether directly or indirectly and including the substantial provider) and capital structure; and if there is an entity essentially controlling the fund provider, provide an overview of the entity (including details of the manner of control of the fund provider, the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, investee, the ratio of the investment in the investee, name of the	The funds for the purchase pertaining to the Share Purchase Conducted and the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. are as described in 2. above, and are not external funds.

	representative, and History for the past ten years), the procurement method, the procurement amount, conditions for the fund provision, and security after the provision of funds, or whether there are commitments, and details thereof, as well as details of related transactions). In addition, please present materials indicating that you can receive the funds.	

Part 5. Communication with Third Parties

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	For the Share Purchase Conducted, please inform us whether there were prior discussions or other communication (including communication related to conducting an Act of Making Important Suggestions, etc., defined in Article 27-26, paragraph (1) of the FIEA to the Company) with a third party other than the Company and the Large-scale Purchaser Group (including competitors of the Company); and if there was communication, the specific form, details, and overview of the third party (including the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, and name of the representative).	N/A
2	For the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., please inform us whether there were prior discussions or other communication (including communication related to conducting an Act of Making Important Suggestions, etc., defined in Article 27-26, paragraph (1) of the FIEA to the Company) with a third party other than the Company and the Large-scale Purchaser Group (including competitors of the Company); and if there was communication, the specific form, details, and overview of the third party (including the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, and name of the representative).	N/A

Part 6. Contracts Related to Shares of the Company Owned or Planned to Be Obtained by the Large-scale Purchaser Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Regarding the lease contract, security contract, repurchase contract, purchase-sale reservation, and other important contract or arrangement, or other agreement (including by oral means; "Security Contract, etc.") which the Large-scale Purchaser Group has currently executed or executed in relation to share certificates, etc. of the Company, please provide an overview of counterparties of the Security Contract, etc. (including the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, and name of the representative) and details thereof, and the number of share certificates, etc. of the Company subject to the Security Contract, etc.	There are no agreements other than the agreement for joint purchases and joint exercise of voting rights between the joint holders set forth in the large-volume holdings statements and the relevant change reports.
2	If there are Security Contracts, etc. that the Large-scale Purchaser Group plans to execute in relation to share certificates, etc. of the Company that the group plans to obtain for the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., please provide us with an overview of the counterparties of the Security Contract, etc. (including the specific name, address, governing law for incorporation, capital structure, and name of the representative) and details thereof, and the number of share certificates, etc. of the Company subject to the Security Contract, etc.	N/A

Part 7. Management Policy, Business Plan, Capital Policy, and Dividend Policy of the Company and the Company's Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Please inform us whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group intends to participate in the business management of the Company; and if it does, please inform us of the details and the policy.	It is not clear what "participate in the business management" specifically means, but the purpose of the Purchase is not to acquire a majority of the Company's voting rights, and the Purchasers do not intend to acquire management control of the Company.
2	The Large-scale Purchasers stated "we have not determined anything about making a	We have not determined specific cases where we would make a proposal for appointing

	proposal for appointing officers at present" in the Statement of Intent; however, considering the results of 2023 General Meeting of Shareholders, whether you might make a proposal for dispatching directors and other officers to the Company and the possibility of dispatching of officers in the future is reserved by stating "at present." Please inform us specifically what type of event may cause you to make a proposal to dispatch officers in the future. In addition, please specifically inform us of the specific purpose when dispatching officers.	officers, but we imagine that making an officer appointment proposal if we determine that doing so would be an appropriate step to take in correcting governance issues at the Company.
3	Please provide specific details of the contemplated management policy, business plan, financial plan, fund plan, investment plan, capital policy, and dividend policy of the Company and the Company's group after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (including plans related to business of the Company, sale of assets, provision of security, and other disposition after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.), customers, business partners, officers, employees of the Company and the Company's group after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., local governments in which real property or manufacturing and production facilities operated and managed by the Company are located, and other treatment policy of stakeholders of the Company.	the purchasers do not plan to acquire the Company's management control through the Large-scale Purchase.
4	In relation to 3. above, there are no statements in the Statement of Intent about expected "management policy, business plan, financial plan, capital policy, dividend policy, asset utilization policy of the Company and the Company's group companies" after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. Considering the ratio of voting rights exercised at the Company, the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. are sufficient to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution by a small number of shareholders acting in cooperation with one another at the Company's ordinary general meeting of shareholders. Needless to say, if the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is to encourage the Company to	As discussed previously, the Company's assertion that "Considering the ratio of voting rights exercised at the Company, the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. are sufficient to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution by a small number of shareholders acting in cooperation with one another at the Company's ordinary general meeting of shareholders" has no factual or legal grounds and is incorrect, and thus this question is lacking in its premise; the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase is not to acquire a majority of the Company's voting rights, and the Purchasers do not intend to acquire management control of the Company. As stated already, we do not recognize that the ratio of voting rights after completion of the Large-scale Purchase

	improve the corporate value and the shareholder value as a shareholder, you should offer an opinion about the above items proactively; moreover, if there are any planned matters, you should disclose them from the perspective of providing sufficient information to the general shareholders. However, considering that there are no statements about each of the above items, would it be possible to understand that you have never considered the above items? If you have considered them, please provide the specific reason why you did not state the details in the Statement of Intent and the details of the consideration.	Actions would be a level "sufficient to have a substantial veto." With respect to the "management policy, business plan, financial plan, capital policy, dividend policy, asset utilization policy of the Company and the Company's group companies," the Purchasers will still have no right to determine the foregoing after the Purchase. In general, there have been no changes to the Purchasers' relevant proposals for improving the corporate value and the shareholder value from what has been communicated in the letters from City Index Eleventh and the press releases.
5	In relation to 3. above, in regard to "whether there are any changes in the relationship between stakeholders, such as customers, business partners, and employees of the Company and the Company's group companies and the Company and the Company's group companies after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., as well as details thereof," the Large-scale Purchasers just stated in the Statement of Intent that "since the voting rights ratio will remain 24.56% in total, we cannot make the above changes only at the discretion of us [the Company's note: refers to Minami Aoyama Fudosan and Mr. Nomura and their specially related parties]" even after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., but we are not requesting such description on the assumption that the above items will be definitely achieved after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. In addition, considering the ratio of voting rights exercised at the Company, the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. are sufficient to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution by a small number of shareholders acting in cooperation with one another at the Company's ordinary general meeting of shareholders. Needless to say, if the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is to encourage the Company to improve the corporate value and the shareholder value as a shareholder, you should proactively explain the above items from the perspective of providing sufficient information to the general	As we have repeatedly stated, the Company's assertion that "the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. are sufficient to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution by a small number of shareholders acting in cooperation with one another at the Company's ordinary general meeting of shareholders" has no factual or legal grounds and is incorrect, and thus this question lacks a premise, and we do not have plans to call for any particular changes in the relationship between stakeholders, such as customers, business partners, and employees of the Company and the Company's group companies and the Company and the Company's group companies (however, there is a possibility that implementation of the proposals in 4. of **Part 3**. and in 17. of **Part 7** would result in changes in conjunction with these).

	shareholders; therefore, after due consideration, please inform us of the expected details from the perspective of providing sufficient information to the general shareholders (apart from certainty of final changes) (if you do not explain, please provide the specific reason thereof).	
6	In relation to **Part 2.**, 8. above, in a meeting between the Company and City Index Eleventh, Ms. Nomura, and Mr. Murakami held on January 6, 2023, regarding shares (8,899,262 shares) allocated through the exercise of share options concerning the Convertible Bonds issued by the Company, the Company informed Mr. Murakami that as the appropriateness of the share buy-back before the Company settles its accounts for the third quarter of fiscal year 2022 (i.e., Share Buy-back) was related to the Company's medium-term management strategy, the Company planned to explain the necessary equity capital in the Medium-Term Management Plan, scheduled to be announced in March 2023, and could not provide a definitive answer regarding implementation of the Share Buy-back as of January 6, 2023. In response, Mr. Murakami made a one-sided announcement that City and Other Parties would acquire 20% or more of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis as the Share Buy-back was not promised as of the meeting date of January 6, 2023, and expressed the intention that there was no room for discussion regarding this point. However, considering the declaration and the intention made contrary to the Company's opinion, it seems that the Large-scale Purchasers' true aim of conducting up to 24.56% of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. as the voting right ratio, as described in the Statement of Intent is to have the Company conduct a large-scale share buy-back this time (and enjoyment of associated tax benefits). Please specifically inform us of your opinion about this point. If it is not true, please inform us specifically of your opinion about the relationship and consistency between the above declaration and intention and the purpose related to the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., which encourages the	With regard to the Share Buy-back, as you stated in your question, only the "shares (8,899,262 shares) allocated through the exercise of share options concerning the Convertible Bonds" ended up being a substantially unnecessary capital increase, and with the share price remaining at a level where the PBR is less than one, we proposed that it would be appropriate to buy back the increased portion of shares, and that is our understanding. In addition, the Purchasers have explained that we do not intend to sell our holdings as part of the Share Buy-back. We certainly explained this point orally in our meeting on December 27, 2022. In light of the foregoing, your conclusion (as included in your question) that the "true aim of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is to have the Company conduct a large-scale share buy-back (and enjoyment of associated tax benefits)" is merely a one-sided speculation without logical bases and is not a fact. The purpose of the Purchase, as stated earlier, is a logical one as pure investment because the Company's share price has been left undervalued by the Company's senior management, who prefer self-protection to the improvement of shareholder value. It is also to urge the Company to improve shareholder value. As we answered in 8. of **Part 2**, the reason that the Purchasers indicated an intention to acquire 20% or more of the Company shares is this: in the first place, after the Company requested that we refrain from purchasing 20% or more of the Company shares, the Purchasers believed the words of then-Director and Senior Executive Officer of the Company, Mr. Yamada, that serious discussions were being made about improving corporate value and shareholder value, and thus did not acquire 20% or more of the Company shares "on the condition that going forward the Company will release

	Company to improve the corporate value and the shareholder value as a shareholder, as described in the Statement of Intent.	a roadmap for improving corporate value and shareholder value that makes sense to many shareholders," however, the Company's remark that "serious discussions were being made about improving corporate value and shareholder value" was not borne out, as exemplified by the failure to implement the Share Buy-back, and we were forced to determine, that the premise of "releasing a roadmap for improving corporate value and shareholder value that makes sense to many shareholders", as described by the Purchasers, would not hold true, and this was the cause. Accordingly, the purpose of the Purchase is consistent.
7	Although the Statement of Intent does not mention that, As the Large-scale Purchaser Group, please provide specific details of the source of the Company's corporate value and what measures you should take in order to improve the Company's corporate value in the medium- to long-term. In addition, please inform us whether you recognize if there will be any change in the Company's corporate value and the source thereof before and after the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. If you recognize that, please provide specific details of your recognition and details of the relevant measures planned to be taken within the Large-scale Purchaser Group.	This is not limited to the Company; we believe the source of corporate value comes from synergies of business resources (including intangible assets, nonfinancial resources and unquantifiable ones) and the ways in which such resources are used (in other words, the steering of business), and think that measures that should be taken to improve the Company's corporate value and shareholder value in the medium- to long-term are a review of "the ways in which such resources are used (in other words, the steering of business)." The increase in the Purchasers' voting rights ratio resulting from the Purchase will increase the Purchasers' influence on the Company by that much, so we think we can further contribute to the efforts to improve the Company's corporate value and shareholder value. However, as discussed earlier, even if the Purchase reaches the upper limit of 4 million shares, the Purchasers' voting rights ratio will not be higher than 24.56%, and the Purchasers will not obtain any right to make decisions or veto matters pertaining to the Company's management.
8	Please inform us specifically about the Large-scale Purchaser Group's opinion on the future outlook of the industry related to the Company's business and positioning of the Company in the industry.	The opinion is as set forth in City Index Eleventh's past letters and press releases pertaining to the Company. Please refer, in particular, to the May 15 press release.
9	Based on the understanding in 8. above, please inform us specifically of your opinion about future demand and trends in the market of the industry related to the Company's	The opinion is as set forth in City Index Eleventh's past letters and press releases pertaining to the Company. Please refer, in particular, to the May 15 press release.

	business and positioning of the Company in the industry (e.g., comparison with competitors) as well as the direction of management that the Company should take in the future.	
10	Mr. Murakami asked the acquisition of the shares of investees of the Large-scale Purchaser Group previously. If you, as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, intend to ask the Company to purchase shares, assets, or the like that you hold, please provide specific details of what type of shares, assets, or the like, and the applicable conditions.	We only made a statement to the effect that, if the Company would like to acquire shares of Fuji Oil for industry reorganization, we would consider transferring shares of Fuji Oil to the Company; describing it as "approaching with a request to acquire the shares of investees of the Large-scale Purchaser Group" is distortion of facts. If the company wishes to make a similar acquisition, we will consider the request sincerely, so long as it would contribute to improvement in the Company's corporate value and shareholder value.
11	Please provide specific details of the recognition and evaluation of the capital policy of the Company, and the capital policy of the Company you consider appropriate; and if such capital policy is adopted, impact on the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value.	We believe that the first step is for you to sincerely consider and release shareholder value-improvement measures that will correct the current situation of the PBR of less than one. The thinking of the Purchasers is as set forth in the past letters and press releases. Please refer in particular to the May 15 press release. We would like the Company to provide a sufficient explanation that is satisfactory to shareholders in regards to your handling of the Share Buy-back in 6. of **Part 7** and the basis for the 600 billion yen in necessary capital indicated in your Seventh7th Medium-Term Management Plan.
12	Please provide specific details of the recognition and evaluation of the dividend policy of the Company, and the dividend policy of the Company you consider appropriate; and if such dividend policy is adopted, impact on the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value.	According to page 5 of the Company's fiscal 2022 financial statement information material, the Company has set as its fiscal 2023 shareholder return policy, "a total payout ratio (excluding any impact from inventory valuation) of 60% or higher (over three years)" and "dividends of at least 200 yen/share", and in the "Notice Regarding Revision of Policy on Shareholder Returns and Revision of Dividend Forecast" dated August 10, 2023, the Company announced an increase in the dividends to "at least 250 yen/share," but it is clear that, in light of the fiscal 2023 earnings forecast that the Company has released, such dividends alone still will not bring the fiscal 2023 total

		payout ratio to 60%. Until the Company provides a specific policy regarding this point, it would not be effective to provide our evaluation or proposals at this point. The Purchasers intend to call on the Company to ensure that it will achieve, at the least, the total payout ratio that it committed to shareholders.
13	Please provide specific details of the recognition and evaluation of the asset utilization policy of the Company, and the asset utilization policy of the Company you consider appropriate; and if such asset utilization policy is adopted, impact on the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value.	If the "asset" in your question includes shares of group subsidiaries, our recognition pertaining to shares of Cosmo Eco Power is as set forth in the past letters and press releases. Please refer in particular to the press release dated April 21 and one dated May 15.
14	Please provide specific details of the future policy for exercise of voting rights by the Large-scale Purchaser Group in the Company's ordinary shareholders meeting (including details of the standard of exercise of voting rights) and other policy for exercise of the right as the shareholder.	We will sincerely deliberate every single resolution. Our decisions will be made based on whether a resolution will contribute to the improvement of corporate value and the improvement of shareholder value for all shareholders.
15	Please provide specific information on whether, after conducting the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., you may request that the Company convene an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders, and if so, whether you will submit a proposal to replace the Company's Board of Directors, or a proposal related to the implementation of a large-scale share buy-back.	We have no plans to do so at this point in time, and even if the Purchase is carried out to the upper limit, our voting rights ratio will not reach the level that would enable replacement of the Company's Board of Directors.
16	After conducting the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., please inform us whether you expect any changes in the ratio of investment by the Large-scale Purchaser Group in the Company, management system, such as division of roles between the Large-scale Purchaser Group and the Company, the decision-making method, business operation policies. If you expect that, please inform us specifically how you will change them when what type of event occurs or what types of conditions are met.	No such changes are anticipated at this point.
17	Regarding the Company, please inform us whether you might make a proposal or provide advice or exercise your influence (including exercise of the right to request purchase of shares) related to capital increase or decrease, merger, business transfer or	At this point, we believe the following possibilities (i) to (vi) are feasible. (i) A proposal to make Cosmo Eco Power Co., Ltd. independent from the Company by taking advantage of the tax benefits of spin-offs (i.e., all shares

	purchase, share exchange or share transfer, company split, or other similar actions, transactions (such as disposition or acquisition of important assets) if there is such a possibility, please provide us with the specific details thereof.	of a subsidiary are allocated to existing its shareholders in the form of dividends in kind) and be newly listed; (ii) A proposal regarding the refineries held by the Company, after thoroughly surveying as to which refineries have competitiveness, a proposal of course of actions, including closure of refineries or consolidation with refineries held by competitors in the industry, and its milestone should be publicly announced; (iii) A proposal if it can be determined that proceeding with the consolidation and abolition of refineries by becoming a part of ENEOS Corporation or Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. or transferring all or part of its refineries would not only be beneficial to the Company but also contribute to the stabilization and optimization of energy supply in Japan; (iv) Proposal to become a part of ENEOS Corporation or Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd., if it can be determined that there is a possibility that it will be necessary to convert the business structure, such as by effectively using the land and facilities of the Company's refineries not only as supply bases for petroleum products but also as supply bases for hydrogen, ammonia, etc. as alternative energy in the future and that there is a possibility that with respect thereto, ownership and management by ENEOS Corporation, Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd., or any other third party other than the Company (a domestic corporation is assumed) would contribute to improvement of the Company's corporate value and stabilization and optimization of the supply of energy in Japan (v) With respect to examination of the feasibility of a portfolio overhaul and business format switch (business structure overhaul in which the Company's refinery land and equipment will be used not only for oil products but as

		supply bases for hydrogen and ammonia as alternative energy), a proposal to set quantitative numerical targets while securing stable profits as a public company; and (vi) A proposal for business transfer, etc. if it can be determined that, regarding a project related to oil exploration & production conducted by the Company through its business companies, ownership and management thereof by a company other than the Company (a domestic corporation is assumed) would contribute to the Company's corporate value and the efficiency of the industry as a whole, eventually Japan's national interests and stabilization and optimization of the supply of energy to Japanese people.

Part 8. Policy regarding the treatment and other conditions of employees, labor unions, business partners, customers, local communities, and other stakeholders of the Company after the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Please inform us whether as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, you intend to respect the interests and intentions of the Company's employees, and if 'yes,' please provide specific details thereof.	Public companies, as organizations of society, owe duties to all stakeholders, including employees, customers, transaction partners, business partners and shareholders. The Company's senior management must respect the interests and intentions of the Company's employees, and similarly, the Purchasers also plan to respect such interests.
2	Please inform us whether as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, you might request the change of working environment of the Company's employees; and if you might request such a change, please provide specific details of what type of change you may request when what type of event occurs or what types of conditions are met and the reason therefor.	We have no such intention.

3	Please inform us whether as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, you intend to respect the interests and intentions of the Company and the Company's current and future business partners and customers, and if 'yes,' please provide specific details thereof.	Naturally, the Purchasers intend to respect the interests and intentions of the Company and those of the Company's current and future transaction partners and customers. Public companies, as organizations of society, owe duties to all stakeholders, including employees, customers, transaction partners, business partners and shareholders. We will urge the Company's management to respect the interests and intentions of its transaction partners and customers.
4	Please inform us whether as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, you might request the change of relationship between the Company and the Company's affiliated companies' business partners or customers; and if you might request such a change, please provide specific details of what type of change you may request when what type of event occurs or what types of conditions are met and the reason therefor.	We have no such intention.
5	Please inform us specifically whether you might propose that the Company reduce the number of the Company's employees (including the reductions associated with the sale of the business; the same shall apply hereinafter), and if what type of event occurs, whether you may propose to reduce the number of the Company's employees.	We have no such intention. The purchasers will request that the management team of the Company ensure stable employment of employees.

Part 9. Specific measures to avoid conflicts of interest with other shareholders of the Company

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Please inform us whether as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, you intend to respect the interests and intentions of the Company's general shareholders other than the Large-scale Purchaser Group, and if 'yes,' please provide specific details thereof.	The Purchasers fully respect the Company's all shareholders' interests and their will. With regard to the inquiry "specific details thereof", which response do you expect? The Purchasers cannot understand the purpose of this inquiry.

Part 10. Investment activities by Mr. Murakami and the companies, etc. over which he exercises influence

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses

1	Regarding the past investment behavior of Mr. Murakami and the companies, etc. over which he exercises influence in (1) Accordia Golf Co., Ltd. (“Accordia”), (2) MCJ Co., Ltd. (“MCJ”), (3) Kuroda Electric Co., Ltd. (“Kuroda Electric”), (4) Yorozu Corporation (“Yorozu”), (5) Sanshin Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Sanshin Electronics”), (6) Excel Co., Ltd., (7) Leopalace21 Corporation (“Leopalace21”), (8) KOSAIDO Holdings Co., Ltd. (formerly KOSAIDO Co., Ltd.), (9) Toei Reefer Line Ltd., (10) Central Glass Co., Ltd. (“Central Glass”), (11) Restar Holdings Corporation (formerly UKC Holdings Corporation), (12) ShinMaywa Industries, Ltd. (“ShinMaywa Industries”), (13) Shibaura Machine Co., Ltd. (formerly Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd.), (14) Hoosiers Holdings Co., Ltd. (“Hoosiers”), (15) Daiho Corporation (“Daiho”), (16) Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd., and (17) JAFCO Group Co., Ltd. (“JAFCO”), please provide individually and specifically the reasons why you decided each of these investees (including specific details of investment criteria of the Large-scale Purchaser Group), when you started the share acquisition, the purpose of the share acquisition, the investment policy, the investment recovery method and investment recovery period that was initially assumed or currently assumed, the actual investment recovery method and investment recovery period, the specific details of the activities that contribute to the improvement of the corporate value of each investee (if any), the form of management involvement after investment, any sale or other disposition of important assets after investment, trends in business results after investment, and whether you have established a friendly relationship with management and employees.	Firstly, the Purchasers, or the companies that invested or have at some previous point invested jointly with the Purchasers, have made, as shareholders, proposals to the senior management of investee companies for improving the corporate value and value of all shareholders. If the management of investee companies carried out business measures for improving the corporate value and value of all shareholders, we have supported them as well. Regarding this point, we decline to answer further for the following reasons: the wide-ranging cases in which the Purchasers, or the companies that invested or have at some previous point invested jointly with the Purchasers, have been involved, include non-public information, and also include cases that have no direct relations to the Purchase, and in the first place, this question itself is an abstract and obscure one that demands a comprehensive explanation that goes beyond the scope necessary for the Purchase and is not an appropriate question. Among the cases (1) to (17) in the question, detailed information is provided in the tender offer notice and revised notice for each of (3) Kuroda Electric Co., Ltd., (8) KOSAIDO Holdings Co., Ltd., (12) ShinMaywa Industries, Ltd. and (13) Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd.), so please refer to them. The Company ask questions about individual cases starting with the next question; for each of them, the Purchasers, or the companies that invested or have at some previous point invested jointly with the Purchasers, when making investments in companies, do aim to improve the corporate value of the investees and the value of all shareholders of such investees, and provide advice to management, and based on such advice, various investees have successfully improved their corporate value and the value of all shareholders. The Purchasers, or the companies that invested, or have invested, jointly with the Purchasers, never pursued short-term profits solely for themselves, and only support measures that will bring about profits to all shareholders equally. If the Company is asking these questions for the purpose of supplying information to

		shareholders, simple questions verifying facts would suffice, and it would not be necessary to include a judgmental statement about the investment cases in the question. But the fact that the Company included a negative judgmental statement in the question about the Purchasers and their group companies demonstrate that the questions in this Information List is not designed for the purpose of supplying information to shareholders, but for the purpose of giving an unfavorable impression of the Purchasers.
2	Although Accordia announced its basic policy of "targeting a consolidated dividend payout ratio of 90%" as its dividend payout ratio after the asset light measure by selling its assets in the press releases "Notice Concerning the Formulation of the Medium-Term Management Plan" and "Notice Concerning Change of Dividend Policy and Revision to Dividend Forecast for the Fiscal Year Ending March 2013 (34th term)" dated December 3, 2012, on March 28, 2014, Accordia announced its asset light measure, financing through loans with share options, and TOB by the issuer, as well as the target of its dividend payout ratio of 45% of its deemed consolidated net income. Thereafter, the Company's shareholders have tended to sell their shares due to uncertainty of the impact of the major change in business policy on earnings and feasibility; consequently, Accordia's share price temporarily fell to 1,100 yen on April 11, which was the lowest price since the beginning of the year (Nikkei Veritas dated April 13, 2014, p. 15). **Under these circumstances, Reno asked that an extraordinary meeting of shareholders be convened for the purpose of dismissing all of Accordia's six outside directors and appointing five outside director candidates nominated by Reno as outside directors in order to propose that Accordia additionally sell its golf courses of 40 billion yen or more within two years and return 20 billion yen to shareholders in two terms** (Accordia's press release entitled "Notice Concerning Shareholders' Request to Convene an	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. The above question distorts the cause-effect relations between the events in a way that is convenient for the Company, and thus is incorrect. The reason Reno and some of its affiliate companies tendered their shares in Accordia's TOB is because even though Reno and some of its affiliate companies turned down the request to tender shares in the TOB, Accordia vigorously made the request, and in the end, Reno and some of its affiliate companies thought that tendering their shares in the TOB would contribute to Accordia's corporate value. The reason Reno asked for convention of an extraordinary meeting of shareholders is because Accordia changed its basic policy of "a consolidated dividend payout ratio of 90%" all too easily, without providing any reasonable explanation. Reno and some of its affiliate companies always ask their investees to treat all shareholders equally, and have never engaged in any act that would have an investee buy back only the shares they hold at an unreasonably high price. In the case of Accordia, the implementation of large-scale shareholder return benefited Accordia's general shareholders as well. With respect to Accordia's TOB, the tender offer notice for such TOB (page 8) contains

	Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders" dated August 6 and 7, 2014). **It can be seen that eventually Reno withdrew the request to convene the extraordinary general meeting of shareholders above after Accordia accepted the proposal above and increased the amount of asset sales and shareholder returns** (Accordia's press release entitled "Company's Asset Light Measures and Shareholder Return Policy" dated August 12, 2014, and press release entitled "Notice Concerning Withdrawal of Shareholders' Request to Convene an Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders" dated the same day). **The reason behind the decline in Accordia's share price is considered to be that shareholders were concerned about Accordia's business continuity and sustainable growth due to excessive shareholder returns (see *supra* Nikkei Veritas dated April 13, 2014, p. 15). Notwithstanding the foregoing, please explain the purpose for which you asked that an extraordinary general meeting be convened in order to propose the additional sale of golf courses and shareholder returns.** In addition, it was pointed out that "market sources believe that 'Reno, who requested to strengthen distribution, remains a major shareholder, which makes it difficult to determine the impact on management.'. . . (Omitted). . . . The presence of major shareholders who seem to be vociferously seeking short-term distribution to shareholders has made the outlook of Accordia's share price uncertain" (Nihon Keizai Shimbun electronic edition section dated September 12, 2014). Please also inform us how you considered the medium- to long-term improvement of corporate value and shareholders' common interests, and requested the additional sale of golf courses, shareholder returns, and the convening of an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders. In addition, in 2020, Accordia transferred real estate of 90 golf courses that it owned to Accordia Golf Trust, which Accordia established jointly with Daiwa Securities and was listed on the Singapore Exchange, through the asset light measures above;	the following statement: "Moreover, for the conversion of such business model, the target company in August 2014 conducted a shareholder return on the scale of approximately 45 billion yen through a tender offer for its shares. For the implementation of this measure, the target company and a large shareholder of the target company (meaning Reno and its joint owner at that time in '(i) the asset-lightening measures by the target company's business trust and its issues') held discussions, from the perspective of maximizing shareholder value, about the impact that the asset-lightening measures by the target company's business trust on the target company's corporate value and shareholder value. In the asset-lightening measures by the business trust, the target company transferred 90 of the 133 golf courses owned by the target company group (including incidental facilities) to AG Assets (defined in Note 1 below), and it was arranged that the target company would be entrusted with their management and operation. Through this measure, the target company secured a stable flow of operation fees while separated the golf course assets, which had caused deterioration in the target company's asset efficiency, from its assets, thereby successfully improving its asset efficiency."

	thereafter, it bought back 88 of the 90 golf courses above from Accordia Golf Trust for a total of 61.8 billion yen. Please inform us specifically as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, including Reno that strongly insisted on selling the golf courses, how you recognize these facts.	
3	According to the press release of MCJ entitled "Notice of the Receipt of a Statement of Intent for a Large-scale Purchase Action of the Company's Shares" dated October 8, 2013, Reno submitted to MCJ a Statement of Intent stating that Reno intended to purchase MCJ shares until its shareholding ratio or the percentage of voting rights reached 20% or above and other matters. In response to this, according to the press release of MCJ entitled "Notice of Receipt of Recommendation of the Independent Committee and the Finalization of the Evaluation and Analysis Results of the Board of Directors of the Company Concerning the Large-scale Purchase Action of the Company's Shares" dated December 12, 2013, MCJ's board of directors fully respected the recommendation of the Independent Committee that the countermeasures against large-scale purchase actions should not be enacted against Reno. It also announced that it does not intend to enact any countermeasures, and that it will continue to monitor the investment trend of Reno and changes in the situation for now. **Nevertheless, after that, Reno did not actually conduct large-scale purchase actions. On December 12, 2013, MCJ's board of directors decided and announced that it would not enact any countermeasures against large-scale purchase actions proposed by Reno; thereafter, the share price of 268 yen (closing price) on the same day surged to 348 yen (closing price) on the following day (December 13). Immediately after that, on December 16 (opening price/high price of 395 yen, closing price of 303 yen, low price of 296 yen), Reno disposed of 3,244,200 shares. This was equivalent to approximately half of the shares that Reno held in MCJ (holding ratio of share certificates, etc. of 6.38%). Please inform us specifically about the circumstances**	Because the action was not by the Purchasers, it is not necessary to answer this question from the perspective of implementation of the Purchase; but because this is a misleading question, we will answer to the extent necessary. In investing in MCJ, Reno submitted a statement of intent on October 8, 2013, setting forth that "the purpose of the share purchase is a pure investment, and it is aimed at realizing a potential value of the shares, and capital gains from improvement in the company's medium- to long-term corporate value." The reason Reno submitted such statement of intent was because there was a possibility of purchasing MCJ shares in the medium to long term (please note that it was just a possibility and Reno had not declared that it would purchase them) and it was necessary to demonstrate to MCJ that Reno would comply with MCJ's "large-scale purchase rules." MCJ's Independent Committee determined that Reno's purchases would not fall under "a large-scale purchase act that would significantly harm MCJ's corporate value and the common interests of shareholders" and recommended against enactment of countermeasures. Reno has since sold MCJ shares, and given that it was an "investment," it is quite natural and reasonable to sell shares when their price goes up.

	and reasons why you decided not to conduct large-scale purchase actions and sold approximately half of the shares that you held immediately after Reno submitted a Statement of Intent for large-scale purchase actions under the large-scale purchase rules**, and MCJ's board of directors decided that it would not enact any countermeasures against large-scale purchase actions. Please also provide the specific amount of profit that Reno received due to the increase in share price.** In addition, on October 16, 2013, when Reno sold approximately half of its shares in MCJ, the opening price was the highest price of the day at 395 yen. Also, please inform us of the share price per share at which Reno sold its shares in MCJ on the same day.	
4	The Large-scale Purchaser Group had been buying a large volume of shares in Kuroda Electric in the market since around 2014, and on May 2, 2017, Reno made a shareholder proposal to Kuroda Electric regarding the appointment of one outside director. Kuroda Electric resolved to object to the shareholder proposal at its board of directors meeting held on May 23, 2017, and announced the board of directors' opinion on the shareholder proposal on May 29, 2017. However, despite Kuroda Electric's objection, the shareholder proposal was approved at the ordinary general meeting of shareholders on June 29, 2017, and Reno dispatched one outside director to Kuroda Electric (according to the published information, the Large-scale Purchaser Group's shareholding ratio to Kuroda Electric had increased to approximately 35% as of June 7, 2017.). After that, according to the published information, although the Large-scale Purchaser Group increased its shareholding ratio to Kuroda Electric to approximately 38% by early November 2017, it accepted the TOB announced by KM Holdings Co., Ltd. ("KM Holdings"), an investment vehicle owned by foreign-affiliated investment fund MBK Partners, on October 31, 2017. Therefore, by March 2018, Murakami Fund-Related Parties sold all of their shares in Kuroda Electric by executing the tender offer agreement with KM Holdings and tendering their shares in	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. It would be inappropriate to say anything to suggest that Reno dispatched an outside director in order to participate in Kuroda Electric's management. Reno made a shareholder proposal regarding the appointment of one outside director who would be independent from Reno and Kuroda Electric, and at Kuroda Electric's ordinary general meeting of shareholders, the proposal was approved by a majority of the shareholders and was passed. In the first place, the shareholder proposal above was meant to propose that an "outside director" be appointed, and it had no intention to actively participate in Kuroda Electric's management, but had an intention to improve Kuroda Electric's corporate governance or enhance its corporate value. As for the privatization of Kuroda Electric, this entailed Reno proposing a reorganization of the electric component industry to Kuroda Electric's senior management at the time, with the senior management then calling for its existing shareholders to agree to collaborate with MBK Partners Group, and those existing

	the TOB and subsequent TOB by an issuer conducted by Kuroda Electric. As mentioned above, the Large-scale Purchaser Group reached an agreement to sell all their shares in Kuroda Electric, only four months after Reno dispatched an outside director to Kuroda Electric; furthermore, they actually sold all these shares only four months after that. Is it correct to understand that although the Large-scale Purchaser Group dispatched an outside director to Kuroda Electric, it did not intend to actively participate in Kuroda Electric's management or to improve corporate governance or corporate value from the beginning? Please inform us specifically about your recognition of this point as the Large-scale Purchasers and Others, including Reno.	shareholders subsequently choosing the privatization route themselves. At that time, MBK Partners JC IV, L.P., to which BBK Partners Group provides services, granted a premium of 33.07% on the closing market price per share on the TSE's First Section on October 30, 2017, which was the business day before the announcement date for the decision regarding privatization, and took Kuroda Electric private through a purchase of common stock from the existing shareholders, and all of Kuroda Electric's shareholders have obtained substantial profits from this privatization of the company.
5	**Yorozu announced the "Notice Concerning Receipt of a Letter from a Shareholder" dated May 9, 2019, stating that "the proposing shareholder [the Company's note: refer to Reno; the same applies hereinafter] and its joint holder, C&I, acquired approximately 12% of shares in the company [the Company's note: refer to Yorozu; the same applies hereinafter] from around 2014 to 2015. When they held the shares, an adviser of the proposing shareholder, Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami, did not understand the importance of the company's supply of products to automobile manufacturers from a global perspective in meetings with the company's representative director and its chairman and others or in telephone calls with the company's officers and employees. He reiterated that if the company does not return 100% of its profits to shareholders or does not implement a large-scale share buy-back that exceeds a few percent, they will make a tender offer for shares in the company. In fact, they submitted to the company a draft letter of intent for large-scale purchase actions, as stipulated in the company's takeover defense measures. The proposing shareholder and others subsequently sold all of their shares in the company when the foregoing was reported in the media and the share price of the company rose." Please explain specifically why**	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. Yorozu's press release dated May 9, 2019 is one-sided in nature, and is not legitimate. While the tender offer to Yorozu was being considered, the market price rose above the tender offer price for the tender offer that was still under consideration, and assuming this price was near the level at which they intended to sell the shares at some future point, going forward with the sale would seem to have been perfectly natural investment behavior for investors looking to obtain a return on their investment.

	Reno and C&I sold all of their shares in Yorozu when the share price in Yorozu rose, even though they submitted a draft letter of intent for large-scale purchase actions under the large-scale purchase rules. Please also provide the specific amounts of profit that Reno and C&I received due to the share price increase, respectively.	
6	On May 10, 2019, Reno filed a petition against Yorozu seeking a provisional disposition order for inclusion of a shareholder proposal (the "Filing for Provisional Disposition Order"), requesting that Yorozu include an agenda item relating to the abolition of takeover defense measures in a notice to convene a shareholders meeting (and related reference materials). The Filing for Provisional Disposition Order was dismissed by the Yokohama District Court (in a decision rendered on May 20, 2019 (page 118 of the *Siryoban Shojihomu* No. 424), the "Original Decision on the Provisional Disposition"), and an immediate appeal was dismissed by the Tokyo High Court (in a decision rendered on May 27, 2019; page 120 of the *Siryoban Shojihomu* No. 424). The Yokohama District Court found the following facts in the Original Decision on the Provisional Disposition underlined and emphasized by the quoter: "d. **Between 2012 and 2019, the Creditor the Company's note: refers to Reno; hereinafter the same applies and other parties purchased a large number of shares in Company J, Company K, Company L, Company M, and Company N, placing the management of the target companies under pressure and earning a resale profit by causing the target companies or their related companies to purchase all or a substantial part of the shares purchased, at high prices.** e. **Between 2002 and 2005, Company O and Company P, which were under the powerful influence of A [the Company's note: refers to Mr. Murakami; hereinafter the same applies], earned a resale profit in the same manner as**	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. The Company, by citing published information setting forth the content of the decision in the case of petition for provisional disposition order for inclusion of a shareholder proposal etc. filed by Reno against Yorozu Corporation (hereinafter, "Yokohama District Court Decision of May 20, 2019"), has created the impression that Reno's objective was not to improve the Company's medium- and long-term corporate value, but was rather only to obtain short-term profits for itself. However, although the Yokohama District Court Decision of May 20, 2019 found that Reno "has shown no interest in any concrete business plans or in any business management-related improvement measures that would contribute to the medium- and long-term profits of the Obligor, and has simply sought for measures to be taken, namely the abolition of the takeover defense measures and share buybacks", given that if the target companies were to announce "concrete business plans or business management-related improvement measures that would contribute to medium- and long-term profits", their share prices would rise upon market valuation, there is no way that Reno—which owns shares for investment purposes—would show no interest in those plans or measures, and therefore this finding would clearly seem to be unreasonable. In fact, the Tokyo High Court Decision of May 27, 2019, which was an appeal instance for the above

	the Creditor and other parties in d. above." "**The Creditor, which is under the powerful influence of A, in the same past manners in which the Creditor and other parties, or Company O and Company P, which likely were under the powerful influence of A, did to their target companies, aims to purchase a large number of shares in the Obligor [the Company's note: refers to Yorozu; hereinafter the same applies], and then place pressure on the Obligor's management in various ways; thereby selling a large number of shares in the Obligor, purchased by the Creditor, to the Obligor and its related parties in a short period of time and at high prices, in order to benefit greatly. Therefore, it is presumed that the Creditor intends to abolish the Response Policies, which hinder this purpose.**" In the Original Decision on the Provisional Disposition, Reno and other parties were found to have "purchased a large number of shares in Company J, Company K, Company L, Company M, and Company N, placing the management of the target companies under pressure, earning a resale profit by causing the target companies or their related companies to purchase all or a substantial part of the shares purchased, at high prices." Please inform us of the company names of the companies mentioned above. In addition, please explain the specific approach Reno applied to Company J, Company K, Company L, Company M, and Company N, and please explain any differences between what was done for those companies and the large purchase of shares of the Company by the Large-scale Purchaser Group.	decision handed down by the Yokohama District Court, did not adopt the findings of the Yokohama District Court and instead examined an issue which the Yokohama District Court had declined to judge, that being whether there were any rights to be preserved; it did not find in favor of Reno's claim, on the grounds that the shareholder proposal seeking the abolition of the takeover defense measures fell under the category of a so-called "advisory resolution" seeking for matters that should be decided by the Board of Directors to be treated as matters to be resolved at the general meeting of shareholders. While we also have objections to the conclusion reached by the Tokyo High Court, at the very least, the Tokyo High Court did not adopt the unjustifiable findings which held that an investor would be indifferent to "concrete business plans or business management-related improvement measures that would contribute to medium- and long-term profits" of the target companies. That the Company would make no mention of the content of the Tokyo High Court Decision of May 27, 2019 (which was an appeal instance for the above decision handed down by the Yokohama District Court) in full knowledge that this decision existed would seem to be evidence that the Company is picking out only those relevant facts which are to its advantage.
7	According to the "Notice Concerning the Company's Response to the Shareholders' Demand for Calling an Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders" announced by	With regard to the above matter as well, in terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this

	Leopalace21 on January 17, 2020, Reno and S-GRANT "mentioned examples of 'dismantling-type acquisition' which they led." **Please provide specific examples of the dismantling-type acquisitions mentioned by Reno and S-GRANT to Leopalace21 that they led, including the names of the companies involved.** Further, please specifically explain all instances of dismantling-type acquisitions that the Large-scale Purchaser Group has conducted in the past.	should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. Reno and S-GRANT Corporation have never "mentioned examples of 'dismantling-type acquisition' which they led", nor have they ever carried out any "dismantling-type acquisitions". Leopalace21 has asserted on the basis of the foregoing that the demand for calling an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders is an abuse of rights, but it is clear that its assertion makes no sense, and therefore Leopalace21 decided itself to convene a general meeting of shareholders in response to this demand for a meeting to be convened. This question posed by the Company is an arbitrary one which ignores that Leopalace21's assertion was not recognized by the court.
8	According to the "Notice Concerning the Company's Position on Reno, Inc.'s Statement dated January 20, 2020" announced by Leopalace21 on January 22, 2020, "it is obvious from the Requesters' [the Company's note: refers to Reno and S-GRANT] past behavior and their remarks on the Company that they [the Company's note: refers to Reno and S-GRANT] are only trying to pursue their own short-term profits by realizing the dismantling acquisition or the sale of assets by the piece. Please provide your thoughts on the pursuing their short-term profits via the dismantling acquisitions or the sale of assets by the piece. In particular, please explain how the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (i.e., the Large-scale Purchaser Group as a shareholder encouraging the Company to improve its corporate value and shareholder value), which is specified in the Statement of Intent relates to the pursuit of short-term profits via the dismantling acquisitions or the piecemeal sale of assets.	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. As in our earlier response in ⑦, although Leopalace21 has stated for instance that "it is clear…that they are only trying to pursue their own short-term profits by realizing the dismantling acquisition or the sale of assets by the piece", and has asserted that the demand for calling an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders is an abuse of rights, it is clear that that assertion makes no sense, and as such Leopalace21 decided itself to convene a general meeting of shareholders in response to this demand for a meeting to be convened. In the case of petition for permission to call a general meeting of shareholders made by Leopalace21, what Leopalace21 took up as an example of a "dismantling acquisition" was the business integration of Excel Co., Ltd. and Kaga Electronics Co., Ltd. However, the role of legal advisor to Excel Co., Ltd. in that business integration was fulfilled by Nishimura & Asahi, which is the Company's legal advisor; that same law

		firm expressed a legal opinion concerning that business integration (further, it was that same law firm that served as Leopalace21's representative in the abovementioned case of petition for permission to call a general meeting of shareholders, and that also made assertions which were not affirmed by the court). In addition, in a press release announcing its business integration with Kaga Electronics, Excel Co., Ltd. stated that "notwithstanding the substantial downward revision in the company's business forecast, an agreement on the share assignment price and ultimately on the entire transaction is now in sight, which we believe is largely attributable to the fact that the major shareholder group (purchaser note: this means "collectively, Office Support, Minami Aoyama Fudosan, C&I HOLDINGS Co., Ltd., CI3, and Reno") took a certain degree of risk and persistently negotiated from the standpoint of maintaining and improving the company's corporate value and shareholder value". The question asks "how the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (i.e., the Large-scale Purchaser Group as a shareholder encouraging the company to improve its corporate value and shareholder value), which is specified in the Statement of Intent, relates to the pursuit of short-term profits via the dismantling acquisitions or the piecemeal sale of assets". Incorporating things that are untrue into a question cannot be considered fair, and it is misleading for investors, and as such it goes against the objective of the large-scale purchase process, the purpose of which is to provide information to investors through fair procedures. In addition, we have received numerous other such questions, and it must be said that this unwillingness to provide accurate information to shareholders or to investors is truly regrettable.
9	**The Large-scale Purchaser Group purchased a large amount of shares in ShinMaywa Industries from the market in 2018 and increased its shareholding ratio to 23.74% by February 19, 2019. After that, it represented its intention to tender shares in ShinMaywa Industries upon an own-share TOB using a price with**	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary.

	a premium (the price with a premium of 10.54% on the closing market price of shares in ShinMaywa Industries on the business day before the announcement) the implementation of which was announced by ShinMaywa Industries through discussion with Reno on January 21, 2019, which was less than one year after the commencement of such acquisition of a large amount of shares (the scale of the own-share TOB was up to approximately 40,252,900,000 yen). In February 2019, the Large-scale Purchaser Group sold a large portion of its shares in ShinMaywa Industries. Such an action is seen as one that is based on the intent to pursue its own short-term profits by tendering shares in ShinMaywa Industries' large-scale own-share TOB and by selling its shares. Please inform us of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's understanding regarding how such an action is consistent with the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (i.e., the Large-scale Purchaser Group as a shareholder encouraging the Company to improve its corporate value and shareholder value), which is specified in the Statement of Intent.	As was publicly announced in ShinMaywa Industries' press release dated January 21, 2019 titled "Notice Regarding Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares", what happened with the TOB by an issuer was that, during the discussions about revisions to the capital structure including the achievement of the ROE target of 8% which ShinMaywa Industries had proposed in the Medium-Term Management Plan that was being pursued at the time, ShinMaywa Industries provided an explanation to Reno and consulted with it about this matter upon request, and then Reno acceded to the own-share buyback, judging that such measure would contribute to improving ShinMaywa Industries' corporate value and shareholder value. In posing this question, the Company has created a false impression as though ShinMaywa Industries' TOB by an issuer was done solely in the pursuit of profits for Reno, and that it would not contribute to improving ShinMaywa Industries' corporate value and shareholder value. However, based on the abovementioned press release made by ShinMaywa Industries, it is understood: that the TOB by an issuer was primarily intended to achieve the ROE of 8%; that at the time the decision was made, various outside specialists were even used to consider the matter in a multifaceted manner from the standpoint of the ideal capital structure, the purchase price for the TOB by an issuer, the fairness of the implementation method, and so forth; and that the TOB by an issuer was carefully conducted in consideration of various processes, including a report made by an exploratory committee consisting of outside experts. This question by its nature ignores these facts, and must be considered to be erroneous.
10	ShinMaywa Industries used the upper limit on the number of shares to be purchased in the own-share TOB of 26,666,600 shares (equivalent to approximately 29.03% of the total number of issued shares of ShinMaywa Industries at that time), which was slightly more than the total number of shares in ShinMaywa Industries held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group immediately before the announcement of the own-share	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required, but with regard to the events leading up to the tender offer and the like, we ask that the Company refer to the tender offer statement for the tender offer and to the press release issued by ShinMaywa Industries. It should be noted that ShinMaywa Industries' press release

	TOB (i.e., 22,882,900 shares). Please inform us of the existence or non-existence and details of the request and discussion with respect to such an upper limit on the number of shares to be purchased.	dated January 21, 2019 titled "Notice Regarding Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares" states that "Reno voiced its opinion that perhaps giving all of the shareholders an equal opportunity would be appropriate".
11	The Large-scale Purchaser Group purchased a large number of shares in Sanshin Electronics, and as of November 4, 2020, had increased its holding ratio of shares, etc. to approximately 27.63%, which comprises approximately 34.73% of the voting rights in Sanshin Electronics. After that, City Index Eleventh and S-GRANT stated their intention to tender all Sanshin Electronics shares held by them at the time of the own-share TOB carried out in June in the same year (the scale of the TOB was approximately 15,743 million yen) at a premium price (a price with an 8.65% premium on the closing market price of Sanshin Electronics shares on the business day prior to the date of announcement), which was announced by Sanshin Electronics on May 12, 2021. This action is viewed as furthering the pursuit of their short-term profits while enjoying the benefit arising from deducting dividend income with regard to the deemed dividends, by tendering their shares in Sanshin Electronics' large-scale own-share TOB and selling their shares. Please inform us of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's understanding regarding how such an action is consistent with the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (i.e., the Large-scale Purchaser Group as a shareholder encouraging the Company to improve its corporate value and shareholder value), which is specified in the Statement of Intent.	With regard to the above matter as well, in terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. As was publicly announced in Sanshin Electronics press release dated May 12, 2021 titled "Notice Regarding Plans for Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares, and the Reduction of General Reserve, Capital Reserve, and Retained Surplus Amounts", the TOB by an issuer was to lead to the improvement of capital efficiency with the aim of rapidly achieving a target ROE of 5%, this being proposed by Sanshin Electronics as its quantitative target, and given that a tender offer involving a major shareholder was essential in order to ensure the success of the TOB by an issuer, Sanshin Electronics provided an explanation to City Index Eleventh and conferred with it about this matter upon request, and then City Index Eleventh and S-GRANT acceded to the own-share buyback, judging that such measure would contribute to improving Sanshin Electronics' corporate value and shareholder value. In posing this question, the Company mentions "the pursuit of their short-term profits while enjoying the benefit arising from deducting dividend income with regard to the deemed dividends"; this is not even factual, and it also invokes an issue that is irrelevant to the Purchase while creating a strong false impression as though City Index Eleventh was pursuing its own profits. As we have already stated, it must be said that such an inarguably unfair tactic is truly regrettable.
12	**At the time of the aforementioned own-share TOB, for the purpose of securing a distributable amount to be used to purchase its own shares, Sanshin Electronics**	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required, but with regard

	reduced its general reserve, capital reserve, and retained surplus, transferred the amount reduced from the capital reserve to other capital surplus, and transferred the amounts reduced from the general reserve and retained surplus to retained earnings brought forward. As a result, the upper limit of the number of shares to be purchased in the own-share TOB was determined to be 7,000,000 shares (equivalent to approximately 28.83% of the then-current total number of issued shares of Sanshin Electronics), which was slightly more than the total number of Sanshin Electronics shares held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group immediately before the announcement of the own-share TOB (i.e., 6,709,100 shares). Please inform us of the existence or non-existence and details of the request for and discussion on the determination of the upper limit of the number of shares to be purchased, as well as in regard to the transfer of the aforementioned amounts to other capital surplus or retained earnings brought forward, which served as the basis for that determination. Further, please explain your opinion on a series of these responses by Sanshin Electronics.	to the events leading up to the tender offer and the like, we ask that you refer to the tender offer statement for the tender offer and to the press release issued by Sanshin Electronics. It should be noted that in the Sanshin Electronics press release dated May 12, 2021 titled "Notice Regarding Plans for Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares, and the Reduction of General Reserve, Capital Reserve, and Retained Surplus Amounts", it is stated that "City Index Eleventh believes that the tender offer will contribute to improving shareholder value for all shareholders of the company, insofar as it will be conducted as part of ROE management practices (increasing capital efficiency) and of measures to improve shareholder value, (omitted) and has announced its intention to participate in the tender offer".
13	**The Large-scale Purchaser Group increased its holding ratio of share certificates, etc. in Hoosiers to approximately 37.57%. After that, it concentrated its shares in Hoosiers only in City Index Eleventh, thereby causing City Index Eleventh's voting rights ratio in Hoosiers to exceed one-third; thereafter, it tendered shares in a large-scale own-share TOB in the approximate total amount of 14,812,000,000 yen that was announced and implemented by Hoosiers on January 28, 2021. This was approximately three years after the commencement of the purchase (upon the own-share TOB, the Large-scale Purchaser Group executed a tender offer agreement with Hoosiers for all shares in Hoosiers held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group). By tendering shares in that TOB and selling in the market its remaining shares after applying the pro rata method, the Large-scale Purchaser**	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. As was publicly announced in Hoosiers' press release dated January 28, 2021 titled "Notice Regarding Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares", the TOB by an issuer was discussed for the purpose of improving medium- and long-term corporate value, given that previous instances of capital procurement had ultimately resulted in a surplus of capital, and also from the standpoint of realizing a capital strategy going forward under the new Medium-Term Management Plan which was announced that same day; City Index Eleventh was provided with an explanation and

	Group sold all of its shares in Hoosiers. Such an action is seen as one that pursues its own short-term profits while enjoying the benefit of arising from deducting dividend income with regard to the deemed dividends, by tendering shares in Hoosiers' large-scale own-share TOB and by selling its shares. Please inform us of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's understanding regarding how such an action is consistent with the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (i.e., the Large-scale Purchaser Group as a shareholder encouraging the Company to improve its corporate value and shareholder value), which is specified in the Statement of Intent.	conferred about this matter upon request, and then City Index Eleventh acceded to the own-share buyback, judging that such measure would contribute to improving Hoosiers' corporate value and shareholder value. With respect to the phrasing "it concentrated its shares in Hoosiers only in City Index Eleventh" in the question, we should add that this was done in connection with the capital procurement by the companies on May 15, 2020, and has no connection whatsoever to the TOB by an issuer in terms of the timing or background events.
14	**On January 14, 2021, which was two weeks before the announcement of the aforementioned own-share TOB, Hoosiers provisionally settled accounts, which was extremely unusual for a listed company, explaining that the purpose was to ensure flexibility and agility in its financial strategies by counting profits and losses for the period from April 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020, in its distributable amount. Considering the timing of the provisional settlement of accounts and the distributable amount at the beginning of the fiscal year ended March 2021 that was shown on non-consolidated financial statements of Hoosiers, the provisional settlement of accounts seems to have been aimed at supplementing the distributable amount to be used for the aforementioned own-share TOB. As a result, the upper limit on the number of shares to be purchased in the own-share TOB was 21,637,500 shares (equivalent to approximately 37.59% of the total number of issued shares of Hoosiers at that time), which was slightly more than the total number of shares in Hoosiers held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group immediately before the announcement of the own-share TOB (i.e., 21,570,200 shares).** As the Large-scale Purchaser Group that tendered shares in the aforementioned own-share TOB, please inform us of the existence or non-existence and details of the request and discussion with respect to the upper limit on the number of	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required, but with regard to the events leading up to the tender offer and the like, we ask that you refer to the tender offer statement for the tender offer and to the press release issued by Hoosiers.

	shares to be purchased, and with respect to Hoosiers' provisional settlement of accounts that served as the basis therefor. Further, please explain your opinion on a series of these responses by Hoosiers.	
15	The Large-scale Purchaser Group purchased a large amount of shares in Daiho from the market, starting from around 2020; and as of December 28, 2021, it increased its holding ratio of share certificates, etc. in Daiho to 38.66%. According to the "Announcement Regarding Issuance of New Shares Through Third-party Allotment, Execution of a Capital and Business Alliance Agreement, Schedule of Own Shares, Change in the Largest Shareholder Which Is the Parent Company and a Major Shareholder, as well as Reduction in Capital Reserves" announced by Daiho on March 24, 2022, on December 23, 2021, since Daiho received an initial letter of intent from Aso Corporation ("Aso") to the effect that Aso would make Daiho a consolidated subsidiary by purchasing shares from existing shareholders (including the Large-scale Purchaser Group) via a TOB (that acquisition scheme, the "Share Transfer Scheme"), around late December, Daiho confirmed whether there was a possibility that the Large-scale Purchaser Group might tender shares in the TOB and sell them to Aso. Against this backdrop, on January 11, 2022, the Large-scale Purchaser Group indicated its intention not to tender shares in the TOB; and in the letter dated January 13, it proposed a scheme to implement a capital increase through third-party allotment to Aso in conjunction with an own-share TOB by Daiho. **Please specifically explain the reason why such a scheme was proposed despite the fact that if only substantial management rights in Daiho are transferred to Aso, the easiest way would be to use the Share Transfer Scheme.**	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. With regard to the Share Transfer Scheme, City Index Eleventh indicated its intention not to tender shares based on the below reasons; (i) based on the basic idea that becoming a consolidated subsidiary of other companies while remaining listed is contrary to what the share market should be, City Index Eleventh and Other Parties agreeing to such scheme and tendering shares means that the purchasers themselves act against this basic idea, and (ii) since we believe the purchasers should tender shares in other company's TOB only if it is confirmed that it will create the largest value for the existing shareholders in an auction format. However, we also communicated that after the TOB by an issuer, the Purchasers had made efforts to improve the ROE through mutual agreement following several years of constructive discussions, and that as such, executing a third-party allotment to another company (with efforts having been made to prevent an increase in net worth) was not something that the Purchasers could rule out.
16	**Daiho, which received the proposal from the Large-scale Purchaser Group, eventually (i) transferred 7.5 billion yen in capital reserves to other capital surplus for the purpose of securing a distributable amount to be used for an own-share**	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required, but with regard to the events leading up to the tender offer and the like, we ask that you refer to the

	TOB, (ii) as a result, implemented the own-share TOB in which the upper limit on the number of shares to be purchased was 8,850,000 million shares, which was slightly more than the total number of shares in Daiho held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group immediately before the announcement of the own-share TOB (i.e., 7,614,831 shares), using a price with a premium of 29.06% on the closing market price of shares in Daiho on the business day before the announcement date, and then (iii) announced on March 24, 2022, that Daiho would issue to Aso new shares representing 8.50 million shares by third-party allotment. As the Large-scale Purchaser Group that tendered shares in the aforementioned own-share TOB, please inform us of the existence or non-existence and details of the request and discussion with respect to Daiho's transfer of 7.5 billion yen in capital reserves to other capital surplus. Also, please explain your opinion on such responses by Daiho.	tender offer statement for the tender offer and to the press release issued by Daiho Corporation.
17	**The Large-scale Purchaser Group purchased a large amount of shares in Central Glass and, as of September 12, 2022, it increased its holding ratio of share certificates, etc. to approximately 28.05%. After that, it tendered shares in a large-scale own-share TOB using a price with a premium (the price with a premium of 1.89% on the closing market price of shares in Central Glass on the business day before the announcement) announced and implemented by Central Glass on September 20, 2022 (the scale of the own-share TOB was up to approximately 49,999,950,000 yen) (upon the own-share TOB, the Large-scale Purchaser Group executed a tender offer agreement with Central Glass for all shares in Central Glass held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group); and as of November 21, 2022, the Large-scale Purchaser Group sold most of its shares in Central Glass via the own-share TOB.** Such an action is seen as one that pursues its own short-term profits by tendering shares in Central Glass's large-scale own-share TOB and by selling its shares. Please inform us of the Large-scale Purchaser	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary. As was publicly announced in the press release by Central Glass dated September 20, 2022 titled "Notice Regarding Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares", the circumstances behind the TOB by an issuer were that starting in September 2018, there was a continuous dialogue about business structural reforms and capital policy in the interest of improving the PBR and ROE, and in fact various steps were taken and different measures were put in place including structural reforms to the glass business and a reduction in cross-shareholdings, at which point it actually became possible to have an 8.0% ROE as an achievable standard under the new Medium-Term Management Plan that began in FY2022 up from the 1.7% ROE that existed in the period ending March 2018. Then differences in opinion about the direction that the

	Group's understanding regarding how such an action is consistent with the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (i.e., the Large-scale Purchaser Group as a shareholder encouraging the Company to improve its corporate value and shareholder value), which is specified in the Statement of Intent.	management strategy should take became apparent from around 2022, and thus examinations and discussions were begun, City Index Eleventh et al. confirmed that measures to improve shareholder value that were to be implemented after they had ceased to be shareholders would be continued, and that measures to improve corporate value by introducing an incentive plan for employees would be implemented, and so forth, and having done that it acceded to the own-share buyback, judging that such measure would contribute to improving corporate value and shareholder value. With this question, the Company has failed to confirm the facts and has instead inserted its own one-sided subjective views, and it must be said that its unwillingness to provide accurate information to shareholders or to investors is truly regrettable.
18	Central Glass used the upper limit of 14,285,700 shares on the number of shares to be purchased in the own-share TOB (equivalent to approximately 33.24% of the total number of issued shares of Central Glass at that time), which was slightly more than the total number of shares in Central Glass held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group immediately before the announcement of the own-share TOB (i.e., 12,053,400 shares). As the Large-scale Purchaser Group that tendered shares in the aforementioned own-share TOB, please inform us of the existence or non-existence and details of the request and discussion with respect to such an upper limit on the number of shares to be purchased.	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required, but with regard to the events leading up to the tender offer and the like, we ask that you refer to the tender offer statement for the tender offer and to the press release issued by Central Glass. It should be noted that the press release issued by Central Glass dated September 20, 2022 titled "Notice Regarding Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares" states that "the number of shares expected to be purchased in the tender offer will be a maximum of 14,285,600 shares (ownership ratio: 35.80%), which is higher than the 12,053,400 shares (ownership ratio: 30.20%) expected to be tendered, in the interest of also providing all of our shareholders other than those who are already planning to participate in the tender offer with the opportunity to take part in the tender offer".
19	**The Large-scale Purchaser Group purchased a large amount of shares in JAFCO; and as of December 21, 2022, it increased its holding ratio of share certificates, etc. to approximately 19% that represented approximately 20% of the voting rights ratio. After that, it tendered shares in a large-scale own-share**	With regard to the above matter as well, in terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required; but the nature of the question could lead to a misunderstanding, and so from that viewpoint, we will respond to the extent necessary.

	TOB using a price with a premium (the price with a premium of 8.23% on the closing market price of shares in JAFCO on the business day before the announcement) announced and implemented by JAFCO on December 21, 2022 (the scale of the own-share TOB was up to approximately 42,000,250,000 yen) (upon the own-share TOB, the Large-scale Purchaser Group executed a tender offer agreement with JAFCO for all shares in JAFCO held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group); and in February of the following year, the Large-scale Purchaser Group sold a large portion of its shares in JAFCO. Such an action is seen as one that pursues its own short-term profits by tendering shares in JAFCO's large-scale own-share TOB and by selling its shares. Please inform us of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's understanding regarding how such an action is consistent with the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (i.e., the Large-scale Purchaser Group as a shareholder encouraging the Company to improve its corporate value and shareholder value), which is specified in the Statement of Intent.	As was publicly announced in the press release issued by JAFCO dated December 21, 2022 titled "Notice Regarding Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares", as regards the TOB by an issuer, while JAFCO was formulating measures to improve shareholder value (including an improved ROE), it provided explanations to City Index Eleventh and conferred with it about this matter upon request, and when City Index Eleventh saw that the two proposals it had been making for some time—namely, for JAFCO to sell its shares of Nomura Research Institute, Ltd., and for JAFCO to reduce its own equity ratio in the funds it had established and was running from slightly over 40% at that time down to a more typical standard level—were about to be fulfilled, City Index Eleventh acceded to the own-share buyback, judging that such measure would contribute to improving JAFCO's corporate value and shareholder value.
20	JAFCO used the upper limit of 16,800,000 shares on the number of shares to be purchased in the own-share TOB (equivalent to approximately 22.93% of the total number of issued shares of JAFCO at that time), which was slightly more than the total number of shares in JAFCO held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group immediately before the announcement of the own-share TOB (i.e., 13,904,500 shares). As the Large-scale Purchaser Group that tendered shares in the aforementioned own-share TOB, please inform us of the existence or non-existence and details of the request and discussion with respect to such an upper limit on the number of shares to be purchased.	In terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required, but with regard to the events leading up to the tender offer and the like, we ask that you refer to the tender offer statement for the tender offer and to the press release issued by JAFCO. It should be noted that the press release issued by JAFCO dated December 21, 2022 titled "Notice Regarding Buyback of Own Shares and Tender Offer for Own Shares" states that "given the need to provide all of our shareholders besides City et al. with the opportunity to participate in the tender offer, the maximum number of shares expected to be tendered will be a number of shares exceeding the company shares owned by City et al.".
21	While we understand that in past investment cases by the Large-Scale Purchaser Group, the shares have been sold through the own-share TOB within a short period of time after	The question states that "in past investment cases by the Large-Scale Purchaser Group, the shares have been sold through a TOB by an issuer within a short period of time

	the start of acquisition, please inform us specifically how long the Large-Scale Purchaser Group plans to hold the Company's shares this time. In addition, please inform us specifically if what type of event occurs or what types of conditions are met, whether the Large-Scale Purchaser Group may change the above period, and if the Large-Scale Purchaser Group changes the above period, please inform us specifically the planned holding period after such change.	after the start of acquisition", but this is not factual. Incorporating things that are untrue into a question cannot be considered fair, and it is misleading for investors, and as such it goes against the objective of the large-scale purchase process, the purpose of which is to provide information to investors through fair procedures. As for the Purchasers, in a case where the Company has made efforts to achieve a share price that exceeds a PBR of one, and it believes corporate value as well as shareholder value for all shareholders has definitively improved, their plan is to then sell their Company shares. The Purchasers have not established any planned retention period in advance.

Information List (2) and the Response (2)

[Noted: translated by the Company]

Ⅰ Among the inquiries and information included in the Information List, responses or provision considered to be incomplete or insufficient

Part 1 Details of the Large-scale Purchasers and its Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In response to the inquiries below from among the inquiries in 3. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (inquiries reposted as (i) and (ii) below in italics), we received the Response, "Purchasers can acquire shares based on the advance notification for inward direct investment, etc. only within six months from the acceptance date of the advance notification. The purchasers [the Company's note: Minami Aoyama Fudosan, Ms. Nomura, and City Index Eleventh; the same applies hereinafter] provided such advance notification to the Company's shareholders (the upper limit of acquisition is 9.9% of the voting rights, respectively), but the purchase availability period of Minami Aoyama Fudosan terminates on October 3, 2023 and that of City [the Company's note: City Index Eleventh; the same applies hereinafter] and Ms. Nomura terminates on October 20, respectively. The current advance notification was provided before submitting the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. this time, and if purchasing occurs after the procedures of the takeover defense measures [the Company's note: Response Policies], the purchasers may make a purchase only to the extent stated in the statement and thus, we believe that the above response is sufficient for details of the current advance notification;" and based on this response we have not received responses to some inquiries. **Regarding (i), "pledges for acquisition" will relate to forms of acquisition of the Company's share certificates, etc., and since**	① The pledges are as follows. Notwithstanding any other statements listed in the "(2) Method of Management Involvement Accompanying Acquisition or Discretionary Investment", the notifier will comply with the following matters (hereinafter, including the introductory section, the "Compliance Matters") for as long as the notifier is a foreign investor (meaning a person listed in any of the items in Article 26, Paragraph 1 of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act; hereinafter, the "Act"), regardless of the percentage of the total number of issued shares of the issuing company accounted for by the number of shares of the issuing company that are owned by the notifier or a person closely related thereto (meaning a non-resident individual, a company, or any other organization (limited to those listed in Article 26, Paragraph 1, Items 2 through 5 of the Act; hereinafter the same shall apply) that would fall under one of the categories listed in those items if the notifier were to be regarded as an acquisitor of shares as prescribed in Article 2, Paragraph 10 of the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment, etc.), or the percentage of total votes in the issuing company accounted for by the number of votes in the issuing company that are owned by the notifier or a person closely related thereto. Further, the notifier understands that if it breaches any of the Compliance Matters, it will be subject to an order under Article 29, Paragraph 2 of the Act, and if an order is issued

	similar pledges may be required when the Large-scale Purchasers conduct Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. in the future, this is important for shareholders as information on the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. In addition, we asked inquiry (ii) because changes in behavior related to the upper limit relates to reliability of your company's responses regarding voting rights acquired by Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. Please sincerely provide an answer again. *(i) "Details indicated on the advance notification for inward direct investment under the Foreign Exchange Act by the Large-scale Purchaser Group (defined in 4. below) (including entities planned to acquire share certificates, etc. of the Company, as well as the limit of share certificates, etc. to be acquired by each entity, acquisition period, and matters indicated on the notification, etc. as pledges upon acquisition) and the current status of the procedures"* *(ii) The material titled "Cosmo Energy Holdings Co., Ltd.'s Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders," dated May 29, 2023, prepared by City Index Eleventh Co., Ltd. ("City Index Eleventh"), claimed that "the effective upper limit in our advance notification under the Foreign Exchange Act is merely 22.9%." While it is claimed that "the effective upper limit is 22.9%," please inform us specifically how this relates to the ratio of the voting rights to be 24.56% for the Large-scale Purchasers and Others after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., planned under the Statement of Intent. Further, while we understand that the claim of "the effective upper limit" is based on the movement of the shares within the Large-scale Purchaser Group, indicated in 8. below, please specifically inform us, with respect to "the effective upper limit" here, of the intention to add "effective," rather than merely indicating "upper limit."*	pursuant thereto, it shall comply with such order. (Prior Consultation Regarding Proposals for Business Transfer etc.) 1. If the notifier intends to make a proposal to abolish, downsize, or assign all or part of the oil and mining-related businesses being conducted outside of Japan (hereinafter, the "oil and mining related businesses") by the issuing company etc. (meaning the issuing company, a domestic subsidiary thereof, or a fully equal joint venture thereof (limited to those in Japan, and being another company in which the issuing company (including any subsidiaries) has 50% of the total number of votes) (limited to companies having two shareholders or members), and not falling under the category of a subsidiary of the issuing company); hereinafter the same), or all or part of the oil refining and sales business relating to JP-5 aircraft fuel operated by Cosmo Oil Co., Ltd., the notifier will notify in advance and discuss this with the International Investment Control Office, Security Trade Control Policy Division, Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (the "Investment Office"). (Assignee in Case of Proposal for Business Transfer etc.) 2. If the notifier is to make a proposal for assigning all or part of the oil and mining-related businesses, the assignee involved in such assignment shall be limited to a business operator not falling under the category of a foreign investor as prescribed in Article 26, Paragraph 1 of the Act (hereinafter the same in this paragraph) (excluding business operators receiving the assignment on behalf of a foreign investor), or a business operator that does fall under the category of a foreign investor but that has received explicit prior consent from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. (Matters Regarding Excessive Cash-out Proposals) 3. The notifier shall not, either itself or through another entity, make any proposals

		to the issuing company or to the executives or officers of the issuing company regarding a shareholder return that would or could potentially make it difficult to operate the oil and mining-related businesses in a continuous and stable manner (meaning any returns to shareholders of the internal reserves of the issuing company by means of share buybacks, dividend increases, or any similar means, or any other actions resembling the foregoing). (Consent to Notification to the Issuing Company) 4. If the notifier has initially executed all or part of the inward direct investment etc. for which notification was made via the Written Notification, it must notify the Investment Office to that effect no later than five business days after the inward direct investment etc. was made. In addition, the notifier shall consent to allow the Investment Office to notify the issuing company on or after the date on which that notification was made about the fact that the notifier has submitted advance notification and has pledged to comply with the Compliance Matters in connection with the inward direct investment etc. in the issuing company. (Prior Consultations) 5. If there are any doubts regarding the interpretation of the Compliance Matters, the notifier shall seek prior consultations with the Investment Office. (Duty of Cooperation) 6. With regard to the status of compliance with the Compliance Matters or to any other related matters, if requested by the Investment Office, the notifier shall within reasonable limits report on the status of its compliance and otherwise cooperate as appropriate. (Changes in Circumstances) 7. If any matters arising on or after the date that the Written Notification is received necessitate a response different from what is prescribed in the Compliance

		Matters, the notifier shall obtain consent in advance from the Investment Office. In addition, if upon prior consultation with the notifier the Investment Office attaches conditions to that consent, the notifier shall comply with those conditions as part of the Compliance Matters starting from the time that consent is given. ② The advance notification given on May 29 was made at a time when the submission of the Statement of Intent was not yet planned, and the upper limit for acquisition in the advance notification at that time and the upper limit for acquisition based on the Purchase as set forth in the Statement of Intent are separate things resting on different assumptions (as discussed in our answer to 2. below, the Purchaser had submitted the advance notification in keeping with the content set forth in the Statement of Intent, and this was accepted as a submission by JD No. 618 (Minami Aoyama Fudosan) and JD No. 619 (Ms. Nomura)), and thus any questions about the relationship between the two or questions about the content of the advance notification from that date are not meaningful from the standpoint of providing information to shareholders.
2	According to the Response to the inquiry in 3. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, "City Index Eleventh will not make the advance notification regarding acquisition of shares after completion of the purchase availability period above, and Ms. Nomura and Minami Aoyama Fudosan will do so in line with the details of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.," but would it be appropriate to understand that the upper limit in the advance notification that will be conducted "in line with the details of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc." will be 24.56% of the voting rights? In addition, regarding matters that are expected to be in the statements on advance notification for inward direct investment under the Foreign Exchange Act in the above case (in particular, **including the limit of the Company's**	(1) Regarding the advance notification in keeping with the content set forth in the Statement of Intent. The Purchaser had submitted the advance notification in keeping with the content set forth in the Statement of Intent, and this was accepted as a submission by JD No. 618 (Minami Aoyama Fudosan) and JD No. 619 (Ms. Nomura). According to what is set forth in the advance notification (the advance notification for Minami Aoyama Fudosan clearly specifies that "Recently, the notifier and Aya Nomura, who has a special relationship with the notifier, sent a notification concerning an additional acquisition of the issuing company's shares with the upper limit set at 4,000,000 shares each, but in fact the total number of additional

	share certificates, etc. to be acquired by each entity, acquisition period, and matters that are expected to be indicated on the notification, etc. as pledges upon acquisition), please provide us with specific detailed information, considering the details of the current advance notification stated in 1. above. In addition, **only City Index Eleventh (which is a joint-holder of the Large-scale Purchasers) has made shareholder proposals and sent letters to the Company, and Ms. Aya Nomura and Mr. Hironao Fukushima, a representative of City Index Eleventh, attended and appeared in a meeting with the Company and press conferences. Nevertheless, Minami Aoyama Fudosan is included as a Large-scale Purchaser instead of City Index Eleventh this time, and since several entities appear in this way, it is very difficult for shareholders to understand the actual state of the Large-scale Purchasers, including the capital relationships of each company. Please provide the reason why the purchasing bodies have been changed in this way**. Specifically, please answer yes or no as to (i) whether avoiding regulations that will be imposed on major shareholders, including the provision system of short-term margins (Article 164 of the FIEA) is included in the purpose and (ii) whether enjoying maximum tax benefits is included in the purpose in anticipation of the Company conducting a TOB by an issuer based on demand of the Large-scale Purchaser Group in the future, respectively.	shares to be acquired by these two parties together is only 4,000,000 shares, and the notification stating an upper limit of 4,000,000 shares each was only made because the breakdown of the acquisition between the two parties had not yet been decided, and it was not intended to communicate that they would be acquiring a total of 8,000,000 additional shares"; the advance notification for Ms. Nomura also contains a similar statement), the upper limit of the acquisition made by the Purchasers would be 24.6% of the voting rights (the reason that this is not 24.56% is that in the advance notification, it is supposed that the percentage will be rounded off to the first decimal place). The timing of the acquisition set forth in the advance notification is "within six months after the date on which the notification is received". The pledges set forth in the advance notification have the same content as that set forth in the answer (1) to question 1 above. (2) The purchasing bodies of the Purchase have been determined as Purchasers through discussions based on the Purchasers' own circumstances. We do not believe it has become significantly difficult for the shareholders to understand the situation just because several entities appear. Our responses to both (i) and (ii) are no.
3	In the Response to 4. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics), since "the definition of the 'Large-scale Purchaser Group' is inappropriate," you disclosed information only on the "purchasers" i.e., City Index Eleventh as well as Minami Aoyama Fudosan and Ms. Nomura, but the "Large-scale Purchaser Group" was established by listing specific company names, after carefully considering the relationship in past investment cases by the Large-scale Purchasers and City Index Eleventh and their related parties (including relationships that were stated to be joint	This inquiry requests provision of information significantly beyond the scope of information disclosure required by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act for a tender offer, and we believe that this is information unnecessary for shareholders to make a decision. The Response Policies clearly specify that the information to be provided "shall be limited to the necessary and sufficient scope for the shareholders to make decisions and for the Company's Board of Directors to form opinions", and so it must be said that this question nevertheless deviates from this scope.

	holders when submitting the large-volume holdings statement) and family relationships, etc. We believe that the broad understanding of the "Large-scale Purchaser Group" including persons who may fall under specially related persons under tender offer regulations is essential in order to provide information to the Company's shareholders, in light of the fact that your company and others clearly stated that your response is "provision of information broader than that is required to be disclosed in the TOB" (response to 7. of **Part 3.** of the Information List) (as you know, in the case of TOB, formal specially related parties and substantial specially related parties of the tender offerors are also required to be disclosed in the tender offer statement) and as stated in 2. above, **Minami Aoyama Fudosan is included as the Large-scale Purchaser this time instead of City Index Eleventh (which was the counterpart of the dialogue), and the purchasing body is changing frequently**. The Company believes that information on the scope of the "Large-scale Purchaser Group" is appropriate. Please inform us of matters regarding the inquiry again (**please provide information so that it is easy for general shareholders to understand by using the capital relationship chart related to relationships between corporations and individuals that are included in the scope of the Large-scale Purchaser Group**). Among the Large-scale Purchaser Group, **it is obvious that Mr. Murakami in particular always has been a main speaker in numerous meetings with your company and others that were conducted since your company and others commenced acquisition of the Company's shares, and had a leading position in the Large-scale Purchaser Group**. Please provide the reason why you "determined that it is sufficient if we provide responses about the purchasers from the perspective of necessity of provision of information to shareholders" and believe that you do not need to provide information on Mr. Murakami, in spite of the above fact.	It should be noted that in 1. of **Part 4**, the Company mentioned that "under the Response Policies, the statement of 'substance equivalent to that which is required to be contained in a tender offer statement' is required", and it then indicated that the Purchasers' answer was inconsistent, yet the Company has likewise made numerous demands for the provision of information significantly exceeding the scope required for a tender offer, as it has with this inquiry, and there would seem to be no consistency in the scope of information that it is requesting to be provided.

	4. *Please provide the following matters with respect to the Large-scale Purchasers' joint holders and specially related parties under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (the "FIEA") concerning the share certificates, etc. of the Company, as well as the Large-scale Purchasers' parent companies, subsidiaries, and affiliated companies, those that have a direct or indirect capital relationship with the Large-scale Purchasers, groups of individuals or relatives who may exercise effective influence over the Large-scale Purchasers, and those falling under joint holders under the FIEA concerning share certificates, etc. of other companies with those parties. Under the change report submitted by City Index Eleventh regarding share certificates, etc. of the Company so far, the Large-scale Purchasers and Reno, Inc. ("Reno") are indicated as "joint holders." Please provide us with the following matters for, in addition to the four parties of City Index Eleventh, Minami Aoyama Fudosan, Ms. Nomura, and Reno (the four parties are collectively referred to as the "Large-scale Purchasers and Others"), the parties objectively acknowledged to have close relationships with the Large-scale Purchasers, regardless of whether they fall under any of the above: Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami ("Mr. Murakami"), Mr. Takateru Murakami, Mr. Yukihiro Nomura, Kabushiki Kaisha Office Support ("Office Support"), S-Grant. Co., Ltd. ("S-Grant"), Kabushiki Kaisha ATRA ("ATRA"), C&I Holdings Co., Ltd. ("C&I"), Kabushiki Kaisha MI2, City Index Holdings Co., Ltd., Kabushiki Kaisha Fortis, Kabushiki Kaisha M Investments, City Index Twelfth Co., Ltd., and Mr. Fuminori Nakashima. The Large-scale Purchasers and the parties indicated in this paragraph are collectively referred to as the "Large-scale Purchaser Group"):*	

	(1) when a party is a corporation, in addition to (i) the location of the head office, (ii) contact information in Japan, and (iii) the governing law for incorporation, the matters designated in 1. above and the following matters with respect to its representative: *(A) address;* *(B) contact information in Japan;* *(C) place of tax payment;* *(D) main banks and/or main lenders, as well as the balance of borrowings therefrom;* *(E) History over the past ten years;* *(F) investees, the investment ratio at the investees, and position at the investees;* *(G) funds effectively controlled or operated by the party, as well as the Outline of the Partners, etc., details of the investment policy, and details of the investment and lending activities over the past ten years; and* *(H) whether falling under a "Foreign Investor" and information serving as the basis thereof (including the existence of an address or residence in Japan); or* *(2) when a party is an individual, the matters from (A) through (H) above.*	
4	In the Response to 5. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, it is merely stated that "the reason for changing the capital structure was due to finances of each company and the circumstances of shareholders, as well as other circumstances," but please provide us with specific details on the (i) finances of each company, (ii) circumstances of shareholders, and (iii) other circumstances, respectively, including the time and facts serving as the basis.	This inquiry requests provision of information significantly beyond the scope of information disclosure required by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act for a tender offer, and we believe that this is information unnecessary for shareholders to make a decision.

5	In the Response to 5. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (inquiry reposted below in italics), you have not provided an answer to the inquiry below, but according to the information in the letter on May 1, 2023 by City Index Eleventh, **since ATRA is a wholly-owning parent company of Minami Aoyama Fudosan, the Large-scale Purchaser, it is obvious that the person who owns 66.6% of the voting rights of ATRA substantially controls investment decisions of Minami Aoyama Fudosan, the Large-scale Purchaser**; therefore, please provide us the details of such person, because it is important information for shareholders. In addition, relation to the details mentioned above, in the Response to 1. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, it is stated that "'the entity substantially controlling' Minami Aoyama Fudosan is **Office Support Co., Ltd., which is a wholly-owning parent company of the company**" [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company]. Does this mean that Office Support directly owns 100% of the shares of Minami Aoyama Fudosan? If so, have there been any changes in the situation "ATRA is a wholly-owning parent company of Minami Aoyama Fudosan, the Large-scale Purchaser," which is stated in the letter on May 1, 2023? If this understanding is correct, this means that the capital structure of Minami Aoyama Fudosan, the Large-scale Purchaser, has changed significantly in a short period of time (the wholly-owning parent company has been changed), but if it was changed, please provide the specific reason for the change, its background, timing, and the fact serving as the basis for making such determination. Also, in light of the possibility that the Large-scale Purchaser will increase its influence on management of the Company through the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., the actual state, including the capital relationship of the Large-scale Purchasers, is quite important as basic information to determine whether the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. will prevent improvement of the Company's corporate value and shareholders' common interests, and if you do not	Office Support directly owns 100% of the shares of Minami Aoyama Fudosan. Because ATRA is a wholly-owning parent company of Office Support, ATRA falls under a wholly-owning parent company of Minami Aoyama Fudosan as well; thus, there has been no change in the capital. Further, regarding ATRA's shareholders other than City Index Eleventh, City Index Tenth Co., Ltd. accounts for 45.4% and Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami and his relatives account for 21.2% in total.

	provide an answer to the inquiry below, it would be difficult for general shareholders of the Company to make a reasonable decision. Please provide specific details of your opinion on this point. *5. "While City Index Eleventh holds 33.4% of the voting rights of ATRA (total number of issued shares: 595), please provide the matters indicated in 4.(1) and (2) above for the holders of the other voting rights of 66.6%."*	
6	According to the Response to 8. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, it is stated that Reno moved all of its shares to Minami Aoyama Fudosan based on "fund demand of each group company." Regarding "fund demand of each group company," please provide us with the specific facts (including the details of "fund demand of each group company") serving as the basis for making such determination.	Fund demand is related to settlement of credits and debts, etc. within the group . In the first place, we believe that this inquiry requests information beyond the scope required for a tender offer and that this is information unnecessary for shareholders' decision; thus, we refrain from making further responses.
7	Regarding 10. and 11. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (each inquiry reposted below in italics), it is obvious that the ratio of the value of the share certificates, etc. of the Company to its total assets also affects behavior relating to timing of sale of the Company's share certificates, etc. and will have a material impact on investment decisions by the Company's shareholders and it is "important information for the shareholders' decision" (the Response to 10. and 11. of **Part 1**) obviously. Please sincerely provide an answer again to each inquiry. *10. "Please inform us about the ratio of the value of the share certificates, etc. of the Company for each of the Large-scale Purchasers and Others to its total assets."* *11. "Please inform us about the ratio of the value of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's shares certificates, etc. of the Company to its total assets."*	10. The financial information of Minami Aoyama Fudosan and City Index Eleventh is disclosed in Attachment 1. and 2. of the Response to the First Information List, and thus we think the ratio of the value of the share certificates, etc. of the Company to its total assets could easily be calculated. 11. This inquiry requests provision of information significantly beyond the scope of information disclosure required by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act for a tender offer, and we believe that this is information unnecessary for shareholders to make a decision. In the first place, the Company introduced the takeover defense measures in an attempt to prevent large-scale purchase actions, etc. of the Company's shares by the Purchasers or their group (at that time, such defense measures were likely premised on the determination that the Purchasers or their group had enough capital to be able to easily make a large-scale purchase action, etc.), and it is unreasonaable for the Company to now suddenly be concerned about a sale of the

		Company shares because of the Purchasers' cash flow situation.
8	Regarding 13. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics), since these actions are Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. for "the purpose of encouraging improvement of the corporate value and improvement of the shareholder value," it is obvious that this inquiry is to ask about important information for shareholders, whether corporate control is intended or not. Therefore, we believe that it is inappropriate to reject the response by stating "since the purchasers do not intend to control and manage the Company, we believe we do not need to answer this inquiry" (the Response to 13. of **Part 1.** of the Information List). Please provide us your answer with specific details again. 13. *"Please inform us specifically whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members have experience in effectively managing a company and being involved in such company's actual operations in Japan, and if 'yes,' of the specific details thereof (including the ratio of the voting rights owned by the Large-scale Purchaser Group and the form of actual management or involvement in the operations)."*	As an example, the Purchasers' group companies operate the following businesses. ・ With regard to the condominium development and sales business, they have a track record of supplying and selling condominiums more than 3,800 condominiums in the past. ・ With regard to the management of fee-based homes with nursing care for the elderly, the entrusted operation and management of for-sale condominiums for the elderly, and the in-home long-term care support business and home-visit long-term care business under the Long-Term Care Insurance Act, they provide services in the hospitality sector.
9	Regarding 19., 20., 21., 23., and 24. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (the inquiries reposted below in italics), we asked about the Large-scale Purchaser **Group**, but in the Response, **you provided answers only about Minami Aoyama Fudosan, Ms. Nomura, and City Index Eleventh**. Please provide us with specific details of the Large-scale Purchaser Group, excluding those you already provided above, again. Regarding 21. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, you provided an answer only about City Index Eleventh; therefore, please also inform us of Minami Aoyama Fudosan.	The Purchasers and their group companies have never been involved in any proxy fights at any time in the past. The Purchasers and their group companies believe the fact that the ratio of listed companies with PBRs of less than one is higher in Japan than overseas is, in many cases, attributable to the fact that these companies have large internal reserves. Therefore, we have advised listed companies not to amass any unnecessary internal reserves, and to allot whatever unnecessary internal reserves they do have to shareholder returns in order to increase their ROE. We are proud of the fact that as a result, many of these companies have seen their share prices improve. In addition, the Purchasers and their group companies have never done anything like

	19. *"Regarding the cases where the Large-scale Purchaser Group has acquired or held share certificates, etc. of listed companies in Japan, if they made, through means such as meeting with the management, and for purposes such as share price increases or returning profits to shareholders, specific proposals such as selling or separating businesses, etc. other than the existing core business, disposing of surplus assets, dividend increases, share buybacks, advising that a person recommended by the Large-scale Purchaser Group be appointed as a director, please inform us specifically of each of the following matters: the specific details of such proposals, responses of the target company that received such proposals, how the share price of the target company developed, including over the medium to long term, following its implementation of such proposals, and the details of the profits received by the Large-scale Purchaser Group thereby."* 20. *"In the cases where the Large-scale Purchaser Group has invested in listed companies in Japan, please inform us specifically of whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group conducted any proxy fights to realize its proposals and of their results."* 21. *"Please provide specific details about the Large-scale Purchaser Group's internal control system (including a corporate group internal control system) to comply with the Laws, as well as their effectiveness."* 23. *"Among the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members' past acts of investment in listed companies, if there are any cases where, after acquiring shares of a target company, they had a return or attempted to have a return on investment by causing company-related parties, such as the target company itself, large shareholders of the target company, or the management thereof, to acquire such shares (including the cases of causing acquisition through a TOB*	greenmailing. It should be noted that while we do on occasion propose a share buyback on a pro rata basis, this is limited to those cases in which we have determined that it will contribute to improving shareholder value. It should also be noted that the investees in which the Purchasers and their group companies have invested in the past number in the several hundreds, in light of which we will refrain from answering about the specific proposals made for each individual one. The initiatives taken by the Purchasers and their group companies to improve the value of listed companies have also been mentioned in the press releases of these investee companies and other such materials. We invite you to look at the following links as a reference. Central Glass: https://ssl4.eir-parts.net/doc/4044/tdnet/2182978/00.pdf Fuji Oil: https://www.foc.co.jp/ja/nwestopics/index/-- JAFCO Group: https://ss14.eir-parts.net/doc/8595/tdnet/2210539/00.pdf In addition, with regard to 21. in **Part 1** of the First Information List, since Minami Aoyama Fudosan does not fall under the category of a large company under the Companies Act, our understanding is that it is not explicitly obligated under the Companies Act to have an internal control system to comply with the Laws, but for practical reasons, it complies with roughly the same process that City Index Eleventh does.

	by an issuer and ToSTNeT-2/3), please provide the consequences leading to those acts, specific details thereof, and the like." 24. *"Regarding the investments in listed companies in Japan conducted so far by the corporations or Funds that have been controlled or operated by the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members or to which they have belonged, please inform us individually and specifically about, among other matters, the name of each investee, the reason for deciding on each investee (including specific details of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's investment standards), the timing to commence acquiring share certificates, etc., purpose of acquiring share certificates, etc., investment policy, method and period for having a return on investment, acts to make proposals to the investee, if the Large-scale Purchaser Group conducted any activity contributing to the improvement of the investee company's corporate value, specific details of such activities, details of participation in the management after the investment, existence of sales or other disposals of material property after the investment, method of acquiring share certificates, etc. of each investee, method and period for having a return on investment, developments of the business results of the investee company after the investment, and whether it was possible to establish an amicable relationship with the management and employees of the investee company."*	
10	In the Response to 19. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, in a proposal to contribute to improvement of the shareholder value provided to the investee company, you indicated as an example "collaboration with other business companies and sale of real property that does not contribute to improvement of ROE to REIT by Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd.," but **in the "Notice of Convocation of the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders" regarding the 84th annual general meeting of shareholders held on**	The Purchasers viewed it as problematic that, at the time, Nishimatsu Construction on the one hand was retaining more of its past profits than was necessary and its shareholders' equity had grown far too much, while on the other hand it was also holding onto rental properties etc. whose profitability relative to assets was relatively low compared to its core business, and it was even trying to acquire more of them, which was leading to a decline in ROE and in turn causing a decline in shareholder

	June 29, 2021, Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd. ("Nishimatsu Construction") stated that the Large-scale Purchaser Group proposed that "the company conduct large-scale share buy-back of the maximum of 200 billion yen by selling real property owned by the Company [the Company's note: Nishimatsu Construction; the same applies hereinafter in this paragraph] for funds" and in response to this proposal, Nishimatsu Construction determined "if real property owned by the Company is sold in bulk and a share buy-buck of the maximum of 200 billion yen is conducted, the financial circumstances may deteriorate and the Company may not be able to continue its business. Therefore, we believe that the large-scale share buy-back of 200 billion yen will damage the corporate value of the Company significantly." Furthermore, Nishimatsu Construction stated that "in making a proposal for such large-scale share buy-back, the Large-scale Purchaser Group clearly stated that they would like to increase the shareholding ratio of the Company to more than 1/3 of issued shares, etc. of the Company (see Article 23, paragraph (6) of the Corporate Tax Act, Article 22-3 of the Corporate Tax Act) because, if the Company conducts share buy-back by own-share TOBs, the Company can enjoy more favorable tax effects (note: the percentage not including deemed dividends goes from 50% to 100%). It is obvious that the Large-scale Purchase Group focuses on short-term profits (investment recovery), including tax benefits, which the specific shareholder's group can enjoy, rather than continuous growth of the Company, improvement of medium- to long-term corporate value, and its shareholders' common interests" and rejected the proposal of the Large-scale Purchaser Group clearly. In light of this background, even if Nishimatsu Construction sold the real property to REIT, we infer that it is not directly related to the proposal of the Large-scale Purchaser Group. Please provide the reason why you indicated the case of Nishimatsu Construction as an example of a	value. As such, the Purchasers made a balance sheet management proposal to improve its circumstances. The content set forth in of the "Notice of Convocation of the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders" regarding the 84th general meeting of shareholders stated, as one example of a measure to improve the company's balance sheet that was after all possible among the proposed activities, that a buyback of own shares would be more reasonable than the acquisition of real property from the standpoint of a return on investment; in our understanding, this shows that a mere portion of the whole content has arbitrarily been clipped out and exaggerated, for the purpose of asserting the feasibility of the company's proposal at the general meeting of shareholders. As a result, subsequently, we received proposals from Nishimatsu Construction concerning various measures to improve shareholder value, and the Purchasers consent to this, judging that it would contribute to improving such value for all shareholders. Therefore, we believe that the sale of real property for the REIT by Nishimatsu Construction was an outcome that was related to the series of proposals made by the Purchasers, and in fact we were even told by Nishimatsu Corporation that "we believe the proposals we have received are good ones".

	proposal that contributed to improvement of shareholder value of the investee company in spite of the above circumstances.	
11	Regarding 22. of **Part 1** of the Information List, you answered regarding Minami Aoyama Fudosan, a company which is part of the Large-scale Purchasers, that "**since financial results about the settlement were not announced due to administrative errors, we are proceeding with the procedures for it now**" [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company], but regarding the TOB for shares of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd. (currently Shibaura Machine Co., Ltd.) by City Index Eleventh, in the response on p. 21 of the submitted "responses to the inquiries for the tender offerors" on February 4, 2020, you provided a similar response, stating "each company of the tender offeror group, **including Minami Aoyama Fudosan,** confirmed **financial results of the settlement were not announced due to administrative errors and thus we are proceeding with the procedures for now**" [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company]." **Please provide the specific reason why you have not announced financial results, even though there was sufficient time of more than three years to deal with it from that time to now (including details of "administrative errors")**. In addition, such **failure to announce financial results breaches Article 440, paragraph (1) of the Companies Act and is subject to sanctions of a civil penalty to directors (Article 976, item (ii) of the Companies Act). Furthermore, if you made false statements about important matters or omitted a statement of material fact that is necessary to prevent it from being misleading in the response letter to inquiries in the TOB for shares of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., it will constitute a material breach of laws and regulations which will be subject to criminal penalties under the FIEA (Article 197-2, item (vi), Article 27-10, paragraph (11) of the same Act)**. Please provide specific details about whether you recognize that there is a	Regarding the inquiry in the 'responses to the inquiries for the tender offerors' on February 4, 2020, submitted by City Index Eleventh in the TOB for shares of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., assuming that the 'tender offeror group' includes Minami Aoyama Fudosan, Minami Aoyama Fudosan is not included in the 'tender offeror group' and the basis of the inquiry is wrong. It should be noted that although the Purchasers confirmed whether the financial results had been announced for the Company's subsidiaries, it could not be confirmed that financial results had been announced for the following seven subsidiaries. City Index Eleventh inquired with the Company to see whether the relevant subsidiaries had announced their financial results, and if so when and by what method they had made the announcements, but as of the time that the Response (1) was submitted, we have yet to receive any response from the Company (we did receive a communication on September 6 to the effect that "We are currently checking into this, and we respectfully ask for a little more time."). *COSMO ENERGY EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION CO., LTD., COSMO OIL SALES CORPORATION, COSMO OIL PROPERTY SERVICE CO., LTD., COSMO OIL MARKETING CO., LTD., COSMO TECHNO YOKKAICHI CO., LTD., COSMO TRADE & SERVICE CO., LTD, and COSMO MATSUYAMA OIL CO., LTD.*

	problem under compliance regarding such circumstances, and regarding consistency with your response to 21. of **Part 1** of the Information List "the purchasers care about legal compliance and are making an effort to maintain legality of business activities by asking assistance and advice from lawyers and other outside experts, as necessary." In addition, in 22. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, you provided answers only about City Index Eleventh and Minami Aoyama Fudosan. Please provide answers about other Large-scale Purchaser **Groups** in the same way.	
12	Regarding 25. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics), you stated "Ms. Yoko Atsumi does not fall under a 'related party' and thus this question lacks premise. Your company requested that the purchasers provide answers, such as the reason why they determined that Ms. Yoko Atsumi does not fall under a related party, but the party claiming that she falls under a related party (your company) should provide the reason why you think so." On this point, **regarding Ms. Atsumi, the Company recognizes the facts as stated in Exhibit 2 (Attached as an Exhibit of the Information List (2). In addition, partially correction of errors, emphasis and underline added by the Company.) of the press release on May 23, 2023 of the Company "Notice Concerning Opposing Opinion of the Company's Board of Directors to the Shareholder Proposal at the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders." In addition, in light of the fact that she is serving as a representative lawyer of City Index Eleventh in the case of petition for provisional injunction order against share option gratis allocation by City Index Eleventh against Japan Asia Group Limited in April 2021, we understand that it is quite possible that she falls under a "related party" as a "person who receives a large amount of money and other assets" from the Large-scale Purchaser Group (Article 2, paragraph (1), item (ii), (e) of the Order on Inward Direct Investment)**. The purpose of this question is to confirm compliance in the	The Company states that in light of the fact that Ms. Yoko Atsumi is serving as a representative lawyer of City Index Eleventh in the case of petition for provisional injunction order against share option gratis allocation by City Index Eleventh against Japan Asia Group Limited in April 2021, it is quite possible that she falls under a 'related party' as a 'person who receives a large amount of money and other assets' from the Large-scale Purchaser Group. Nevertheless, in the above case, the person with whom City Index Eleventh executed the delegation agreement is not Ms. Yoko Atsumi, but the legal professional corporation to which Ms. Yoko Atsumi belonged at that time; therefore, your indication is inappropriate.

	Large-Scale Purchaser Group, not with respect to Ms. Atsumi personally. Please provide an answer to the inquiry again considering these circumstances. 25. *"At the Company's Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, held on June 22, 2023, the Large-scale Purchaser and Others submitted a shareholder proposal (the "Shareholder Proposal"), which proposed to appoint Ms. Yoko Atsumi ("Ms. Atsumi"), who had a transactional relationship with the Large-scale Purchaser Group, which was a "Foreign Investor," and could fall under a "related party" as "a person that has received a large amount of money or any other property" (Article 2, paragraph (1), item (ii)(e) of the Order on Inward Direct Investment) from the Large-scale Purchaser Group, as a director of the Company, and exercised its voting rights to approve the proposal. Please provide the details indicated on the advance notification by the Large-scale Purchaser Group in this regard and the current status of the procedures. In relation to the above, if the Large-scale Purchaser and Others determines that Ms. Atsumi does not fall under a "related party" as she is not "a person that has received a large amount of money or any other property," please specifically provide the reason and the facts serving as the basis for making such determination."*	

Part 2 Details of Share Purchase Conducted

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the response to the inquiry in 7. of **Part 2.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics), it is stated that "Nothing was pointed out by the Company (in the past letters) regarding the rapid purchases of share certificates, etc. of the Company indicated	We do not believe that the purchases of the Company's shares that were made between March 10, 2022 and April 4, 2022 had an adverse effect on general shareholders (the Company's assessment of those purchases is a one-sided determination offered by the

	in the inquiry. Furthermore, since the ratio of shares of the Company obtained as a result of the Share Purchase Conducted is approximately 20%, and considering that they were not purchases made to acquire control of the Company or a veto on matters requiring a special resolution in ordinary general meetings of shareholders, the purchasers do not recognize such purchases as having an adverse effect on general shareholders." However, regarding the statement above, in light of fostering the environment for constrictive conversation with Mr. Murakami and the Large-scale Purchasers Group, the fact that the Company did not point out anything does not mean that the Company recognizes there to have been no problem in the process of the Share Purchase Conducted. In addition, regarding the reason above, since the ratio of share certificates, etc. of the Company obtained by the Large-scale Purchasers and Others as a result of the Share Purchase Conducted is approximately 20%, the ratio of shareholding is not small, and even if "they were not purchases made to acquire control of the Company or a veto on matters requiring a special resolution in ordinary general meetings of shareholders," the Large-scale Purchaser and Others stated that from the viewpoint of improving the Company's corporate value and shareholder value, the Large-scale Purchasers and Others purchased share certificates, etc. of the Company **to influence the Company's management**, and they substantively acknowledged that the Share Purchase Conducted would have an important effect on the Company's corporate value; therefore, please sincerely provide an answer again. 7. *"Please inform us of the specific reason that you chose the market purchase method for the Share Purchase Conducted (i.e., the reason that you selected the market purchase, even though a TOB and other methods were available). Further,* ***in the Share Purchase Conducted, as shown by the fact that the Large-scale Purchaser Group increased its holding ratio of share certificates, etc. by 8.28% during a***	Company, and we do not accept it). If the Company is asserting that an adverse effect was had, the Company should clearly specify in concrete terms what sort of adverse effect it is claiming was had. As the Company itself admits, the Company did not recognize there to have been any problem with the purchases, and yet it in the First Information List, it suddenly began to find a problem with the purchases, seemingly as a contrivance, and thus it seems that the inquiry set forth in the Information List was not intended to provide information to shareholders, but rather is being used to attack the Purchasers in order to protect the Company's own senior management.

	period of only 26 days (17 business days) from March 10, 2022 to April 4, 2022, and increased its holding ratio of share certificates, etc. by 7.64 % during a period of only 80 days (54 business days) from July 26, 2022 to October 13, 2022, the Large-scale Purchaser Group purchased a large amount of the Company's share certificates, etc. during short periods of time both before and after the period in which it had no choice but to suspend the purchase of the Company's share certificates, etc. due to the advance notification procedures pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Act. *Please inform us of your specific understanding in regard to the adverse effects on general shareholders caused by these rapid purchases of the Company's share certificates, etc. from the market, which were conducted without providing sufficient information."*	
2	In the response to 8. of **Part 2** of the Information List, it is stated that "because the Company's remark to the effect that 'the Company is seriously discussing the improvement of the corporate value and shareholder value' was not true, and under the current circumstances we cannot avoid determining that the purchasers' assumption that 'your company will announce a path to improve your corporate value and shareholder value that is satisfactory to the shareholders' will not hold up, the purchaser indicated the intention to acquire 20% or more of the Company's shares." On the other hand, as stated in question (v) above, in a meeting on January 6, 2023 between the Company, City Index Eleventh, Ms. Nomura, and Mr. Murakami, the Company told Mr. Murakami that as the appropriateness of the Share Buy-back was related to the Company's medium-term management strategy, the Company planned to explain necessary equity capital in the Medium Term Management Plan, scheduled to be announced in March 2023, and could not make a definite promise regarding the implementation of the Share Buy-back as of January 6, 2023. **In response, Mr. Murakami made a one-sided announcement that they would acquire 20% or**	As in the response to 8. of **Part 2** of the First Information List, the reason that the Purchasers requested that the Company carry out the share buyback was that with regard to the Euro-Yen Convertible Bonds with Stock Acquisition Rights Due 2022, which were worth 60 billion yen and set to mature in December 2022, the Company did not purchase all of those convertible bonds, and ultimately 32 billion yen worth were converted, with the capital increase which resulted in a PBR of one (or less) leading to a dilution of existing shareholders. Although the Purchasers had appealed to the Company a number of times about the necessity of the share buyback, a needless amount of time had continued to pass without any sufficient explanation from the Company; in light of these circumstances, it had to be said that the Purchasers' assumption that "your company will announce a path to improve your corporate value and shareholder value that is satisfactory to the shareholders" had not held up at that time, and as such we believe that the additional purchasing of the Company's shares by the Purchasers in no way whatsoever contradicts what the Purchasers communicated to the Company, and that the Company's observation is off the mark.

	more of the Company's shares as calculated on a large-volume holdings statement basis as the Share Buy-back was not promised as of the meeting date of January 6, 2023, and expressed an intention that there was no room for discussion regarding this point and actually the Large-scale Purchasers and Others commenced the additional purchasing of the Company's shares. Please explain the specific reason that the one-sided announcement above was made and commenced additional purchasing the Company's shares without waiting for the announcement of the specific measures of the Medium Term Management Plan even though the Company stated that the Company's Medium Term Management Plan was scheduled to be announced and that the Company planned to explain necessary equity capital in the plan.	It should also be noted, as a supplementary note, that the Purchasers told the Company repeatedly that even if the Company executed the share buyback, they had no intention of selling in response to it.

Part 3 Purposes, method, and details of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the response to the inquiry in 1. of **Part 3.** of the Information List, it is stated that "Minami Aoyama Fudosan made joint investments with City Index Eleventh and Ms. Nomura in the past, and as a result of the consultation between purchasers, it was deemed desirable for Minami Aoyama Fudosan and Ms. Nomura to be the entity to make the Purchase;" as such inquiry stated, **since the reason why it was deemed "desirable for Minami Aoyama Fudosan and Ms. Nomura to be the entity to make the Purchase" as a result of such consultation, even though Minami Aoyama Fudosan (we understand that Mr. Tatsuya Ikeda serves as a representative director , and there are no directors other than him) has no involvement (the previous meetings had been conducted between the Company and City Index Eleventh, Ms. Nomura and Mr. Murakami) as stated in the same inquiry as well, is important**. Please inform us about the specific details of this point. Furthermore, in what way do you	Firstly, it is incorrect that Minami Aoyama Fudosan has not been involved in any consultation with you. Minami Aoyama Fudosan just did not participate in in-person consultations with you directly, and with regard to the details of consultations between City Index Eleventh and Ms. Nomura and you, three parties had consultations, and that consultation among the three parties was for purposes of encouraging you to improve corporate value and shareholder value. Even the process leading up to the decision that the Purchasers would be the entities involved in the Purchase, which occurred via consultations among the three parties, obviously proceeded on the basis that the three parties acted together to encourage you to improve corporate value and shareholder value.

	think the details of such consultation will contribute to the "purpose of encouraging improvement of (the Company's) corporate value and shareholder value" explained in the Statement of Intent?	
2	In the response to the inquiry in 8. of **Part 3.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics), it is stated that "Even assuming that the ratio of voting rights exercised at the Company's 8th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders was approximately 87.5%." Even assuming such ratio of voting rights exercised, the planned number of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is sufficient **for a small number of shareholders jointly acting in cooperation with one another** to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution in the Company's ordinary general meetings of shareholders; in addition, unlike the Company's Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders in which the proposal for enactment of countermeasures based on the Response Policies and proposal for appointment of directors by shareholder proposal were agenda items, **the ratio of voting rights exercised at the Company's Seventh Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders held on June 24, 2022**, **which was held** in **the** ordinary situation**, was approximately 75.0%**, and considering such ratio of voting rights exercised, **the ratio of voting rights deemed to be held by the Large-scale Purchasers and Others as a result of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (24.56%) is sufficient for a small number of shareholders jointly acting in cooperation with one another to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution in the Company's ordinary general meetings of shareholders.** Furthermore, the proposals listed in the response to the inquiry in 17. of **Part 7.** of the Information List include matters which may be sufficient to constitute matters requiring a special resolution in the Company's ordinary general meetings of shareholders, such as a proposal for the spin-off of Cosmo Eco Power Co., Ltd. ("ECP"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company engaged in the	The percentage of voting rights exercised at the Seventh Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders to which you referred took place in a non-contentious situation, where there were no shareholder proposals or other similar matters. The percentage of Purchasers' voting rights becomes significant when there is a conflict between the policies of your management and the Purchasers. We believe that the exercise of a percentage of voting rights to which you should refer is not approximately 75% of the Seventh Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, which occurred at a non-contentious meeting, but is approximately 87.5% of the Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders. In addition, the Company asserts as it has in this case that "if the shareholders of the company think that the corporate value of the company will be lost under the strong influence of the Large-scale Purchaser Group, rather than remaining a minority shareholder of such a company, they may be forced to consider immediately selling their shares of the company in the market", but assuming that that assertion holds true, then surely the share price would have gone up after the takeover defense measures were approved at the Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, and the share price would have then gone down after the Purchasers submitted the Statement of Intent. In fact, the share price has done just the reverse of that, and we wonder what the Company thinks about that.

renewable energy business, (through dividend in kind of shares,) , transferring the crude oil development business, the Company becoming an affiliate company of other companies, or the consolidation and abolition of refineries by transferring all or part of them. Based on the above, please sincerely provide a response to such inquiry again.

8. *"**In the Statement of Intent, regarding the planned number of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., it is stated that you intend to acquire 24.56% of the shares as the voting rights ratio; however, considering the ratio of voting rights exercised at the Company, the planned number of purchases is sufficient to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution by a small number of shareholders acting in cooperation with one another at the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders and there will be a structural coercion in the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.** (if the shareholders of the Company think that the corporate value of the Company will be lost under the strong influence of the Large-scale Purchaser Group, rather than remaining a minority shareholder of such a company, they may be forced to consider immediately selling their shares of the Company in the market). While the Large-scale Purchasers stated "there is no coercion in purchase by the Company and others" in the Statement of Intent (we understand that such statement is related to the Share Purchase Conducted), there are no statements in the Statement of Intent about your understanding of the structural coercion related to the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. that may be conducted in the future. In regard to this point, please inform us why you made no statements about the coercion related to the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. and of your specific understanding as the Large-scale Purchaser Group in regard to the above structural coercion. In addition,*

	please inform us of measures that the Large-scale Purchaser Group is taking or plans to take in order to avoid or mitigate such coercion."	
3	In the response to the inquiry in 10. of **Part 3.** of the Information List, regarding the possibility of additional purchases of share certificates, etc. of the Company in the future, it is stated that "since the purchase period of the Purchase will not end until one year after the submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., nothing has been determined at this time. **If we intend to acquire additional shares of the Company after the completion of the purchase period, it would be acceptable for the Company to re-confirm the intentions of shareholders regarding whether the additional acquisition is appropriate, if necessary at the time."[the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company]** We understand that such statement means that the Large-scale Purchasers assume prior confirmation of intentions of the Company's shareholders for the additional acquisition of shares of the Company at the Company's ordinary general meetings of shareholders if the Company's Board of Directors considers it necessary, and **if the Large-scale Purchasers assume that the method to confirm the intentions of the Company's shareholders for the additional purchases is to make an ordinary resolution, which includes the voting rights of the Large-scale Purchaser Group, since the voting rights ratio of the Large-scale Purchaser Group will further increase at that time, in effect, it would be even more difficult to reflect the intentions of general shareholders other than the Large-scale Purchaser Group, and we must say that such step-by-step purchases (in the United States and other countries, its problematic nature has already been pointed out as creeping takeover/acquisition) are a purchase method that disrespects the intentions of the Company's general shareholders**. Please provide your perception in this regard as the Large-scale Purchaser Group.	The Purchasers have not adopted a purchase method that disrespects the intentions of the Company's general shareholders (the Company's assessment is nothing more than a one-sided determination meant to protect its own senior management). In the first place, in the fifth agenda item at the Company's Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders (Approval Regarding Enactment of Countermeasures Based on Response Policies to Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.), the Company moved to enforce the MoM resolution and to exclude the exercising of voting rights by City and Other Parties, while declining to exclude the voting rights of approximately 22% of the cross-shareholders in a broader sense that seemed most likely to exercise their voting rights in a way that would be advantageous to the Company's senior management, and so this was quite far removed from being a fair resolution. The fact is that when City Index Eleventh exercised its right to request the inspection or copying of voting forms, etc., it was found that in terms of the percentage of voting rights, 99.4% of the officers (past and current), employees (past and current), employee shareholding associations, officer shareholder associations, operating companies deemed to be trading partners, and counterparty financial institutions (hereinafter, "Company-Involved Shareholders") that could be expected to vote in a way that would be advantageous to the Company had in fact been in favor of the resolution. In light of the foregoing, the Company-Involved Shareholders could be said to be "ruling party shareholders" for the Company's senior management, almost without exception. The fact that the Company would justify the MoM resolution in this way, without mentioning at all how it handled the voting rights of shareholders in an advantageous way for protecting its own senior management, could well be thought of disrespecting the intentions of the general shareholders.

4	In the response to the inquiries in 3. of **Part 1.** and 10. of **Part 3.** of the Information List, it is stated that "City will not make the advance notification regarding acquisition of shares after completion of the purchase availability period above, and Ms. Nomura and Minami Aoyama Fudosan will do so in line with the details of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.," and "since the purchase period of the Purchase will not end until one year after the submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., nothing has been determined at this time. If we intend to acquire additional shares of the Company after the completion of the purchase period, it would be acceptable for the Company to re-confirm the intentions of shareholders regarding whether the additional acquisition is appropriate, if necessary at the time;" please provide a specific response to the following inquiries regarding such statements again. (i) **<u>If the Large-scale Purchaser acquires shares of the Company until the voting rights ratio in the Company exceeds 24.56% after implementation of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., please provide us about the maximum number of additional shares of the Company that may be acquired</u>**. In relation to this, please inform us about the specifics of the expected details of the written procedures for advance notification under the Foreign Exchange Act (including an entity scheduled to acquire share certificates, etc. of the Company, the maximum number of share certificates, etc. of the Company to be acquired by each entity, and matters expected to be stated in written notifications, etc. as the pledges during the acquisition period and at the time of acquisition) (notwithstanding the upper limit of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., this includes whether the Large-scale Purchaser plans to apply for acquisition of the maximum number of share certificates, etc., 9.99%, of each entity as before). In	(i) In our response to the First Information List, we already responded that nothing has yet been decided regarding purchases after expiration of the purchase period of the Purchase, and your request to explain in detail the "possibility" of matters about which nothing has yet been decided and which are nearly a year hence is impractical. Our response is 'yes' to the question that it will be at least a year hence or more (from submission of the Statement of Intent) if we are to acquire Company's shares in excess of 24.56%. (ii) As noted in our response to (i), nothing has yet been decided. In addition, if anyone belonging to the Purchasers' group other than the Purchasers is to acquire Company shares in excess of 24.56%, it will be at least a year hence or more (from submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.). (iii) Our response is the same as that given for (ii).

	addition, since it is stated that "the purchase period of the Purchase will not end until one year after the submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.," **we understand that if the Large-scale Purchaser acquires shares of the Company until the voting rights ratio exceeds 24.56%, it will do so after a period of at least one year, and please just in case answer yes or no as to whether this understanding is correct**. (ii) **There is no statement regarding the possibility of acquisition of shares of the Company by the Large-scale Purchaser Group excluding the Large-scale Purchaser; please provide whether there is a possibility that the Large-scale Purchaser Group will acquire additional shares of the Company in the future**. (iii) Regarding (ii) above, if there is a possibility that the Large-scale Purchaser Group excluding the Large-scale Purchaser will acquire additional shares of the Company in the future, please provide the way the Large-scale Purchaser Group may assume (purpose and time of acquisition, number of shares to be acquired, methods and policy of acquisition, etc.)	
5	In relation to 9. of **Part 3.** of the Information List, in change report No. 12 dated April 14, 2023 for the large-volume holdings statement submitted by City Index Eleventh, the Large-scale Purchasers and Others states "investments and the act of providing advice and making important suggestions, etc., to the management depending on situations" as the purpose of holding ("the Act of Making Important Suggestions, etc." includes disposition of important property, important changes to capital policy, etc.), but in such response to the inquiry, it is only stated that "the purchaser will continue to ask the Company's management to continuously improve the profit of all shareholders of the Company," and no specific answer has been provided. In this regard, considering that the Large-scale Purchaser submitted the	First, as we also stated in our response in 2. of **Part 2**, with regard to the Euro-Yen Convertible Bonds with Stock Acquisition Rights Due 2022, which were worth 60 billion yen and set to mature in December 2022, the Company did not purchase all of those convertible bonds, and ultimately 32 billion yen worth were converted, with the capital increase which resulted in a PBR of one (or less) leading to a dilution of existing shareholders, and in response to this the Purchasers have already proposed to the Company multiple times that it execute a share buyback with respect to the converted portion. In addition, in terms of the Act of Making Important Suggestions, etc. envisioned by the Purchasers, we believe that a material change in dividend policy (dividend increase)

	Statement of Intent and declared it will purchase the shares of the Company until the voting rights ratio reaches 24.56% in such Statement of Intent, we believe that the Large-scale Purchaser has some specific assumptions about such "Act of Making Important Suggestions, etc.;" please inform us about the specific details of what is considered "an act of making important suggestions, etc." at this time and how you believe this will contribute to the medium- to long-term corporate value of the Company and its shareholders' common interests. If the Large-scale Purchaser determines that it is not in a situation where it should conduct "an Act of Making Important Suggestions, etc." at present, please inform us specifically about the basis for such determination.	or a material change regarding capital policy (other than the abovementioned share buyback) are possible. In response to the fact that the Company's equity capital has exceeded its stated target of 400 billion yen for the past 13 years, the Purchasers have requested for some time now that the Company fulfill its responsibility of providing explanations to the shareholders, and that it also prescribe appropriate equity capital standards and return any portion exceeding them to the shareholders in full. However, not only did the Company decline to carry out the aforementioned own-share buyback and leave its existing shareholders diluted through the capital increase that resulted in in a PBR of less than one, we believe that when it abruptly raised the target sum to 600 billion yen without providing any reasonable explanation for it under the Seventh Medium-Term Management Plan, it also brought about the deterioration of its medium- and long-term capital efficiency. Moreover, according to page 5 of the Company's FY2022 Consolidated Financial Results, the explanation regarding the Shareholder Return Policy FY2023 entailed "60% or more of the total payout ratio (excluding impact of inventory valuation) (three-year cumulative)", and "dividends of 200 yen/share or higher", while the "Notice Regarding Revision of Policy on Shareholder Returns and Revision of Dividend Forecast" dated August 10 announced an increase to "dividends of 250 yen/share or higher", but in light of the FY2023 Financial Forecast published by the Company it is clear that the dividend schedule in question along will not enable the FY2023 total return ratio to reach 60%. Under these circumstances, we foresee that if the actual equity capital amount exceeds or could reasonably be expected to exceed the equity capital target amount, which was reasonably established, then we will demand that the Company establish an appropriate equity capital amount by means of a dividend increase or an own-share buyback. We wish to add well that the Purchasers are a major shareholder of the Company and would never make any proposals that would damage the Company's corporate value or shareholder value.

		With regard to an Act of Making Important Suggestions, etc. that might be proposed in relation to business integration or business transfer, please see our answer to 17. in **Part 7** of the First Information List and our answer to **Part II** in the response (1).
6	In the response to the inquiry in 9. of **Part 3.** of the Information List, it is stated that "since the price of shares of the Company has been left undervalued by the Company's management who prefers self-protection to the improvement of shareholder value, we intend to acquire shares of the Company." In addition, based on other the Large-scale Purchaser Group's investment cases, we understand that **only the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is for the Large-scale Purchaser Group to obtain capital gain**. Also, in other inquires, no other positive response or explanation was provided as to why the Voting Rights Ratio will be increased to 24.56% from the viewpoint of improving the Company's corporate value; please provide your perception of this understanding.	First, the Company says that "Based on other the Large-scale Purchaser Group's investment cases, we understand that only the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is for the Large-scale Purchaser Group to obtain capital gain," but since there is no guarantee whatsoever that after the Purchase is made at an undervalued share price the undervaluing would be corrected in the short term, the Company's understanding is wrong. Next, the Company's senior management has not made any serious efforts to improve shareholder value for a long time, but having acquired the Company's shares the Purchasers have urged the Company's senior management to improve shareholder value, and as a result the Company has begun to direct its attention—albeit not to a sufficient extent—toward the improvement of shareholder value. The Purchasers believe that by acquiring more of the Company's shares and providing stronger inducements to the Company's senior management, they can encourage the Company to more seriously direct their attention to improving shareholder value, thereby encouraging the sustainable improvement of shareholder value for all of the Company's shareholders.
7	In the inquiry in 16. of **Part 3.** of the Information List, we asked for an overview of advisers employed by the Large-scale Purchasers and Others for the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., because the "Company's Basic Policies for the Control of the Company Based on the Fact that City Index Eleventh Co., Ltd. and Other Parties Carry Out Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. of the Company's Share Certificates, etc. and Response Policies to Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. of the Company's Share Certificates, etc." states that the advisors, as part of the specific shareholders' group, may	There are no advisers who own any of the Company's shares, or who are planning to acquire them. As the Purchasers inquired in the response given to 16. in **Part 3** of the First Information List, we would like to see the Company disclose the advisers that it improperly appointed with regard to the MoM resolution and the Information List at the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders. Based on what the Purchasers have heard, it seems that the Company appointed IR Japan, Inc. and attorneys closely related

	be treated as one with the Large-scale Purchasers and Others (please see Note 1 on page 13 of the press release concerning the same response policies as of January 11, 2023). Since this is not a request for disclosure of the details of advisory agreements, please provide a response thereto again.	to that company as its advisers, and it is assumed that they were paid large fees for their counsel (we would also point out that the Information List contains many questions that are nearly identical in their content to those set forth in the questionnaire that was sent by Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd. when City Index Eleventh made a tender offer to Toshiba Machine in 2020). What is required of the Company's senior management is not its own protection, but rather the improvement of shareholder value, and therefore the use of capital received from shareholders for the former purpose is not permissible, and we ask that this disclosure be made immediately.

Part 4 Basis for funds of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the inquiry in 4. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, most parts of the basic information concerning the "Large-scale Purchaser Group" were not disclosed, and in the response to the inquiry in 8. of **Part 1**. of the Information List, it is stated that "based on the demand for funds from each of the purchaser's group companies, etc., the shares were transferred," and the fact that the demand for funds from each of the purchaser's group companies, etc. is fluid was suggested; in the response to the inquiry in 2. of **Part 4.** of the Information List, it is stated that "the Purchase will be made using the purchaser's own funds (**including funds of the purchaser's group companies**). We believe that it is clear only by reference to the shares held that were disclosed by the purchaser **and its group companies** in the large-volume holdings statement and its change report that funds necessary and sufficient for the Purchase can be prepared" [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company]. **While the Large-scale Purchasers refused to provide responses regarding the information concerning the Large-scale Purchaser Group other than the Large-**	Since the purchasing entity and the provider of capital are different in nature, we do not believe there is any lack of consistency here. In addition, the fact that the Purchasers have the financial backing needed to make the Purchase is evident from the responses given to the First Information List. In the first place, in the Notice of Convocation of the Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, one of the proposed reasons for the resolution to approve the takeover defense measures was stated to be that "the Company has reasonably concluded that it is highly probable that City and Other Parties will commence the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., with regard to the Company's share certificates, etc. to acquire up to 29.97%, which will be the upper limit in the future pursuant to their advance notification based on the inward direct investment regulations under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (or 39.96%, the current upper limit permitted in practice under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act) after the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders." Therefore, it has to be said that for the Company to tell its

	scale Purchaser in other parts, here was a response that there would be no problem because "the purchaser's group companies" have funds, etc., and the responses lack consistency, but under the Response Policies, the statement of "substance equivalent to that which is required to be contained in a tender offer statement" is required, and for the TOB, the "document sufficient to show existence of a tender offeror's balance of deposits in banks, etc. and other funds necessary for tender offer (securities, etc. if securities, etc. are in exchange for purchases, etc.)" (Article 13, paragraph (1), item (vii) of the Cabinet Office Ordinance on Disclosure Required for Tender Offer for Share Certificates, etc. by Person Other than Issuer) is required. Based on the foregoing, please provide a response to the inquiry in 2. of **Part 4.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics), in addition to the inquiry in 3. of **Part 1.** above, again. 2. *If part or all of the funds pertaining to the Share Purchase Conducted and the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., are funds on hand of individuals, funds, corporations, unions, or other organizations of the Large-scale Purchaser Group, please provide specific details regarding the funds on hand (including the name of the owner of the funds and ownership form, the amount of funds, the ratio of funds on hand and external funds). In addition, please present materials indicating that you have these funds on hand.*	shareholders that the Purchasers would very likely acquire around 10% to around 20% more shares in an effort to get them to agree to the takeover defense measures, while telling the Purchasers to demonstrate that they had the funds to acquire less than an additional 5% more (and doubting whether they even had enough funds to purchase less than 5% more), is an appalling contradiction.

Part 5. Management policy, business Plan, capital policy, and dividend policy of the Company and the Company's group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the responses to the inquiries in 1., 3., and 4. of **Part 7.** of the Information List (the inquiries reposted below in italics), it is respectively stated that "the purpose of	As stated in the Response to 2. of **Part 3**, the voting turnout of the Seventh Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders to which the Company refers took place in a non-

	the Purchase is not to acquire a majority of the Company's voting rights, and **the purchasers** do not intend to acquire the Company's management control," and "**the purchasers** do not plan to acquire the Company's management control through the Large-scale Purchase" "even after the Purchase, **the purchasers** do not have the decision rights of 'management policy, business plan, financial plan, capital policy, dividend policy and asset utilization policy'." [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company], but as stated in 2. of **Part 3.** above, (notwithstanding the intention or schedule of the acquisition of the management control,) considering that the substantial impact of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. on the management of the Company's group is large, please provide a response to such inquiries as the Large-scale Purchaser Group again. 1. *"Please inform us whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group intends to participate in the business management of the Company; and if it does, please inform us of the details and the policy."* 3. *"Please provide specific details of the contemplated management policy, business plan, financial plan, fund plan, investment plan, capital policy, and dividend policy of the Company and the Company's group after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (including plans related to business of the Company, sale of assets, provision of security, and other disposition after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.), customers, business partners, officers, employees of the Company and the Company's group after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., local governments in which real property or manufacturing and production facilities operated and managed by the Company are located, and other treatment policy of*	contentious situation where there were no shareholder proposals, etc. A situation where the Purchasers' veto will become an issue can be said to be a general meeting where there is a contentious relationship; thus, the Purchasers believe that the voting turnout that should be referred to is not the approximately 75% turnout of the non-contentious Seventh Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders but is the approximately 87.5% turnout of the Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders. Accordingly, in light of the fact that the Purchasers' percentage of voting rights after the Purchase remained 24.56%, it is clear that this question is lacking in its premise.

	stakeholders of the Company." 4. *"In relation to 3. above, there are no statements in the Statement of Intent about expected "management policy, business plan, financial plan, capital policy, dividend policy, asset utilization policy of the Company and the Company's group companies" after completion of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. Considering the ratio of voting rights exercised at the Company, the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. are sufficient to have a substantial veto on matters requiring a special resolution by a small number of shareholders acting in cooperation with one another at the Company's ordinary general meeting of shareholders. Needless to say, if the purpose of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is to encourage the Company to improve the corporate value and the shareholder value as a shareholder, you should offer an opinion about the above items proactively; moreover, if there are any planned matters, you should disclose them from the perspective of providing sufficient information to the general shareholders. However, considering that there are no statements about each of the above items, would it be possible to understand that you have never considered the above items? If you have considered them, please provide the specific reason why you did not state the details in the Statement of Intent and the details of the consideration."*	

Part 6 Investment activities by Mr. Murakami and the companies, etc. over which he exercises influence

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Since you did not provide your responses to the inquiry in 12. of **Part 10.** of the Information List, "please explain your opinion on a series of these responses by Sanshin Electronics," the inquiry in 14. of the same part "please explain your opinion on a series	The purport of this question is unclear, and in terms of providing information to the Company's shareholders regarding the Purchase, we believe that no response to this should even be required, but regarding Sanshin Electronics at that time, we recognize

	of these responses by Hoosiers," and the inquiry in 16. of the same part, "please explain your opinion on such responses by Daiho," please sincerely provide each of your responses thereto again.	that the amounts of general reserve, capital reserve, and retained surplus were obviously large compared to the amount of capital surplus due to any past circumstance. we recognized that the fact that Hoosiers at that time received dividends from its consolidated subsidiaries, when a new Medium-Term Management Plan, a capital policy, and a shareholder return policy were being formulated, is related to such responses. we recognized that although 7.5 billion yen in capital reserves was transferred to other capital surplus, the amount of capital reserves was increased shortly thereafter by 20.0 billion yen through the third-party share issuance capital increase to Aso. Accordingly, we believe that each company determined that there were no financial obstacles with respect to Sanshin Electronics and Daiho, that there was no impact on the full-year consolidated financial settlement with respect to Hoosiers, and that they had no problem from the viewpoints of liquidity on hand and total financial stability, and because such responses were carried out for a TOB by an issuer which was explained in the companies' respective press releases as being implemented to improve their corporate value, the Purchasers understand that the series of responses did help improve their corporate value.
2	In the response to the inquiry in 13. of **Part 10.** of the Information List, it is stated that "In regard to the statement in the inquiry that 'the Large-scale Purchaser Group concentrated its shares in Hoosiers only in City Index Eleventh,' this was implemented on May 15, 2020 in relation to the financing, etc. by each company," but please inform us about the specifics of "in relation to the financing, etc. by each company." In addition, **regarding the fact that after each company of the Large-scale Purchaser Group concentrated its shares of Hoosiers only in City Index Eleventh, City Index Eleventh tendered shares in Hoosiers' TOB by an issuer, please answer yes or no as to whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group enjoyed the more benefit arising from deducting dividend income with regard to the deemed dividends due to the**	The Purchasers believe that there is no need to respond from the perspective of provision of information concerning the Purchase to the Company's shareholders, but as the Purchasers have already answered, the reason "they concentrated their shares only in City Index Eleventh" was for financing, etc., but the answer is "yes" to the question of "whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group enjoyed the more benefit arising from deducting dividend income with regard to the deemed dividend" as a result.

	concentration of such shares, by tendering shares in Hoosiers' large-scale TOB by an issuer and by selling its shares.	
3	In the response to the inquiry in 15. of **Part 10.** of the Information List, regarding the Share Transfer Scheme, it is stated that "(i) based on the basic idea that becoming a consolidated subsidiary of other companies while remaining listed is contrary to what the share market should be, City Index Eleventh and Other Parties agreeing to such scheme and tendering shares means that the purchasers themselves act against this basic idea, and (ii) since we believe the purchasers should tender shares in other company's TOB only if it is confirmed that it will create the largest value for the existing shareholders in an auction format, we indicated our intention not to tender shares." First, regarding (i), **since we believe that even through the scheme that was revealed to have been proposed in the letter dated January 13, 2022 by the Large-scale Purchaser Group itself to implement a TOB by an issuer by Daiho and a capital increase through third-party allotment to Aso, a company would still "become a consolidated subsidiary of other companies while remaining listed" and the proposal for the scheme "means that the purchasers themselves act against this basic idea," please explain your specific opinion on the inconsistency such explanation with approval**. In addition, regarding (ii), please specifically explain a case where "it is confirmed that this will create the largest value for the existing shareholders in an auction format" and the reason why you determined that the Share Transfer Scheme does not fall under such case.	As set forth in the press release of Daiho dated March 24, 2022, which stated that "(i) if the company does not choose to become an affiliate of any company other than Aso, and the company seeks to improve shareholder value by making a tender offer for its shares at a price obtained by valuation of the company's common shares, one option we will consider is tendering the company's common shares held by City Index Eleventh and others to such tender offer for its shares, (ii) City Index Eleventh and others believe that a fair price of the company's common shares is 4,800 yen or more per share, and that 8 million or more shares is an appropriate number of its shares to be purchased, and (iii) if the company implements the capital policy of (i) above and wishes to implement a capital increase through third-party allotment to form a capital and business alliance with Aso (however, so that there is no dilution of the company's shareholder value after the capital increase through third-party allotment is implemented, the issue price must be no less than the purchase, etc. price of the tender offer for its shares), our intention is to honor this, as was indicated in the January 13, 2022 letter," it was merely an explanation that in the case of a scheme to implement a capital increase through third-party allotment to Aso after a TOB by an issuer by Daiho, if the demand of City and others set forth in the parentheses in (iii) above were to be considered seriously, City Index Eleventh and others would not realistically refuse from a rational perspective, and this question is premised on an erroneous understanding that a "proposal was made." Further, the statement "if it is confirmed that it will create the largest value for the existing shareholders in an auction format" assumes a case where there will be disclosure of the auction process and provision of due diligence opportunities to a number of candidates, and the candidate offering the highest purchase price will

		purchase all of the shares. The same press release by Daiho stated as follows: "In response to our confirmation, City Index Eleventh and others indicated at a meeting with the company on January 11, 2022 that they cannot accept Aso's tender offer for the company's common shares. According to City Index Eleventh and others, the reason the companies made such an indication was that if another company made a tender offer to the company for the company's common shares, to maximize shareholder value, the company should solicit many purchasers and express an opinion in favor for the person offering the highest price, and that they cannot accept a proposal for a tender offer of the company's common shares by Aso, which has not completed such procedures." Please confirm. Please explain the reason why, despite 15. in **Part 10.** of the First Information List being a question that refers to this press release, despite the content being one that can be easily understood from such press release and the response of the purchaser, and despite the fact there are cases related to other companies, such a question is being asked over and over.

Ⅱ Additional questions or information requested to be responded to or provided (as those related to the Response, etc.)

Part 1 Specifics and feasibilities etc. of the proposals by the Large-scale Purchaser Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the response to 17. of **Part 7.** of the Information List, you stated possibility such as "(ii) regarding the refineries held by the Company, after thoroughly surveying as to which refineries have competitiveness, a proposal of course of actions, including closure of refineries or consolidation with refineries held by competitors in the	First, the responses (i) through (vi) to 17. of **Part 7.** of the First Information List which state "the possibility of making a proposal, providing advice or exercising influence (including exercise of the right to request purchase of shares) related to capital increase or decrease, merger, business transfer or purchase, share exchange or

	industry, and its milestone should be publicly announced," and "(iii) if it can be determined that proceeding with the consolidation and abolition of refineries by becoming a part of ENEOS Corporation or Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. or transferring all or part of its refineries would not only be beneficial to the Company but also contribute to the stabilization and optimization of energy supply in Japan, then such a proposal." **The Company assumes that it will continue to run refineries at high operation rates for the time being, even taking into account future decrease in domestic demand, because the Company has significantly decreased its oil refining capacity strategically and increased the sales volume from the past**, as the Large-scale Purchasers and Others admitted in the response to 1. of Part 2. of the Information List. **In light of this, please provide specific details regarding the status of examination of the impact on the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value and the common interests of its shareholders in connection with becoming a part of ENEOS Corporation or Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd..** Furthermore, please provide the circumstances whether or not there have been any consultations with these companies, and your recognition as the Large-scale Purchaser Group regarding the feasibility from the perspective of compliance with various domestic and foreign laws and regulations including Antimonopoly Act of Japan and other competition laws of each country.	share transfer, company split, or other similar actions, or related to transactions such as the disposition or acquisition of important assets," merely envision changes to the Company and the Company's external business environment that could occur in the future (including the near future), and list—only as possibilities, and as broadly and as specifically as possible within the scope currently conceivable—matters which likely will need to be thoroughly examined at some point; they are not a list of matters for which proposals, etc. will made at the moment. With respect to the phrase "the course of actions that includes" in (ii), as set forth in the underlined portion of the question which states that it will "continue to run refineries at high operation rates for the time being, even taking into account future decrease in domestic demand," the Company is expecting a situation where continuation of high operation rates will be difficult after the "time being," which can be said to be a management challenge that is apparent to everyone. The Purchasers believe that examination of course of actions should be commenced, not necessarily immediately, but as soon as possible. Putting off such a management challenge could not possibly help improve the Company's medium- and long-term corporate value or the shareholder value of all shareholders. Shareholders (including potential shareholders) are concerned about the possibility that if the challenge is not addressed because things are good "for the time being," it would be too late when the challenge is recognized, resulting in huge amounts of losses in future profits, and that reducing such future uncertainty will help improve shareholder value. The Purchasers believe that not addressing but ignoring future challenges that seem negative is a convenient way for management to protect themselves, and is negligent. From the perspective of what is ideal for the industry as a whole, and eventually for Japan, it is obvious that maintaining both a stable supply for consumers and productivity of suppliers, meaning a state where a supply-demand balance is

		maintained, is desirable, and the Purchasers believe that to realize such a state, each company in the industry needs to carry out examinations without seeking only their respective short-term interests. Of course, the interests of the companies must not be sacrificed, and as mentioned in the question, it will be necessary to comply with competition laws, etc. and engage in examinations with related authorities, and it will also be necessary to negotiate with local communities; thus, examinations will not be easy. In that sense, the statements in (iii) that "it would not only be beneficial to the Company, but also contribute to the stabilization and optimization of energy supply in Japan," and "proceeding with the consolidation and abolition of refineries by becoming a part of ENEOS Corporation or Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. or transferring all or part of its refineries" are not foregoing conclusions but merely one scenario with conditions. The question assumes that such conditions have already been satisfied, and the Company's question overlooks such assumption and is erroneous. Please note that the Purchasers are not engaged in concrete discussions with such companies regarding the foregoing matters.
2	In the response to 17. of **Part 7.** of the Information List, you stated that "(vi) proposal for business transfer, etc. if it can be determined that, regarding a project related to oil exploration & production conducted by the Company through its business companies, ownership and management thereof by a company other than the Company (a domestic corporation is assumed) would contribute to the Company's corporate value and the efficiency of the industry as a whole, eventually Japan's national interests and stabilization and optimization of the supply of energy to Japanese people." **Considering the fact that the Company has established close partnership with oil producing countries in the Middle-East through businesses related to crude oil mining for 50 years or more**, please inform us **the specific status of the consideration of such proposal, in particular, regarding a project related to the Company's crude**	As with the answer in 1. above, the proposal of (vi) was stated as one possibility for the future; one scenario is that, supposing that the Company or the Company's oil refinery business goes under the umbrella of another (domestic) company, and if that company also has a crude oil exploration and production business and synergies from the Company's oil exploration and production business can be expected, and the partner countries of the Company's oil exploration and production business also wish to engage in transactions with that company, we believe a business transfer to another company would contribute to the Company's corporate value and to Japan's national interests, as well as to the stabilization and optimization of the energy supply to the Japan.

	oil development, in what cases you believe a business transfer to another company would contribute to the Company's corporate value and Japan's national interests, as well as stabilization and optimization of the supply of energy to Japanese people.	
3	In relation to 1. above, on the other hand, in the response to the inquiry in 10. of **Part 7** of the Information List, it states that "we stated that if the Company would like to acquire shares of Fuji Oil for industry reorganization, we would consider transferring shares of Fuji Oil to the Company." **Given even only "the Company's acquisition of shares of Fuji Oil" and "the Company becoming a part of ENEOS Corporation or Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. or proceeding with consolidation and abolition of refineries," these proposals regarding the operation policy of the Company's petroleum business are wide-reaching**. Please inform us specifically about **your opinion on how the relationships with other companies should ultimately be in order to increase the Company's refinery competitiveness**.	Firstly, there are various conceivable scenarios, and thus your description that the proposals are "wide-reaching" does not mean anything. The Company surely anticipates a wide range of scenarios pertaining to its future, we hope. As answered in 1. above, we believe that maintaining the supply-demand balance is important, and that during a time of soft demand, proceeding with consolidation and abolition on the supply side would be one option. Moves such as Fuji Oil becoming part of the Company or the Company becoming part of another company would result in promoting consolidation and abolition of refineries, from the standpoint of reducing the number of industry players, which tend to focus solely on their own viewpoints.
4	Please inform us about the specific reason that, in the response to the inquiry in 17. of **Part 7.** of the Information List, you believe that "there is a possibility that it will be necessary to convert the business structure, such as by effectively using the land and facilities of the Company's refineries not only at supply bases for petroleum products but also at supply bases for hydrogen, ammonia, etc. as alternative energy in the future" and that there is a possibility that "with respect thereto, ownership and management by ENEOS Corporation, Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd., or any other third party other than the Company (a domestic corporation is assumed) would contribute to improvement of the Company's corporate value and stabilization and optimization of the supply of energy in Japan."	The Purchaser's answer in (iv) is "if the Company determines that there is a possibility that it will be necessary to convert the business structure, such as by effectively using the land and facilities of the Company's refineries not only at supply bases for petroleum products but also at supply bases for hydrogen, ammonia, etc. as alternative energy in the future" and that there is a possibility that "with respect thereto, ownership and management by ENEOS Corporation, Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd., or any other third party other than the Company (a domestic corporation is assumed) would contribute to improvement of the Company's corporate value and stabilization and optimization of the supply of energy in Japan, then the Purchaser proposes that the Company become part of such companies." The Purchaser's answer clearly included the language "if [the Company] determines", but the Company's question presumes that such determination has already been made

		and thus is logically incorrect. Please explain why such a logically incorrect question would be asked.
5	Please provide the reason why you suddenly suggested the proposals at this time listed as (i) through (vi) in the response to 17. of **Part 7.** of the Information List even though proposals other than (i) and (ii) had rarely (or never) been mentioned in prior dialogue. Furthermore, even though the proposals listed as (i) through (vi) in the response to the inquiry in 17. of **Part 7**. of the Information List are essential matters which can have the Company's management basis change significantly, including matters which may be sufficient to constitute matters requiring a special resolution in the Company's ordinary general meetings of shareholders. Please provide the details of the consistency and reason that in the response to the inquiry in 8. of **Part 3.** of the Information List, it is stated that "the purpose of the Purchase is not so-called corporate acquisition or to acquire management control by acquiring a majority of the Company's voting rights," and in the response to the inquiry in 13. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, it is stated that "the purchasers do not intend to control and manage the Company."	As with the question of 4. above, this question is an illogical one. The question in 17. of **Part 7.** of the First Information List asked: "Regarding the Company, please inform us whether you might make a proposal or provide advice or exercise your influence (including exercise of the right to request purchase of shares) related to capital increase or decrease, merger, business transfer or purchase, share exchange or share transfer, company split, or other similar actions, transactions such as disposition or acquisition of important assets, and if there is such a possibility, please provide us with the specific details thereof." In response to the question "whether you might make (a proposal, etc.), and if there is such a possibility, please provide us with the specific details thereof.", we answered that "it is possible that we will make a proposal, etc." In response, you asked us to "provide the reason why you suddenly suggested the proposals at this time"; we do not understand your intention. We merely responded the possibility that we would make proposals, and you took it as though we did make such proposals in fact, and this is completely illogical and incomprehensible. Please answer what sort of intention was behind this question. Moreover, the proposals listed as (i) through (vi) are merely potential proposals, and it could not possibly mean that we have the intention of acquiring control of the Company. The Company's question lacks logic. Please inform us the intention of the Company for posing such an illogical question.

Part 2 Status of other companies' shares held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, etc. (status regarding conflict of interest with the Company and the Company's shareholders)

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Please inform us specifically about any relationship, such as stock ownership, personal relations, or other relationships, between the Large-scale Purchaser Group and companies operating business which competes with the Company (including ENEOS Holdings, Inc., ENEOS Corporation, Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd., Fuji Oil Company, Ltd., INPEX Corporation, and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd.) and San-ai Obbli Co., Ltd. (if any entity belonging to the Large-scale Purchaser Group holds any share certificates, etc. of those companies, including which entities hold which amount of the share certificates, etc. in detail).	It is true that we hold shares in the Company's competitors, but unlike shares in the Company, we do not hold the large amount of shares that is required to submit a statement of large-volume holdings. As answered in 2. below, these holdings would not hurt the interests of the Company, and any answer beyond this would be unnecessary from the standpoint of providing information to shareholders.
2	In relation to 1. above, if the Large-scale Purchaser Group has any relationship, such as stock ownership, personal relations, or other relationships, with companies operating business which competes with the Company, please inform us specifically about the influence of the relationships on the Company Business and the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (awareness of the risk that company secrets and important information of the Company Business will be shared with companies operating business which competes with the Company, as well as measures that are expected or have already been taken in order to eliminate such a risk) and the possibility that the relationships will be used as pressure on the Company and recoupment of investment in the Company. Specifically, **in a meeting on May 25, 2022, Mr. Murakami made a proposal regarding integration Yokkaichi Refinery and Chiba Refinery with other refineries, and also Mr. Murakami proposed that "Don't you have the intention to hold the shares of Fuji Sekiyu?"**. **Thereafter, in a meeting on August 31, 2022, he made a similar proposal**, and also made a proposal regarding Fuji Oil again. Given this, please provide your specific response.	The Company has not disclosed company secrets or important information regarding the Company Business to the Purchasers in the first place, and therefore there is no risk that undisclosed information would be shared with other companies. Supposing that, sometime in the future, the Company would disclose company secrets or important information regarding the Company Business to the Purchasers, naturally a confidentiality agreement would be executed that time, and the Purchasers would comply with the confidentiality duty thereunder. With respect to Fuji Oil shares, we stated we would be willing to sell their shares if the Company determines that an assignment would contribute to the improvement of the Company's corporate value and shareholder value, and improvement in the Company's corporate value would likely have a positive impact on the Purchasers' investment in the Company shares. However, in this case, it would have a positive impact on the Company and all the Company shareholders as well, and would not mean the Purchasers would be the only party to benefit from such act. We would approach the Company in regard to competitors other than Fuji Oil only in limited cases where we believe such an act would contribute to the improvement of the Company's corporate

		value and shareholder value.
3	**At a meeting with the Company and Mr. Murakami and City Index Eleventh held on June 29th, 2023, after the Company's 2023 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, they proposed a certain proposal, by providing a specific company name in their proposal, and asserted that Mr. Murakami himself should be allowed to be directly involved in the negotiations between this company and the Company as an intermediary**. In response to this, the Company stated that **even if the Company were to negotiate with this company, the Company would not allow Mr. Murakami to participate in the negotiations since the Company needed to carefully consider, among others, the following matters: (i) in general, such negotiations are conducted only by the parties to a transaction; (ii) involving Mr. Murakami in the negotiations may result in having the Large-scale Purchase Group including Mr. Murakami (the Group's total holding ratio of share certificates, etc. is currently 20.01%, which virtually constitute a status as a "major shareholder" under the FIEA) informed of material facts under insider trading regulations; and (iii) a Fair Disclosure Rules issue could also arise**. **However, City Index Eleventh and Mr. Murakami insisted that Mr. Murakami should be allowed to be practically involved in the negotiations, such as requesting a report on the negotiation process. As soon as City Index Eleventh and Mr. Murakami recognized that the Company's intent to not allow Mr. Murakami to be involved in the negotiations was strong, they unilaterally determined, among other things, that the Company was reluctant to improve its shareholder value only based on the fact that there was no progress during the period of only two weeks after the proposal, and immediately after that, they showed their intention to acquire additional shares of the Company, and finally, unilaterally notified that they would submit a Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.,**	Firstly, your explanation that "the Large-scale Purchasers and Others virtually constitute a status as a "major shareholder" under the FIEA" lacks evidence and is wrong. Next, Mr. Fukushima, Representative Director of City Index Eleventh, sent the following email to IR Group Manager Nagano in the Company's Management Planning Department on July 10. Thank you for your response to our proposal [note by the Purchasers: via phone] on Friday. The response from the Company was as follows. <The Company's answer > After a discussion that began at 5:30pm on July 7, 2023, the directors decided that the Company would like to have talks with [undisclosed]. 1. This is a sensitive topic that includes insider information, so the Company would like to proceed directly between the two companies. 2. A press release was mentioned by Mr. Murakami the other day, but given the sensitive timing involved, the Company asks not to have a press release while talks are being held. 3. Chairman Kiriyama is an acquaintance of President [undisclosed] of [undisclosed], so he would like to contact the president directly. With respect to 3. above, when the Company sent its response, we said that Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami is the referring party and the referring party would bring up

	unless the Company immediately decides and discloses measures to improve its shareholder value. In connection with the circumstances above, **please specifically provide each of the following: (i) the reason why you insist that Mr. Murakami should be directly involved in the negotiations with this company; (ii) whether your understanding is that having Mr. Murakami directly involved in the negotiations will not violate the principle of shareholder equality or the principle of equal and fair disclosure to shareholders (if you believe that it does not violate those principles, please provide the reason); and (iii) the reason why you showed your intention to acquire additional shares of the Company and finally submitted the statement of intent suddenly after the Company you realized the Company's strong will not to allow Mr. Murakami to be involved in the negotiations**. In addition, particularly in relation to (iii) above, please answer yes or no as to **whether the intention of making Mr. Murakami and people who execute business of the Large-scale Purchasers directly involved in negotiations and consultations regarding transactions between the Company and third parties like that is included as one of the purposes to execute the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc**.	the talks to the other party and then the talks would proceed, and that these are the proper steps to be taken, and so we turned down the request. Mr. Nagano, you promised that this point would be confirmed internally and that you would get back to me on Monday, July 10. In light of the Company's response above, we'd like to inform you of our thinking as follows. We plan to accept 1. And 2. Above on the condition that a certain deadline is set. How about setting the deadline so that you will indicate the Company's direction in response to our proposal by the end of this month? Once the direction is indicated, we imagine that the deadline will be extended and we will proceed to the stage of working out details. IR Group Manager Nagano of the Company's Management Planning Department responded as follows in this email dated July 13. We plan to examine your proposal from various angles. However, given that we're in the middle of the screening and evaluation period of the offshore wind project auction, having talks with specific information with [undisclosed] would be difficult from the perspective of compliance under the public auction occupation guidelines, and we are concerned that [undisclosed] would find it offensive. In addition, a change in the shareholder composition of Cosmo Eco Power, the project operator, would have an impact on the consortium, and could adversely affect the screening and evaluation process.

		At the same time, we expect to have comprehensive dialogue with an eye toward a possible tie-up in other fields, without limiting the dialogue partner to Cosmo Eco Power. As a public company, naturally we need to pay particularly careful attention to what will be discussed in such dialogue, taking into consideration the insider trading rules and fair disclosure rules. This is why we asked to leave the matters, including the timing of the talks, to the two companies. We consider talks with you about improving the corporate value important, and would like to provide you with updates on the progress depending on the status of the talks to the extent possible. With respect to 1., as set forth in Mr. Fukushima's email above, at no point did the Purchasers "insist that Mr. Murakami should be directly involved in the negotiations with this company" as the Company asserts, and we consented to the Company having direct, two-party exchanges with said company. The Company has repeatedly engaged in such attempts to take the Purchasers' remarks out of context and manipulate the impression, and it is extremely disappointing to see a public company engage in such acts. With regard to 2., also as set forth in Mr. Fukushima's email above, we have informed you that Mr. Murakami, the referring party, should be involved in connecting the Company to the counterparty, but he will not be involved in your subsequent, specific exchanges between the two parties. Accordingly, we believe that, in the first place, the Purchasers will not be in contact with any information that have the possibility of "violating the principle of shareholder equality or the principle of equal and fair disclosure to shareholders."

		Our answer to 3. is "No."

Part 3 Purposes, method, details, etc. of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	According to the Statement of Intent, in order to acquire share certificates, etc. equivalent to approximately 24.56% of the voting rights in the Company, the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. has been contemplated. **We believe that in comparison with the current status, it would come to be more difficult to sell or dispose of the Company's shares equivalent to 24.56% of the voting rights ratio, which is a large amount. Since the sale or disposal of the Company's shares in that percentage would have a strong influence on the share market and the Company's general shareholders, please inform us specifically about the method how the Large-scale Purchaser Group, including you and others, (currently) expected for recoupment of investment (in particular, if it is expected that the Company will conduct the TOB by an issuer will be sold in their entirety to third parties, to that effect)**.	The Purchasers are not funds, and the purchase is being funded within the group, so there is no deadline for when the shares must be sold, nor is there a need to dispose of a large number of shares in a short period of time (the Company's 'difficulty of sale' would not apply to the Purchasers as it presumably applies to a case of being forced to sell in a short period of time), so we are not currently anticipating any specific method of recoupment.
2	In relation to 1. above, in the responses to 1. and 3. of **Part 7** of the Information List, it is stated respectively that "purchasers **do not intend to acquire the Company's management control**" and "the purchaser **do not intend to acquire the Company's management control by the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.**" [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company]. **Please inform us about the specific reason that the Large-scale Purchaser Group not only maintains the current holding ratio but also intends to contemplate to conduct the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. even though if the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is conducted, (in light of difficulty to sell or dispose of a large amount of the Company's shares) it is expected objectively that it will become more difficult for**	As stated in the answer to 1. above, the premise of the question is incorrect, as the criterion of "difficulty to sell" does not apply to the Purchasers. The Purchasers will make the Purchase with the aim of encouraging the Company to improve the Company's corporate value and shareholder value. As to "whether the final purpose is to acquire the Company's management right," the answer is no.

	the Large-scale Purchaser Group to recoup investment made in order to acquire the Company's shares. Specifically, as the Large-scale Purchaser Group (not as the Large-scale Purchasers), **please answer yes or no as to whether the final purpose is to acquire the Company's management right**	

Part 4 Management policy, business plan, capital policy, and dividend policy of the Company and the Company's group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	Considering the details of the discussion between the Company and the Large-scale Purchaser Group so far and the material titled "Explanation of Our Proposal" on April 21, 2023, prepared by City Index Eleventh, and other announced materials, we understand that at that time, measures for improvement of the Company's corporate value claimed by the Large-scale Purchasers and Others were mainly the division and listing of ECP. In the response to 17. of **Part 7**. of the Information List, you stated, as one of the proposals, a "proposal to make Cosmo Eco Power Co., Ltd. independent from the Company by taking advantage of the tax benefits of spin-offs (i.e., all shares of a subsidiary are allocated to existing its shareholders in the form of dividends in kind) and be newly listed." However, **with respect to ECP, it was indicated that "there are various issues which should be considered, including whether a certain level of capital relationship with the Company should be retained (and if so, how much should be retained), as well as capital relationship issues (including whether to use a spin-off tax system for the change in capital relationship), business issues (including whether to retain business relationships related to management resources, human resources, and know-how, and if so, which should be retained), and the timing of when to list the subsidiary," but in the Response, no statements were made in regard to this point**. Please inform us specifically of the Large-scale	With the extremely limited disclosure of the current status and investment plans of renewable energy projects at the Company, we cannot effectively consider the underlined part of your question on the basis of published information alone. If we could be given an opportunity for due diligence, we would like to make a proposal after evaluation and review.

	Purchaser Group's opinion about these points at present.	
2	**For the division and listing of ECP, in the announced material on January 27, 2023,** City Index Eleventh **suggested that ECP's corporate value should be increased by locating ECP within the Company's group, by stating "we believe that the Company can distribute a portion of the shares in its renewable energy business subsidiary to the Company shareholders as dividends in kind" and "we believe that said subsidiary will be able to improve its corporate value as a group company of the Company even after it becomes a publicly traded company."** However, **in the announced material on February 22, 2023, City Index Eleventh made a complete change and stated "We believe that the renewable energy business should aim for maximum shareholder value as an independent, publicly traded entity. Further, we believe that a spin-off (taking a business from an existing company and creating a new company, and assigning the shares of the new independent company to the shareholders of the existing company) would be an option that can be considered as a method to achieve this" and in the power point material titled "Attachment" on the same date, it indicated that "Since no change can be expected as long as the renewable energy business stays under the umbrella of the Company Group, it should aim for the maximization of shareholder value as an independent, publicly traded entity" [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company] , and made a suggestion on the assumption that the Company would divide ECP from the Company's group**. Please provide the specific reason why the Large-scale Purchaser Group significantly changed its statements as indicated above in regard to whether ECP should remain in the Company's group or be separated from the Company's group.	Firstly, the Purchasers have previously proposed various structures, including a partial spin-off and an independent listing, as one way to improve the Company's corporate value and shareholder value, without necessarily focusing on a specific means, as noted in the letter to the Company dated April 13. In the first place, the Purchasers, with access to no more than publicly available information, have made various proposals with the aim of contributing to improving the Company's shareholder value, and we cannot help but be surprised at the response by the Company's management which has consistently been one of opposition, in that they have already rejected the proposal without even sufficiently discussing it at Board of Directors meetings. Furthermore, we would like to add that the Company's disclosure information on renewable energy projects is extremely limited and that if detailed and definitive value-enhancing measures are to be sought from a shareholder in this context, important information that contributes to investors' decisions should first be made public.
3	City Index Eleventh made the Shareholder Proposal in the 2023 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, to the effect that it would appoint Ms. Atsumi, a lawyer, as an	With regard to the first part of the question, we believe that there are multiple factors, and we do not necessarily believe that "we can reasonably conclude that the Company's

	outside director of the Company, and she stated that she was committed to "seriously discussing the listing of the renewable energy subsidiary at the Company's Board of Directors meeting and disclosing the results thereof." However, as a result, **the approval rate of the Shareholder Proposal was just 25.93% of the total voting rights of the Company's shareholders who exercised their voting rights, and if we deduct affirmative votes by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, only 3.04% of affirmative votes were gathered; subsequently, this means that an overwhelming number of general shareholders of the Company were against the Shareholder Proposal**. Regarding the reason for such a result, as the Large-scale Purchaser Group, please inform us specifically of your understanding. In addition, in light of the low percentage of votes in favor of the Shareholder Proposal, we can reasonably conclude that the Company's general shareholders' will with respect to listing the renewable subsidiary has been confirmed substantially. **Please provide specific details about the reason that you still have described that "proposal to make Cosmo Eco Power Co., Ltd. independent from the Company by taking advantage of the tax benefits of spin-offs (i.e., all shares of a subsidiary are allocated to existing shareholders in the form of dividends in kind) and be newly listed" in the response to 17. of Part 7. of the Information List**.	general shareholders' will with respect to listing the renewable subsidiary has been confirmed substantially", but we do take the result itself very seriously with great regret. With regard to the second part, in the first place, question 17. of Part 7. of the Information List (1) asks, "Is there a possibility (of making proposals, etc.)? If so, please indicate the specific content thereof." In the rapidly changing offshore wind industry, where the so-called second round of bidding and screening is underway, which is also a very frequent process in the industry, it cannot be said that there will be no suitable timing for further spin-offs, depending on the conditions going forward, and the answer states only that there is the possibility of proposals.
4	In the response to 17. of **Part 7.** of the Information List, you stated a "proposal to make Cosmo Eco Power Co., Ltd. independent from the Company by taking advantage of the tax benefits of spin-offs (i.e., all shares of a subsidiary are allocated to existing shareholders in the form of dividends in kind) and be newly listed." Please provide **specific details of the reason and background why this was proposed again even though there are no statements about the operation policy of ECP-related business (division and listing as well as conversion of ECP into a joint venture with another company) in the Statement of Intent**. In addition, **City Index Eleventh and**	This overlaps with our previous response in 3. of Part 4, but with regard to the percentage of votes in favor of the Shareholder Proposal, we do take the results seriously, but there were several factors, and one cannot necessarily conclude that it is "the result of Company's shareholders supporting its opinion that growth of ECP across the Company group's entire value chain contributes to the enhancement of the Company's corporate value and its shareholders' common interests," nor can it be said that there will be no suitable timing for further spin-offs, depending on the conditions going forward, and since we believe that the Company is aware of this possibility based

	Mr. Murakami also after the Company's 2023 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders that ECP will be converted into a joint venture with another company. However, we understand that **it is significantly different from a "proposal to make ECP …independent …and be newly listed" as mentioned above**. Please provide specific details of the reason why their assertion has significantly changed in this way and specific ideas about ECP's growth strategy. **In addition, with respect to the low percentage of votes in favor of the Shareholder Proposal as mentioned above 3., the Company believes that it is the result of Company's shareholders supporting its opinion that growth of ECP across the Company group's entire value chain contributes to the enhancement of the Company's corporate value and its shareholders' common interests. Even though these results show its shareholders' determination, please provide specific details about the reason that you still adhere to separating ECP from the Company, such a proposal for converting ECP into a joint venture and injection of external capital**.	on past comments, we have included it in (i) through (vi) as described in 1. of Part 1 of II above, as a possibility of a broad-based proposal. This overlaps with our previous response in 1. of Part 4, but with the limitations on the information available, it is difficult to narrow it down to a single optimal solution. However, as shareholders, we believe it is appropriate to stimulate discussion and make proposals from various angles on what we consider to be important issues for consideration.
5	Mr. Murakami (i) stated that in a meeting on November 22, 2022, **he desired to recommend persons who have deep expertise of the oil industry and have no self-interest as director candidates (he also stated that if Mr. Murakami himself is not appointed, one person would be sufficient, and asked whether it was possible to appoint Mr. Murakami himself and another person),** and (ii) stated that in a meeting on November 25, 2022, in order to avoid a situation in which the director candidate would simply agree and follow his opinions, **he desired a person who was older than him to be the director candidate and that it was meaningless for a person who had less expertise of the industry than him and who did not hold shares of the Company to discuss matters regarding the Company**. In addition, **in an article of Toyo Keizai Online dated June 9, 2023, Mr. Fukushima, the representative of City Index Eleventh, stated, "what Yoshiaki Murakami wanted to say was that 'an**	In the first place, Mr. Murakami was supposed to introduce to the Company a number of candidates for the position of director, saying, "I would like to recommend some candidates who have deep knowledge of the petroleum industry and who are not self-serving," on the assumption that they would be candidates for the position of director based on a company proposal, and in a meeting with the Company on November 25, 2022, Representative Director and President Kiriyama responded to Mr. Murakami's proposal by saying, "The proposal to appoint an METI alumnus as a candidate for outside director of the Company based on a company proposal is a good idea for the Company and deserves consideration, and we will do what we can given the time constraints before the ordinary general meeting of shareholders," and therefore we believed that Mr. Murakami's proposal had been agreed to, and the Purchasers had the same understanding. However, during a meeting with then-Executive Director

	outside director should be appointed who can properly discuss how the Company and the oil industry should be after 10 years and 20 years.'" Please inform us of the Large-scale Purchaser Group's understanding regarding consistency between this series of remarks and the shareholder proposal that recommended, as the Company's outside director candidate, Ms. Atsumi, who responded, "I was involved in structured finance business related to renewable energy when I worked in a law firm, so I have expertise in renewable energy to some extent" in response to the inquiry (on whether she had such skills and expertise) from the Company's Nomination and Remuneration Committee at the 2023 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders. Further, in a meeting with Mr. Murakami and others on December 13, 2022, as the Company's outside director candidates, several persons from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry were specifically lined up. Please provide the specific reason why you thought that in comparison with such candidates, Ms. Atsumi would be suited for the position of the Company's outside director. Further, please answer whether there is a possibility that Mr. Murakami himself or people who execute business of the Large-scale Purchasers will be recommended as candidates for the position of the Company's director if the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. are conducted.	Yamada on December 27 of the same year, one of the candidates proposed by Mr. Murakami was mentioned as a suitable candidate for a Director of the Company, but the Company responded that it wanted to contact the candidates directly from the Company, rather than Mr. Murakami etc. contacting the candidate, thus adopting a response that clearly disregarded Mr. Murakami's role in providing the introduction, and the Company determined that it would be difficult to introduce a Director candidate proposed by Mr. Murakami and the Purchasers based on a company proposal. Under these circumstances, it is true that there was a time constraint before the ordinary general meeting of shareholders. Meanwhile, City Index Eleventh, in light of the situation where the Company's management disregards corporate governance and prioritizes self-preservation over the improvement of shareholder value, recommended Ms. Atsumi as a candidate for outside director as "a director who is capable of effective governance so that the Company's Directors, who should have a thorough knowledge of the industry and should discuss the ideal state of the oil industry 10 to 20 years from now, can engage in sincere discussions," and we do not believe there to be any inconsistency here. At this time, we do not plan to recommend Mr. Murakami or any of the Purchasers' executive officers as a candidate for Director of the Company in the event the Purchase is executed.

Part 5 Employment policies of the Company and its group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	You stated in the response to 5. of **Part 8.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics) that "we have no such intention. The purchasers will request that the management team of the Company ensure stable employment of employees."	We do not see any inconsistency, as we believe that even if a business etc. is sold, the purchaser should be required to continue employment. Your perception of "a negative attitude toward investment in the renewable energy

	However, we believe that **such a statement contradicts the fact that the proposals listed as (i) through (vi) in the response to 17. of Part 7. of the Information List include the (actual) sale of company, sale of business, or assets (crude oil development business and refineries etc.), etc.** Please provide your thought on this. In addition, as stated in 2. trough 4. of **Part 4.** above, you have consistently taken a negative attitude toward the Company's investment in the renewable energy business. With the inevitable downsizing of the petroleum business over the medium to long term, please provide your specific thoughts on how you intend to achieve stable employment of employees for the Company's group. 5. *"Please inform us specifically whether you might propose that the Company reduce the number of the Company's employees (including the reductions associated with the sale of the business; the same shall apply hereinafter), and if what type of event occurs, whether you may propose to reduce the number of the Company's employees."*	business" is inaccurate, and we express concern that the investment will be made as a wholly owned subsidiary of the group with no clear investment plan or investment profitability. We believe that it is desirable for investment plans and profitability to be clearly announced, or for investment to proceed significantly through capital participation by other companies or a public listing, thereby enabling the business to grow and creating more jobs.

Part 6 Investment activities, tax treatment, etc. by the Large-scale Purchaser Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the response to the inquiry in 23. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, regarding "Among the Large-scale Purchaser Group and its members' past acts of investment in listed companies, cases where, after acquiring shares of a target company, they had a return or attempted to have a return on investment by causing the target company itself, large shareholders of the target company, or the company-related parties, such as management thereof, to acquire such shares (including the cases of causing acquisition through a TOB by an issuer and ToSTNeT-2/3)," you mentioned that "when there was a request from an	The Company's thinking with regard to "evidence that many listed companies came to recognize that the existence of the Large-scale Purchaser Group prevents improvement of such listed companies' corporate value and its shareholders' common interests" is incorrect. Many of the companies in which the Purchasers have invested in the past had not been proactive about increasing shareholder value and had allowed their share prices, ROE, and PBR to stagnate, and had not considered and implemented appropriate capital

	investee and we determined that it would contribute to improvement of the investee's shareholder value, we responded to the request (for a specific example, please see the response to the inquiry in Part 10.), but the purchasers have never demanded it." However, a considerable number of the companies we listed in the Information List, even if only provided in **Part 10.** of the Information List, ultimately implemented the TOB by an issuer with the upper limit exceeding the number of shares held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, and if the response that all of them were based on voluntary requests from listed companies is true, we believe that such fact is evidence that many listed companies came to recognize that the existence of the Large-scale Purchaser Group prevents improvement of such listed companies' corporate value and its shareholders' common interests. Please explain your opinion on this as the Large-scale Purchaser Group.	policies. Our view is that the Purchasers' investment in and approach to these companies led the companies to consider ways to improve shareholder value and, as a result, to implement share repurchases as part of their capital policies. The Purchasers sell shares when they believe that such capital policies will contribute to improving shareholder value for all shareholders. Outwardly, we see this as a change in the recognition phase on the part of the Company as a company limited, which we believe will contribute to improving corporate value and shareholder value for all shareholders. If this is "evidence that many listed companies came to recognize that the existence of the Large-scale Purchaser Group prevents improvement of such listed companies' corporate value and its shareholders' common interests," then what are your thoughts on the increase in the share prices of many companies, including the Company, after the Purchasers acquired their shares and their holdings became public? This could be seen as a sign that management had not been focused on improving shareholder value. What is the Company's view on this? It should be noted that the share price of the Company has markedly risen from the closing market price of 2,577 yen on March 10, 2022, the next business day after the sale by Abu Dhabi was announced, to the closing market price on 5,549 yen on September 7, 2023, the business day before the submission date of the Response (1), and it is our understanding that the Purchasers' approach to the Company had some impact on such rise in price. What is the Company's view on this?
2	We believe that the Large-scale Purchaser Group obtained a significant amount of returns by investing in various investees. However, according to the public notice of account closing (from the 13th term to the 17th term) of City Index Eleventh, the amounts of net profits before tax for is as follows: the 13th term (from June 1, 2019 to May 31, 2020): 2,872,000,000 yen;	It is not true that City Index Eleventh has not paid any corporate tax, inhabitants' tax, or enterprise tax . City Index Eleventh pays taxes in accordance with the corporate, local, and other relevant tax laws in an appropriate manner.

	the 14th term (from June 1, 2020 to May 31, 2021): 10,008,000,000 yen; the 15th term (from June 1, 2021 to January 31, 2022): 22,006,000,000 yen; the 16th term (from February 1, 2022 to July 31, 2022): 25,463,000,000 yen; and the 17th term (from August 1, 2022 to February 28, 2023): 24,260,000,000 yen. The most recent three fiscal terms are so large that they reach 20 billion yen or more, on the other hand, **it seems that City Index Eleventh has not paid any corporate tax, inhabitants tax, or enterprise tax at least since fiscal year 2019 until fiscal year 2022, and we believe that such circumstances are very strange. Is our understanding correct that City Index Eleventh has not actually paid any corporate tax, inhabitants tax, or enterprise tax ("Corporate Tax and Others")**? **If it has not actually made payment, please explain according to what tax treatment it has not made payment, together with the specific reason**. In particular, if tax benefits (that cannot be enjoyed by individuals and foreign corporations) obtained through exclusion of dividends from taxable gross revenue regarding deemed dividends for the tender and sale in the TOB by an issuer regarding 11. through 20. of **Part 10.** of the Information List is involved, in relation thereto, please explain according to what treatment it has not paid the Corporate Tax and Others, together with the specific reason	
3	In relation to 1. above, of City Index Eleventh's fiscal years, each period of the15th term (from June 1, 2021, to January 31, 2022), the 16th term (from February 1, 2022, to July 31, 2022), and the 17th term (from August 1, 2022, to February 28, 2023) is less than one year. It is extremely unusual for fiscal years to be such periods of less than one year continuously. Please explain due to what reason those fiscal years are less than one year.	For efficient fund management.
4	In relation to 1. above, please explain the status of payment of the Corporate Tax and Others of the Large-scale Purchaser Group other than City Index Eleventh. Also, if	City Index Eleventh pays taxes in accordance with the corporate, local, and other relevant tax laws in an appropriate manner. We believe that there are differences

	such payment has not been made at all or is a significantly low amount, please explain the reason why such payment has not been made at all or is a significantly low amount. In particular, regarding Minami Aoyama Fudosan, which is the Large-scale Purchaser, according to the profit and loss statements provided (from the 17th term to the 19th term), the amounts of Corporate Tax and Others for each term are extremely small compared to the net profits before tax as follows: **the 17th term** (from October 1, 2021 to November 30, 2021): net profits before tax: 1,570,808,814 yen; Corporate Tax and Others: 11,600 yen; **the 18th term** (from December 1, 2021 to November 30, 2022): net profits before tax: 5,126,639,871 yen; Corporate Tax and Others: 70,000 yen; and **the 19th term** (from December 1, 2022 to February 28, 2023): net profits before tax: 2,177,561,717 yen; Corporate Tax and Others: 17,500 yen. Please provide the reason why the amounts of the Corporate Tax and Others for each term are extremely small compared to the net profits before tax, to the extent that it would normally be unthinkable	between taxable income and accounting profit, which lead to the situation the Company have pointed out.
5	Regarding Minami Aoyama Fudosan, which is the Large-scale Purchaser, as stated in 4. above, the fiscal year period of the 17th term is only two months and the fiscal year period of the 19th term is more than one year. It is extremely unusual to have a fiscal year of several months and a fiscal year of more than one year. Please explain due to what reason those fiscal years are as above.	For efficient fund management. It is noted that the fiscal year period of the 19th regarding Minami Aoyama Fudosan is three months (from December 1, 2022 to February 28, 2023).
6	Reno, which transferred shares of the Company (6.8%, its holding ratio of share certificates, etc.) to Minami Aoyama Fudosan, which is the Large-scale Purchaser, outside the market as of April 7, 2023, was taxed for the borrowing totaling 16.4 billion yen from Mr. Murakami based on the application of the thin capitalization rule as of	Minami Aoyama Fudosan has no borrowings. With regard to Ms. Aya Nomura, we will refrain from disclosing this information as it is personal information and we do not believe that information about borrowings between relatives should be disclosed on this occasion.

	July 29, 2016 (please see Tokyo High Court judgment dated July 7, 2021, page 12 of Hanrei Jiho Vol. 2502). Please specifically provide what amount Minami Aoyama Fudosan and Ms. Aya Nomura, who are the Large-scale Purchasers, borrow from Mr. Murakami and his relatives, and the interest rate and other borrowing conditions. Furthermore, if there are any borrowings, please provide a response as to whether there is a possibility of taxation based on the thin capitalization rule.	

Information List (3) and the Response (3)

[Noted: translated by the Company]

Ⅰ Among the inquiries and information included in the Information List and Information List (2), responses or provision considered to be incomplete or insufficient

Part 1 Details of the Large-scale Purchasers and their Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the Response to **2.** of **Part 1 in I** of the Information List (2) (a part of the inquiry reposted below in italics), you indicated that "the purchasing bodies of the Purchase have been determined as purchasers through discussions based on the purchasers' own circumstances. We do not believe it has become significantly difficult for the shareholders to understand the situation just because several entities appear." However, **as several entities appear as the Company's large shareholders and the purchasing bodies have frequently changed in the Large-scale Purchaser Group for reasons unknown to outsiders, it has become unclear which entity is responsible for dialogue with the Company. In addition, when it remains unclear which entity would affect the Company's management after the implementation of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., it is difficult for the Company's general shareholders to evaluate accurately what impact the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., would have on the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value or shareholders' common interests** (for example, the representative for City Index Eleventh, who made a shareholder proposal to the Company at the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, differs from the representative for Minami Aoyama Fudosan, who is listed in the Large-scale Purchaser Group). Further, **from an objective perspective, there does not seem to be any particular situation preventing an**	The Purchasers disclose their large-volume holdings statements and the relevant change reports in a timely manner in accordance with the provisions of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, and have clearly stated the holding ratio of the Company's share certificates, etc. held by the Purchasers, including those held by joint holders; the Purchasers' letters to the Company are also published City Index Eleventh's website in a timely manner; and it would not be difficult for common shareholders to understand the Purchasers' ownership percentages or to evaluate the Purchasers' approach to the Company. Therefore, we believe that the Company's point misses the mark and it is immaterial which entity is the purchaser of the Company's shares (the same applies to subsequent questions).

explanation of why the entities of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., have changed. **Although originally, the three parties of City Index Eleventh, Reno, and Ms. Aya Nomura jointly held shares of the Company, why was Reno replaced by Minami Aoyama Fudosan, and why was it decided that City Index Eleventh, which made the shareholder proposal at the Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, would not be included in the Large-scale Purchasers?** Therefore, in light of the purpose of the information provision procedures in the Response Policies and the principle of transparency, which is emphasized in the Guidelines, please provide us with specific details in a sincere manner with regard to "discussions based on the purchasers' own circumstances." In addition, while you stated "we do not believe it has become significantly difficult for the shareholders to understand the situation just because several entities appear," (this relates to 3. below) you have refused to provide an explanation that is easy for general shareholders to understand by using the capital relationship chart related to relationships between corporations and individuals that are included in the scope of the Large-scale Purchaser Group (from an objective perspective, there is not any reasonable reason for refusing to provide an explanation thereof.). Please provide us with the specific reason therefor.

2. *"In addition, **only City Index Eleventh (which is a joint-holder of the Large-scale Purchasers) has made shareholder proposals and sent letters to the Company, and Ms. Aya Nomura and Mr. Hironao Fukushima, a representative of City Index Eleventh, attended and appeared in a meeting with the Company and press conferences. Nevertheless, Minami Aoyama Fudosan is included as a Large-scale Purchaser instead of City Index Eleventh this time, and since several entities appear in this way, it is very difficult for shareholders to understand the actual state of the Large-scale Purchasers, including the capital relationships of***

	***each company. Please provide the reason why the purchasing bodies have been changed in this way**.”*	
2	In the Response to **2.** of **Part 1 in I** of the Information List (2) (a part of the inquiry reposted below in italics), you indicated that “our responses to both (i) and (ii) are no.” If that is the case, please provide us with the specific reason for dividing the purchasing body into multiple entities. **In the meetings between the Company and (City Index Eleventh and) you, Mr. Murakami has been in the forefront and has led the meetings in the past, and if your responses are no, we believe that dispersing the purchasing body to several entities will result in not only making the entities responsible for the dialogue unclear, but also making it unclear which entity will have management influence over the Company after the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., are executed. For this matter as well, from an objective perspective, there does not seem to be any particular situation preventing an explanation thereof**; thus, we ask for your sincere response. 2. “*Specifically, please answer yes or no as to (i) whether avoiding regulations that will be imposed on major shareholders, including the provision system of short-term margins (Article 164 of the FIEA) is included in the purpose and (ii) whether enjoying maximum tax benefits is included in the purpose in anticipation of the Company conducting a TOB by an issuer based on demand of the Large-scale Purchaser Group in the future, respectively.”*	As also answered in 8. of **Part 1** of I of the Information List (1) and in 6. of **Part 1** of (2) of the First Information List (1), investments are made by several entities on the basis of the financial needs of the group companies and other factors. As for the underlined part, as stated in our response to 1. above, the Purchasers’ ownership of the Company’s shares has been disclosed in a timely and appropriate manner as joint holders in accordance with the provisions of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, and Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami, Ms. Nomura, and Mr. Fukushima, the representative director of City Index Eleventh, have consistently been at the forefront in discussions with the Company, and therefore we believe the Company’s point does not apply.
3	Regarding **3.** of **Part 1 in I** of the Information List (2) (the inquiry reposted below in italics), not only in the response to **4** of **Part 1** of the Information List, but also in the response to the Information List (2), you still refused, without giving any adequate reason for doing so, to provide a response, merely explaining that “this inquiry requests provision of information significantly beyond the scope of information disclosure	Firstly, as also answered in 8. of **Part 1** of I of the First Information List with regard to the change of the purchasing entity, shares were transferred according to the funding needs of Group companies and other factors. Further, as answered in the responses to 2. and 3. above, the question of which entity within the group will be the purchasing entity is not an essential issue in the decision

	required by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act for a tender offer, and we believe that this is information unnecessary for shareholders to make a decision." **In light of the circumstance where the purchasing bodies** of shares of the Company **have changed multiple times in a short amount of time** in the past **(with no specific explanation)**, we believe **it is essential, upon providing information to the Company's general shareholders, to have a wide understanding of the actual structure of the "Large-scale Purchaser Group," including those who may fall under specially related parties under the tender offer regulations**. We consider the scope of the "Large-scale Purchaser Group" to be appropriate, and **the Guidelines clearly indicate that "it is advisable for the acquirer to respond in good faith when asked by the target company about the extent to which there are any joint holders, and if there are circumstances which can be inferred that a person is a joint holder, it is advisable for the acquirer to provide relevant information" (p. 34)** (this principle is understood to apply to those who potentially may be added as a joint holder at any time). In this regard, please provide us with a sincere response to the matters regarding such inquiry again (the Large-scale Purchasers have refused disclosure with no specific reasonable reason; however, **please provide again an explanation that is easy for general shareholders to understand by using the capital relationship chart related to relationships between corporations and individuals that are included in the scope of the Large-scale Purchaser Group**.). In fact, in light of the situations where (i) the Large-Scale Purchaser Group transferred a large number of shares of the Company off-market from Reno to Minami Aoyama Fudosan (the Company did not receive any communication from Mr. Murakami or you regarding this off-market transfer until City Index Eleventh's Change Report dated April 14, 2023 was filed) and the entity that holds shares of the Company has changed, and (ii) City Index Eleventh's letter dated May 1, 2023 to the Company stated that	of the shareholders, and as answered in 3. of **Part 2** below, there are no current plans to transfer shares within the group, and therefore we believe it unnecessary to answer this question.

	"Minami Aoyama Fudosan has filed an advance notification of inward direct investment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act and if you look at it together with the advance notifications by us, Ms. Nomura Aya, and Reno, it is a fact that the maximum ratio of the acquisition of shares of your company has been formally increased to approximately 40% in total. However, the advance notification only indicates the maximum acquisition limit (acquisition framework) within six months after the notification by each entity filing the notification, and this does not mean that the above four entities will immediately acquire up to approximately 40% of shares of your company. In fact, 6.8% in terms of the investment ratio of the acquisition limit of Minami Aoyama Fudosan was used for the transfer of shares of your company within our group, and was not used for additional acquisition by our group," **it is obvious that the Large-scale Purchaser Group, including you, have transferred the shares of the Company in themselves at will. Therefore, in light of evaluating the Large-Scale Purchase Actions, etc.,** the Company believes that **it is also obvious that the Company's general shareholders need the information about whole Large-scale Purchaser Group**. On this point, as we addressed in Information List (2), in light of the increase in influence by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, including City Index Eleventh and you, over the Company's management due to the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., the actual situation of the Large-scale Purchasers, including their capital relationship, is extremely important as basic information to decide whether the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. will hinder the improvement of the Company's medium-to long term corporate value and shareholders' common interests. If you fail to provide a response to the below inquiry, it will become difficult for the Company's shareholders to make a reasonable decision. In spite thereof, if you reject providing information with regard to above, please explain the reason why you reject it specifically and convincingly.	

	3. *In the Response to 4. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics), since "the definition of the 'Large-scale Purchaser Group' is inappropriate," you disclosed information only on the "purchasers" i.e., City Index Eleventh as well as Minami Aoyama Fudosan and Ms. Nomura, but the "Large-scale Purchaser Group" was established by listing specific company names, after carefully considering the relationship in past investment cases by the Large-scale Purchasers and City Index Eleventh and their related parties (including relationships that were stated to be joint holders when submitting the large-volume holdings statement) and family relationships, etc. We believe that the broad understanding of the "Large-scale Purchaser Group" including persons who may fall under specially related persons under tender offer regulations is essential in order to provide information to the Company's shareholders, in light of the fact that your company and others clearly stated that your response is "provision of information broader than that is required to be disclosed in the TOB" (response to 7. of **Part 3.** of the Information List) (as you know, in the case of TOB, formal specially related parties and substantial specially related parties of the tender offerors are also required to be disclosed in the tender offer statement) and as stated in 2. above, **Minami Aoyama Fudosan is included as the Large-scale Purchaser this time instead of City Index Eleventh (which was the counterpart of the dialogue), and the purchasing body is changing frequently**. The Company believes that information on the scope of the "Large-scale Purchaser Group" is appropriate. Please inform us of matters regarding the inquiry again (**please provide information so that it is easy for general shareholders to understand by using the capital relationship chart related to relationships between corporations and individuals that are included**	

	in the scope of the Large-scale Purchaser Group*). Among the Large-scale Purchaser Group,* ***it is obvious that Mr. Murakami in particular always has been a main speaker in numerous meetings with your company and others that were conducted since your company and others commenced acquisition of the Company's shares, and had a leading position in the Large-scale Purchaser Group****. Please provide the reason why you "determined that it is sufficient if we provide responses about the purchasers from the perspective of necessity of provision of information to shareholders" and believe that you do not need to provide information on Mr. Murakami, in spite of the above fact.*	
4	In the Response to **4.** of **Part 1 in I** of the Information List (2) (the inquiry reposted below in italics), you still refused, without giving any specific adequate reason for doing so, to provide a response, merely explaining that "this inquiry requests provision of information significantly beyond the scope required by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act for a tender offer, and we believe that this is information unnecessary for shareholders to make a decision." The tender offer statement with respect to Japan Asia Group Limited, dated April 27, 2021, submitted by City Index Eleventh, indicated that Minami Aoyama Fudosan (a Large-scale Purchaser for this matter) held 100 shares (50% in terms of the voting rights ratio) of City Index Eleventh's 200 issued shares. However, in the letter dated May 1, 2023, there was a change, and a response was provided that Minami Aoyama Fudosan held no shares of City Index Eleventh. We believe that such a change in the capital structure in the Large-scale Purchaser Group is far from insignificant. As such, as the capital relationship of the vehicles, including the Large-scale Purchasers, frequently change in the Large-scale Purchaser Group due to reasons unknown to outsiders, it is unclear which entity is responsible for dialogue with the Company. In addition, when it remains unclear which entity would affect the	As we answered in 1. of **Part 1** above, the Purchasers disclose their large-volume holdings statements and the relevant change reports in a timely manner in accordance with the provisions of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, and have clearly stated the holding ratio of the Company's share certificates, etc. held by the Purchasers, including those held by joint holders; the Purchasers' letters to the Company are also published City Index Eleventh's website in a timely manner; and it would not be difficult for common shareholders to understand the Purchasers' ownership percentages or to evaluate the Purchasers' approach to the Company. Therefore, we believe that the Company's point does not apply and it is immaterial which entity is the purchaser of the Company's shares (the same applies to subsequent questions). In addition, we believe that this inquiry requests information beyond the scope required for a tender offer under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act; thus, we believe that a response is unnecessary.

	Company's management after the implementation of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., it is difficult for the Company's general shareholders to evaluate accurately what impact the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., would have on the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value or shareholders' common interests. Further, **from an objective perspective, there does not seem to be any particular situation preventing an explanation of at least why the capital relationship has changed at, in addition to Minami Aoyama Fudosan, which is listed in the Large-scale Purchaser, City Index Eleventh, which still currently holds a large amount of shares of the Company, and Reno (the representative of both companies is Mr. Fukushima and the administrative contact for both is Ms. Yoko Takahashi), a former holder thereof**. In light of the situation where the capital structure frequently changes greatly even at the Large-scale Purchasers alone, we believe it is essential, upon providing information to the Company's shareholders, to have a deep understanding of the actual structure of the "Large-scale Purchaser Group," including those who may fall under specially related parties under the tender offer regulations. Therefore, in light of the purpose of the information provision procedures in the Response Policies and the principle of transparency, which is emphasized in the Guidelines, please provide us again with a response in a sincere manner with regard to the matters regarding such inquiry. 4. *In the Response to 5. of **Part 1.** of the Information List, it is merely stated that "the reason for changing the capital structure was due to finances of each company and the circumstances of shareholders, as well as other circumstances," but please provide us with specific details on the (i) finances of each company, (ii) circumstances of shareholders, and (iii) other circumstances, respectively, including the time and facts serving as the basis.*	

5	In the response to the inquiry of 5. of **Part 1.** in **I** of the Information List (2), it is stated that "Office Support directly owns 100% of the shares of Minami Aoyama Fudosan. Because ATRA is a wholly-owning parent company of Office Support, ATRA falls under a wholly-owning parent company of Minami Aoyama Fudosan as well; thus, there has been no change in the capital," and with respect to the capital structure of ATRA, it is stated that "further, regarding ATRA's shareholders other than City [the Company's note: City Index Eleventh; the same applies hereinafter], **City Index Tenth Co., Ltd.** accounts for 45.4% and Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami and **his relatives** account for 21.2% in total" [underline and emphasis added by the Company]. **The capital structure of City Index Tenth Co., Ltd. ("City Index Tenth") that holds nearly half of the voting rights of ATRA(a 100% grandfathered company of Minami Aoyama Fudosan, which is a Large-scale Purchaser) and the details of "his relatives" above, etc. are obviously understood to be important as basic information**. Therefore, please provide us with the following matters: (1) with respect to City Index Tenth, in addition to (i) the location of the head office, (ii) contact information in Japan, and (iii) the governing law for incorporation, the matters designated in 1. of **Part 1.** of the Information List and the following matters with respect to its representative: (A) address; (B) contact information in Japan; (C) place of tax payment; (D) main banks and/or main lenders, as well as the balance of borrowings therefrom; (E) history over the past ten years; (F) investees, the investment ratio at the investees, and position at the investees;	In addition, we believe that this inquiry requests information beyond the scope required for a tender offer under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act and that this is information unnecessary for shareholders' decision; thus, we refrain from making further responses. In 1. of **Part 4** of I of the Second Information List, the Company mentions that "The Response Policy requires the inclusion of 'information equivalent to the information to be included in the tender offer statement,'" and alleges inconsistency in the Purchasers' responses; meanwhile, the Company is also making numerous requests for unnecessary and unreasonable information beyond the scope required for a tender offer, not only in this inquiry, but also in many other inquiries. We must say that the conclusions of the Company's legal advisors, who seem to have prepared the information list questions without consistency in the scope of information requested, are out of the ordinary. We would like to add that this unnecessary and unreasonable volume of repeated questioning is costing the shareholders a great deal of money in legal fees that will disappear from the shareholders' equity, which is only a detriment to the shareholder value of all of the Company's shareholders.

	(G) funds effectively controlled or operated by the party, as well as the outline of the partners, etc., details of the investment policy, and details of the investment and lending activities over the past ten years; and (H) whether falling under a foreign investor and information serving as the basis thereof (including the existence of an address or residence in Japan); and (2) with respect to each of Mr. Murakami's relatives (who hold shares of ATRA), the matters from (A) through (H) above	
6	In the response to the inquiry of 6. of **Part 1.** in **I** of the Information List (2) (the inquiry reposted below in italics), you provided only a vague response to the effect that "fund demand is related to settlement of credits and debts, etc. within the group . In the first place, we believe that this inquiry requests information beyond the scope required for a tender offer and that this is information unnecessary for shareholders' decision; thus, we refrain from making further responses." With respect to the specific details of the fund demand of each group company, you have given no further detailed information than "fund demand is related to settlement of credits and debts, etc. within the group." For this matter as well, if the entities that hold shares of the Company in the Large-scale Purchaser Group change greatly for reasons unknown to outsiders, it will become unclear which entity is responsible for dialogue with the Company. In addition, if the entity that affects the Company's management after the implementation of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is uncertain and may change at any time, it will be difficult for the Company's general shareholders to evaluate accurately what impact the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., would have on the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value or shareholders' common interests. In fact, as mentioned in 3. above, in light of the situations where (i) the Large-Scale Purchaser Group transferred a large number of shares of the Company off-market from Reno to Minami Aoyama Fudosan (the Company did not receive any	As is clear from the answers to inquiries of 1. to 5. above, we believe that this inquiry requests information beyond the scope required for a tender offer and that this is information unnecessary for shareholders' decision; thus, we refrain from making further responses.

	communication from Mr. Murakami or you regarding this off-market transfer until City Index Eleventh's Change Report dated April 14, 2023 was filed) and the entity that holds shares of the Company has changed, and (ii) City Index Eleventh's letter dated May 1, 2023 to the Company stated that "Minami Aoyama Fudosan has filed an advance notification of inward direct investment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act and if you look at it together with the advance notifications by us, Ms. Nomura Aya, and Reno, it is a fact that the maximum ratio of the acquisition of shares of your company has been formally increased to approximately 40% in total. However, the advance notification only indicates the maximum acquisition limit (acquisition framework) within six months after the notification by each entity filing the notification, and this does not mean that the above four entities will immediately acquire up to approximately 40% of shares of your company. In fact, 6.8% in terms of the investment ratio of the acquisition limit of Minami Aoyama Fudosan was used for the transfer of shares of your company within our group, and was not used for additional acquisition by our group," it is obvious that the Company's concerns above are reasonable. Therefore, in light of the purpose of the information provision procedures in the Response Policies and the principle of transparency, which is emphasized in the Guidelines, please provide us again with a response in a sincere manner with regard to the inquiry. 6. *According to the Response to 8. of Part 1. of the Information List, it is stated that Reno moved all of its shares to Minami Aoyama Fudosan based on "fund demand of each group company." Regarding "fund demand of each group company," please provide us with the specific facts (including the details of "fund demand of each group company") serving as the basis for making such determination.*	

7	In response to 11 of **Part 1** in **I** of the Information List (2) (some of the inquiries reposted below in italics), you responded, "regarding the inquiry in the 'responses to the inquiries for the tender offerors' on February 4, 2020, submitted by City Index Eleventh in the TOB for shares of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., assuming that the 'tender offeror group' includes Minami Aoyama Fudosan, Minami Aoyama Fudosan is not included in the 'tender offeror group' and the basis of the inquiry is wrong." However, with regard to not including Minami Aoyama Fudosan in the "tender offeror group" in the "responses to the inquiries for the tender offerors" on February 4, 2020, we consider that the above response was inappropriate or misleading, considering that Minami Aoyama Fudosan was a shareholder who holds 33.5% of City Index Eleventh, a tender offeror, and fell under a formal specially related party at the time of the response. Even if we put this point aside for the moment, this does not change the fact that such failure to announce financial results breaches Article 440, paragraph (1) of the Companies Act and results in directors being subject to civil penalties (Article 976, item (ii) of the Companies Act). Please explain why Minami Aoyama Fudosan, which is included in the Large-scale Purchasers, has not announced financial results yet regardless of the description of the tender offer statement below (including the details of "administrative errors" to which you referred). Please provide specific details on what you think about such circumstances, and regarding consistency with your response to 21. of **Part 1** of the Information List "the purchasers care about legal compliance and are making an effort to maintain legality of business activities by asking assistance and advice from lawyers and other outside experts, as necessary." In addition, regarding 22. of **Part 1** of the Information List, you provided answers only about City Index Eleventh and Minami Aoyama Fudosan. Please provide answers about other Large-scale Purchaser Groups in the same way. In particular, in the TOB for shares of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd. (currently Shibaura Machine Co., Ltd.) by City	First, the fact that the Company did not properly read the counter-question and asked questions to the purchaser based on incorrect assumptions, and then insists on its view without admitting fault, is a true indication of the stance of the Company's questions in the Information List. You seize on the fact that Minami Aoyama Fudosan did not publish its financial statements because of administrative errors and act triumphantly, despite the fact that, according to the Company's press release dated September 11, Cosmo Techno Yokkaichi Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of the Company, also did not publish its financial statements. "Administrative errors" refers to the fact that, although we strive to ensure compliance with laws and regulations and to maintain the legality of our business activities by seeking assistance and advice from attorneys and other outside experts as necessary, we had failed to do so with regard to the procedures for publishing our financial statements. Going forward, we will take care to ensure that this does not happen again.

	Index Eleventh, Toshiba Machine itself is positioned as the "tender offeror group"; moreover, regarding Office Support about which you responded "since financial results about the settlement were not announced due to administrative errors, we are proceeding with the procedures for it now," it seems that Office Support announced the last financial results for the term ending October 2019 (the 22nd term), and it has not announced financial results since then, excluding the term ending March 2022 (the 25th term). Similarly, it seems that S-Grant made its last announcement in the term ending June 2019 (the 19th term), and it has not announced the financial results for the period since then. Please similarly provide answers about the financial results of these companies. We are aware that Office Support has publicly announced its financial results for the fiscal period ending March 31, 2021 (24th period), the fiscal period ending March 31, 2022 (25th period), and the fiscal period ending March 31, 2023 (26th period) in the Official Gazette dated September 20, 2023, and we are aware that S-Grant has published a public notice of its financial results for the fiscal period ending June 30, 2021 (21st period), the fiscal period ending November 30, 2021 (22nd period) and the fiscal period ending November 30, 2022 (23rd period) in the same official gazette, but your response does not constitute an answer to this question, so please answer in good faith. 11. *Regarding 22. of **Part 1** of the Information List, you answered regarding Minami Aoyama Fudosan, a company which is part of the Large-scale Purchasers, that "**since financial results about the settlement were not announced due to administrative errors, we are proceeding with the procedures for it now**" [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company], but regarding the TOB for shares of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd. (currently Shibaura Machine Co., Ltd.) by City Index Eleventh, in the response on p. 21 of the submitted "responses to the inquiries for the tender offerors" on February 4, 2020, you provided a*	

	similar response, stating "each company of the tender offeror group, ***including Minami Aoyama Fudosan,*** *confirmed* ***financial results of the settlement were not announced due to administrative errors and thus we are proceeding with the procedures for now****" [the Company's note: emphasis and underline added by the Company]."* ***Please provide the specific reason why you have not announced financial results, even though there was sufficient time of more than three years to deal with it from that time to now (including details of "administrative errors")***	
8	In the response to 12. of **Part 1** in I of the Information List (2) (the inquiry reposted below in italics), you mentioned that "you state that in light of the fact that Ms. Yoko Atsumi is serving as a representative lawyer of City Index Eleventh in the case of petition for provisional injunction order against share option gratis allocation by City Index Eleventh against Japan Asia Group Limited in April 2021, it is quite possible that she falls under a 'related party' as a 'person who receives a large amount of money and other assets' from the Large-scale Purchaser Group. Nevertheless, in the above case, the person with whom City Index Eleventh executed the delegation agreement is not Ms. Yoko Atsumi, but the legal professional corporation to which Ms. Yoko Atsumi belonged at that time; therefore, your indication is inappropriate." However, if this interpretation works, this means that lawyers and other professionals who belong to organizations do not fall entirely under "related parties"; **furthermore, since Ms. Yoko Atsumi is listed as a representative attorney (not a subagent attorney) in the above case, it is apparent that City Index Eleventh issued a letter of attorney to her, and it was submitted to the court (in other words, there was engagement agreement between Ms. Atsumi and City Index Eleventh directly)**; thus, unfortunately, we have to say that the interpretation above is distorted. Laws and regulations that provide for "related parties" list persons who fall under the main persons who are strongly influenced by foreign investors; furthermore, even if the	The Company's interpretation is not only contrary to the wording of Article 2, Paragraph 1, Item 2(e) of the Order on Inward Direct Investment, etc., but also incorrect, as it ignores the fact that (b) through (d) of the same item clearly state "officers or employees of a corporation or other entity" and also cover officers, employees, etc., while (e) does not. Further, the answer to Q7 in the "Foreign Exchange Act Q&A (Inward Direct Investment/Specified Acquisition)" (revised April 2023) prepared by the International Bureau of the Bank of Japan does not indicate such an interpretation. As Ms. Yoko Atsumi is not a "related party of a foreign investor" under this item, no prior notification is required in order to vote in favor of (consent to) the proposal to appoint her as a Director at the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders to be held in 2023, and therefore no such notification has been made.

	attorney belongs to an organization (in addition, we understand that Ms. Atsumi was a representative attorney at the Kojimachi Office of Atsumi & Sakai Legal Professional Corporation at the time of the case; moreover, according to the press release on December 25, 2020, by Atsumi & Sakai, Ms. Atsumi also served as a senior partner of the same office), in the case where the organization (Atsumi & Sakai in a relationship with Ms. Atsumi) is in a position to receive a large amount of money as compensation, the person is considered to be strongly influenced by foreign investors; accordingly, we believe that your interpretation is unreasonable considering the above point. If you have any rebuttal to this point, please let us know. Furthermore, as for the Large-scale Purchasers, please answer 'yes' or 'no' whether they noticed in advance with regard to exercise the voting rights (agree) in the Proposal No.6 which was for Ms. Atsumi as the outside director candidate in the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders held in 2023. 12. *"Regarding 25. of **Part 1.** of the Information List (the inquiry reposted below in italics), you stated "Ms. Yoko Atsumi does not fall under a 'related party' and thus this question lacks premise. Your company requested that the purchasers provide answers, such as the reason why they determined that Ms. Yoko Atsumi does not fall under a related party, but the party claiming that she falls under a related party (your company) should provide the reason why you think so." On this point,* ***regarding Ms. Atsumi, the Company recognizes the facts as stated in Exhibit 2 (Attached as an Exhibit of Information List (2). In addition, partially correction of errors, emphasis and underline added by the Company.) on May 23, 2023 of the Company "Notice Concerning Opposing Opinion of the Company's Board of Directors to the Shareholder Proposal at the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders." In addition, in light of the fact that she is serving as***	

	a representative lawyer of City Index Eleventh in the case of petition for provisional injunction order against share option gratis allocation by City Index Eleventh against Japan Asia Group Limited in April 2021, we understand that it is quite possible that she falls under a "related party" as a "person who receives a large amount of money and other assets" from the Large-scale Purchaser Group (Article 2, paragraph (1), item (ii), (e) of the Order on Inward Direct Investment). *The purpose of this question is to confirm compliance in the Large-scale Purchaser Group, not with respect to Ms. Atsumi personally. Please provide an answer to the inquiry again considering these circumstances."*	
9	In relation to the inquiries above, and as we addressed therein, considering the actual situation where the Large-scale Purchaser Group including you has transferred shares of the Company freely within the group, your decision to reject providing basic information about the Large-scale Purchaser Group without reasonable cause means that the Large-scale Purchaser Group for which even basic information is unclear will increase its influence over the Company's management through the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. Accordingly, we believe that this will raise concerns about damage to the Company's corporate value and shareholders' common interests, and as a result, this will actively induce the Company's shareholders to respond to the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., and the Company's shareholders will be pressured in this sense. If you have any rebuttal to this point, please let us know.	As is clear from the previous responses, the Company's above assertions lack a reasonable basis. The information that the Company has requested and that the Purchasers have not provided is information that is unnecessary for shareholders to make a decision, and the withholding of that information is not intended to make the Purchase coercive.

Part 2 Purposes, Method, and Details of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the response to 1 of **Part 3** in **I** of the Information List (2), you stated, "Firstly, it is incorrect that Minami Aoyama Fudosan has not been involved in any consultation with	With regard to the first sentence, we do not believe that all of the joint holders need to attend every meeting in the first place, but the Company's point is not applicable

	you. Minami Aoyama Fudosan just did not participate in in-person consultations with you directly, and with regard to the details of consultations between City Index Eleventh and Ms. Nomura and you, three parties had consultations, and that consultation among the three parties was for purposes of encouraging you to improve corporate value and shareholder value. Even the process leading up to the decision that the purchasers would be the entities involved in the Purchase, which occurred via consultations among the three parties, obviously proceeded on the basis that the three parties acted together to encourage you to improve corporate value and shareholder value." **However, since April 7, 2023, when Minami Aoyama Fudosan became a shareholder of the Company, several opportunities were provided for meetings between our former company and the Large-scale Purchasers; however, please provide the specific reasons why Mr. Tatsuya Ikeda, a representative director of Minami Aoyama Fudosan, did not participate directly in the meeting with the Company (even though opportunities were provided at the meeting on May 23, 2023, (attended by Ms. Nomura and City Index Eleventh), the meeting on June 29, 2023 (attended by Mr. Murakami and City Index Eleventh), and the meeting on August 17, 2023 (attended by Ms. Nomura and City Index Eleventh) and the opportunity for Minami Aoyama Fudosan (which had already become the shareholder of the Company) to participate directly in these meetings was secured)**. In addition, **you stated, "The consultations among the three parties were to encourage you to improve corporate value and shareholder value. Even the process leading up to the decision that the purchasers would be the entities involved in the Purchase, which occurred via consultations among the three parties, obviously proceeded on the basis that the three parties acted together to encourage you to improve corporate value and shareholder value." However, we did not**	because Mr. Fukushima, the Representative Director of City Index Eleventh, is seconded to Minami Aoyama Fudosan and is also an employee of Minami Aoyama Fudosan, and he attends the meetings with the Company as a representative of City Index Eleventh and as an employee of Minami Aoyama Fudosan. With respect to the second sentence, as is clear from the previous responses, the Company's above argument lacks a reasonable basis, and we do not believe it necessary to respond.

	hear this from you and Mr. Murakami, and there is no statement regarding such agreement in the "significant contracts related to said stock, etc. such as collateral agreements" section of the change report which you submitted regarding share certificates, etc. of the Company. Even putting that aside, **the reason why it was deemed "desirable for Minami Aoyama Fudosan and Ms. Nomura" in order to encourage improvements to corporate value and shareholder value "to be the entity to make the Purchase" as a result those consultations is very important** (we believe that the reason for this is important information for general shareholders of the Company, to make an appropriate evaluation about the effects the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. will have on improvement of the medium- to long-term corporate value of the Company and on shareholders' common interests). Therefore, please inform us of this point again, specifically. Furthermore, please inform us again, specifically, of the manner in which you think the details of these consultations will contribute to the "purpose of encouraging improvement of (the Company's) corporate value and shareholder value," as explained in the Statement of Intent?	
2	In connection with 1. above, around April 7, 2023, when Minami Aoyama Fudosan, whose 20th fiscal year started on March 1, 2023, became a shareholder of the Company, (i) with respect to share certificates, etc. of Sumitomo Mitsui Construction Co., Ltd., according to Change Report No. 5, dated April 4, 2023, for the large-volume holdings statement submitted by City Index Eleventh, since March 23, 2023, Minami Aoyama Fudosan holding shares of Sumitomo Mitsui Construction as a joint holder, (ii) also with respect to share certificates, etc. of Arcland Service Holdings Co., Ltd., according to Change Report No. 2, dated May 12, 2023, for the large-volume holdings statement submitted by City Index Eleventh, since May 1, 2023, Minami Aoyama Fudosan holding shares of Arcland Service Holdings as a joint holder, and (iii) with respect to share certificates, etc. of Yaizu Suisankagaku Industry Co., Ltd., according to the large-volume	As answered in 1. of Part 2 above, several entities have become investment entities according to the financial situations of each group company. Most recently, Minami Aoyama Fudosan has become an investment entity because it has surplus funds.

	holdings statement dated September 5, 2023, submitted by Minami Aoyama Fudosan, since August 8, 2023, Minami Aoyama Fudosan holding shares of the Company. As such, based on the fact that Minami Aoyama Fudosan was a party to the acquisition of shares of a number of investee companies of the Large-scale Purchaser Group in the same period, the reason for selecting Minami Aoyama Fudosan as the main entity of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. in the Statement of Intent, submitted on July 27, 2023, is considered solely to obtain benefits with respect to investment by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, such as maximizing tax benefits for the whole Large-scale Purchaser Group, and the Company supposes that it has nothing to do with the Company's medium- to long-term corporate value or shareholders' common interests. In this regard, please inform us if you have any counterarguments.	
3	In connection with 2. above, as you know, **individual or foreign investors shall not receive benefits from the system of exclusion of deemed dividends from gross profits under tax laws and regulations of Japan (as for domestic corporation, the percentage not including deemed dividends of shareholders which own 5% or more of the Company's shares, such as Minami Aoyama Fudosan and City Index Eleventh, is 50%, and on the other hand, that of shareholders which own less than 5% is only 20%).** In this regard, on September 10, 2021, immediately before the TOB by an issuer announced and implemented on September 21, 2021, by Nishimatsu Construction, Ms. Nomura, who held shares of Nishimatsu Construction, transferred all of such shares held to S-Grant (with respect to such TOB by an issuer, S-Grant entered into a subscription agreement with Nishimatsu Construction regarding all the shares S-Grant held). Further, on November 1, 2022, immediately before the TOB by an issuer announced and implemented on December 21, 2022, by JAFCO, Ms. Nomura, who held shares of JAFCO, transferred all of such shares held to Minami Aoyama Fudosan (with respect to such TOB by an issuer, Minami Aoyama Fudosan entered into a subscription	Firstly, with respect to the point that "the selection and change of entities in this matter is ultimately to maximize tax benefits for the whole Large-scale Purchaser Group," we naturally consider the tax merits for each company, but the wording "is ultimately to maximize tax benefits for the whole Large-scale Purchaser Group" is incorrect. Such an assumption, a technique often used in the Company's questions in the Information Lists, is misleading to the Company's shareholders and is unwarranted, to say the least. The Company should strive to provide accurate information to its shareholders. Although there is a possibility that shares may be transferred based on the funding needs of each group company and other factors, there are no current plans to transfer shares within the group.

	agreement with JAFCO regarding all the shares Minami Aoyama Fudosan held). In addition, before the TOB by an issuer announced and implemented on September 20, 2022, by Central Glass, on October 30, 2020, Ms. Nomura, who held shares of Central Glass, transferred all of such shares held to City Index Eleventh and S-Grant as we expected. Around the time of the large-scale TOBs by an issuer of those companies and the announcement and implementation thereof, Ms. Nomura, who was a foreign investor, transferred shares to entities that were domestic corporations, and such entities subscribed for the TOBs by an issuer and sold shares. In light of this series of events, we cannot help but believe that they were intended to maximize tax benefits for the whole Large-scale Purchaser Group by share transfers from Ms. Nomura to domestic corporations, and that it has become normal for the Large-scale Purchaser Group to receive tax benefits by share transfer and selection of purchasing bodies in the group. Therefore, we believe that the selection and change of entities in this matter is ultimately to maximize tax benefits for the whole Large-scale Purchaser Group. Also in this regard, please inform us if you have any counterarguments. In addition, please answer 'yes' or 'no' if you plan to transfer the Company's shares which Ms. Nomura holds to domestic corporations of Large-scale Purchaser Group.	
4	In response to your statement "the percentage of voting rights exercised at the Company's Seventh Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, held on June 24, 2022, which was held in the ordinary course of business, was approximately 75.0%, and considering that this percentage of voting rights was exercised, the percentage of voting rights deemed to be held by the Large-scale Purchasers and Others as a result of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. (24.56%) is sufficient for a small number of shareholders, acting jointly in cooperation with one another, to have a substantial veto over matters requiring a special resolution at the Company's ordinary general meetings of shareholders." in 2 of **Part 3** in **I** of the Information List (2), you stated "The	It is inconsistent and unreasonable to claim that the Company has a substantial veto over special resolution matters with 24.56% of the voting rights, while at the same time claiming that there is no impact when a special resolution matter is brought before a general shareholders meeting and the Purchasers do not express their support for the proposal (the Company's management can rest assured that the proposal will pass without any specific solicitation of votes). We believe that the purchaser's response that the 24.56% voting rights they would have would not entitle them to veto special resolution matters is reasonable.

	percentage of voting rights exercised at the Seventh Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders to which you referred took place in a non-contentious situation, where there were no shareholder proposals or other similar matters. The percentage of purchasers' voting rights becomes significant when there is a conflict between the policies of your management and the purchasers. We believe that the exercise of a percentage of voting rights to which you should refer is not approximately 75% of the Seventh Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, which occurred at a non-contentious meeting, but is approximately 87.5% of the Eighth Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders." However, **with regard to matters that require a special resolution be passed at the Company's ordinary general meeting of shareholders, considering that you are always able to exercise opposing voting rights regardless of your publicly expressed intention to oppose the vote in advance (with respect to the matters proposed by the Company, which are different from the situation where you submitted a shareholder proposal by yourself) (i.e., it is always possible to exercise opposing voting rights in the "non-contentious situation" you reference), we believe that the response above substantially acknowledges that the percentage of voting rights (24.56%) that will be held by the Large-scale Purchasers as a result of the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. is sufficient to enable a small number of shareholders, acting jointly and in cooperation with one another, to have a substantial veto over matters requiring a special resolution at the Company's ordinary general meeting of shareholders**, but if you have any rebuttal, please let us know.	
5	In the response to 3. in **Part 2** of the Information List, there are statements that "we do not expect a specific yield" and "there is no period for having a return on investment," but if the Large-scale Purchasers perform the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., in a	Given that the Company's volume for the year from October 2022 to September 2023 is about 1.3 times the number of issued shares, we believe that it is realistically possible to sell the shares in the market from the standpoint of liquidity as you have indicated.

	situation where the liquidity of the Company's shares declines, please explain specifically, along with the reason for this belief, whether you believe it actually is possible to dispose of all of the Company's shares acquired by the Large-scale Purchaser Group in the market, and if the shares are disposed of in the market, whether you think that the price of Company's shares may decline, and even though there is such a possibility of a decline in share prices, whether you think it is possible to obtain a return on investment. In addition, please also inform us specifically of other methods of obtaining a return on investment and the economic rationality and feasibility thereof.	Are we correct in understanding the Company's inquiry as requesting that the Purchasers remain major shareholders of the Company and that they refrain from selling the Company's shares in the market? Please answer 'yes' or 'no.'
6	The responses to 10. of **Part 3** of the Information List and to 4. of **Part 3** in **I** of the Information List (2) stated respectively with respect to additional acquisition of shares that "the purchase period of the Purchase will end as much as one year after submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.; thus, nothing has yet been decided," and "in our response to the first information list, we already responded that nothing has yet been decided regarding purchases after expiration of the purchase period of the Purchase, and your request to explain in detail the "possibility" of matters about which nothing has yet been decided and which are nearly a year hence is impractical. Our response is 'yes' to the question that it will be at least a year hence or more (from submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.) if we are to acquire Company's shares in excess of 24.56%." Regarding the possibility of additional acquisition by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, it is stated that "nothing has yet been decided. If anyone belonging to the purchasers' group other than the purchasers is to acquire Company's shares in excess of 24.56%, it will be at least a year hence or more (from submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.)." However, as in the response above, you do not expressly deny the possibility of making additional purchases when one year has passed since submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. Please provide us with	This question is misleading and attempts to give shareholders the impression that "the Purchaser intends to purchase more shares after the expiration of the Purchase Period" by having the Purchaser respond in the abstract that it is a possibility. The Purchaser's response, as already stated, is that "the purchase period of the Purchase will end as much as one year after submission of the Statement of Intent; thus, nothing has yet been decided." We would suggest that you stop asking questions aimed at maliciously manipulating perceptions, such as this one, and consider providing fair information to shareholders.

	a response again by answering 'yes' or 'no' as to whether we can conclude that after a year has passed since submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., there is the possibility of acquiring Company's shares in excess of 24.56%.	

Part 3 Specifics and feasibilities etc. of the proposals by the Large-scale Purchaser Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the response to 17. of **Part 7.** of the Information List, you stated "(ii) regarding the refineries held by the Company, after thoroughly surveying as to which refineries have competitiveness, a proposal of course of actions, including closure of refineries or consolidation with refineries held by competitors in the industry, and its milestone should be publicly announced," and "(iii) if it can be determined that proceeding with the consolidation and abolition of refineries by becoming a part of ENEOS Corporation or Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd. or transferring all or part of its refineries would not only be beneficial to the Company but also contribute to the stabilization and optimization of energy supply in Japan, then such a proposal." In addition, according to your response to 1. of **Part 1. in I** of the Information List (2), when you made an advance notification under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, you pledged that **"if you intend to make a proposal to abolish, downsize, or transfer all or part of the oil refining and sales business relating to JP-5 aircraft fuel operated by Cosmo Oil Co., Ltd."** [underline and emphasis added by the Company], you will notify in advance and discuss with the International Investment Control Office, Security Trade Control Policy Division, Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (the "Investment Office"). In this regard, **we believe that the Investment Office considers the oil refining and sales business of Cosmo Oil Co., Ltd., which involves JP-5 aircraft fuel, to be highly important from the perspective of Japan's**	In response to 1. of **Part 1** of II of the Information List (2), the Purchaser stated that "Firstly, responses (i) through (vi) 17. of **Part 7** of the First Information List are presented as "the possibility of making a proposal, providing advice or exercising your influence (including exercise of the right to request purchase of shares) related to capital increase or decrease, merger, business assignment or purchase, share exchange or share transfer, company split, or other similar actions, or related to transactions such as the disposition or acquisition of important assets" and are listed only as possibilities, in as broad and specific a manner as possible based on assumptions about possible future (including near future) changes in the Company and its external business environment that would eventually make thorough consideration inevitable, and are not presented as proposals, etc. at this very moment." (note that (i) through (vi) above were also included in the prior notification as possible proposals to the Company, and of course, the Investment Office is also aware of this information). Therefore, it is not something that would be subject to prior consultation with the Investment Office at this time. Notwithstanding the responses to the Second Information List mentioned above, the Company is asking these questions now on the assumption that these proposals are specific current proposals, which is incorrect. Did the Company ask this question without reading the responses from the purchaser mentioned above, or did it read it and

	national interest, as well as energy supply to the people of Japan, and that the Investment Office does not easily allow for proposals to abolish, downsize, or transfer all or part of the business. Accordingly, please inform us **whether the Large-Scale Purchaser Group has specifically discussed the proposal with the Investment Office regarding , and if so, what types of discussions have been held regarding the feasibility of the proposal and other similar matters?**	brazenly ask this question in order to give its shareholders a bad impression of the Purchasers? We can only assume that inquiry 1. in **Part 1** of II of the Second Information List was asked by the Company, having forgotten what its own inquiry 17. in **Part 7** of the First Information List was about. In relation to (ii), City Index Eleventh's January 23 letter to the Company states the following, but does not reach a specific proposal, nor does it cover the "Petroleum Refining and Marketing Project for JP-5 Aircraft Fuel." "With Japan's domestic demand for petroleum products expected to decline, how does the Company plan to reduce its refineries to ensure a stable energy supply over the medium to long term? Domestic demand for petroleum products has been declining gradually, but the pace of this decline is accelerating due to the Carbon Neutral Declaration and other factors, and demand is expected to decline by 30% in 2030, 60% in 2040, and 75% in 2050, starting from the year 2020. Currently, there are 21 refineries in Japan with a refining capacity of approximately 3,258,000 barrels per day, but by 2030, it will be necessary to reduce the capacity by 6 refineries, equivalent to 1 million barrels per day, and by 2050, only about 5 refineries will remain in all of Japan. ENEOS and Idemitsu Kosan have excess refining capacity and it is said that they will be forced to engage in refinery restructuring, including drastic capacity reductions or refinery closures, over the next few years. In this environment, what role do you see the Company playing in the restructuring of domestic refineries to ensure a stable supply of energy in Japan over the medium to long term? We believe that the vision of the Company's management and how the Company contributes to the industry is very important and will in turn lead to profits for the Company."

2	In the response to 17. of **Part 7.** of the Information List, it is stated that "(vi) a proposal for business transfer, etc. is to be made where it can be determined that it would contribute more to the Company's corporate value and the efficiency of the industry as a whole, and eventually to Japan's national interests and stabilization and optimization of the supply of energy to Japanese people, if a company other than the Company (a domestic corporation is assumed) owns and manages a project related to oil exploration and production conducted by the Company through its business companies." However, according to the response in 1. of **Part 1. in I** of the Information List (2), when you made an advance notification under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, you pledged to the Investment Office that you will notify and discuss with the Investment Office **"if the Issuing Company, etc., … proposes to abolish, downsize, or transfer all or part of … the business related to crude oil mining conducted outside Japan, or intends to approve or agree to any agenda items relating to such proposals"** [underline and emphasis added by the Company]. In this regard, **we believe that the Investment Office considers that the Company's crude oil mining business is highly important from the perspective of Japan's national interest, as well as energy supply to the people of Japan, and that the Investment Office prohibits suggesting abolishing, downsizing, or transferring all or part of the business easily.** Accordingly, please inform us **whether the Large-Scale Purchaser Group has specifically discussed the proposal with the Investment Office, and if so, what kind of discussions have been held regarding the feasibility of the proposal and other similar matters?**	Same as the answer to question 2. above.

Part 4 Status of other companies' shares held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, etc. (status regarding conflict of interest with the Company and the Company's shareholders)

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses

1	In the response to 1. of **Part 2. in II** of the Information List (2) (the inquiry reposted below in italics), **you stated that "It is true that we hold shares in the Company's competitors, but unlike shares in the Company, we do not hold the large amount of shares that is required to submit a large-volume holdings statement." As in the past Mr. Murakami and relevant parties have vigorously emphasized the need for industry restructuring to the Company, information such as whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group holds shares in the Company's competitors, and the quantity thereof, is also extremely important for the Company's general shareholders in considering whether and to what extent there is a conflict of interest with the Company's general shareholders (even if the shareholding does not meet the requirements for submitting a large-volume holdings statement). Therefore, we ask you again to provide us with a specific response to this inquiry**. In addition, please inform us specifically whether you plan to hold shares in other companies operating businesses that compete with the Company in the future to an extent that requires you to submit a large-volume holdings statement, as well as whether you plan to hold shares in companies other than existing competitors that will compete with the Company in the future. For clarity, please confirm whether it is correct to understand that you have no personal relations with other companies operating businesses that compete with the Company. *1. Please inform us specifically about any relationship, such as stock ownership, personal relations, or other relationships, between the Large-scale Purchaser Group and companies operating business which competes with the Company (including ENEOS Holdings, Inc., ENEOS Corporation, Idemitsu Kosan Co., Ltd., Fuji Oil Company, Ltd., INPEX Corporation, and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd.) and San-ai Obbli Co., Ltd. (if any entity belonging to the*	As of October 10, 2023, the Purchasers do not own any shares of the Company's competitors. As for future holding plans, we honestly have no idea whether or not we will hold shares in any of these companies in the future, and cannot answer that question, as it will be affected by changes in the external environment, including the business conditions and share prices of each company. We find the question itself unbecoming of a listed company. As a publicly listed company, is the Company asking its competitors' shareholders and potential or existing shareholders of the Company whether they plan to own shares of the Company and its competitors' stock? Please be sure to answer truthfully, as this is a very important question for the stock market. The question is about personal relationships with the Company's competitors, but we do not know what you mean by personal relationships, and the purpose and intent of your question is unclear, so we are unable to answer.

	Large-scale Purchaser Group holds any share certificates, etc. of those companies, including which entities hold which amount of the share certificates, etc. in detail).	
2	In the response to 2. of **Part 2.** in **II** of the Information List (2), it is stated that "we told that we are ready to transfer the shares of Fuji Oil Company, Ltd., ("Fuji Oil") if the Company determines that it would contribute to improvement of the Companys corporate value and shareholder value," but it is not true. In the meeting on May 25, 2022, Mr. Murakami asked us, "Don't you have the intention to hold the shares of Fuji Oil?", and after that, Mr. Murakami stated that "There are no synergies between the Company and Fuji Oil." However, in the meeting on August 31, 2022, he made a similar proposal and mentioned that he approached the Company because he had been turned down by other company, stating that "We were turned down by a certain company [the Company's note: this refers to the Company's competitor]." Thus, it is difficult to believe that the Large-Scale Purchaser Group approached the Company for the purpose of improving the Company's corporate value. In relation to 1. above, please answer 'yes' or 'no' if there is possibility that the Large-Scale Purchaser Group will propose the transfer of the Company's shares held to the Company's competitors or the transfer of the Company's competitors' shares held to the Company. In addition, please answer the specific reason therefor.	At this time, there are no such plans. As with question 6. of **Part 2** above, this is a misleading question that attempts to give shareholders the impression of a high probability by having the Purchasers respond in the abstract that there is a possibility. The Company should strive to provide accurate information to its shareholders.
3	In the response to the inquiry of 3. of **Part 2.** in **II** of the Information List (2), it is stated that "there is no fact indicating that we insisted on directly involving Mr. Murakami in the negotiations with the company." However, it is significantly different from the Company's recognition of the fact and only a part of the series of communication between the Company and your company has been cut out in your favor; in addition, details of the response may mislead shareholders. Thus, we have restated the fact again, as below. Given the circumstances below, please provide us with a specific response	(1) With regard to (i) Firstly, the allegation "intervene in business negotiations between the Company and 'the company' involving insider information" is factually incorrect. The Purchasers merely informed the Company that Mr. Murakami, as the person who made the introduction, should be involved in the meeting between the Company and the other party, and that he would not be involved in any specific subsequent correspondence between the two parties, and requested a progress report on the

	to the inquiry below. **[Specific circumstances leading to this case]**: In the first place, **on June 29, 2023**, which is immediately after the 2023 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, **Mr. Murakami visited the Company on his own strong wishes, and made a "certain proposal" to the Company by providing a specific company name and suggested that Mr. Murakami himself should be allowed to be directly involved in the negotiations between the Company and the company.** In response, on July 7, 2023, the Company informed Mr. Fukushima, the Representative Director and President of City Index Eleventh that belongs to the Large-scale Purchaser Group, that the Company would like him to leave how to proceed with future negotiations up to the Company because the Company knows the company. In response, Mr. Fukushima continued to strongly insist on Mr. Murakami's intervention by stating that "**it is unreasonable that the Company will negotiate with the company arbitrarily**" because the negotiations were Mr. Murakami's proposal. In addition, on July 10, 2023, in an email from Mr. Fukushima to the Company, it is stated again that "**it is natural**" that the Company will proceed with negotiations with the company after Mr. Murakami runs the negotiations past the company. Moreover, Mr. Fukushima unilaterally set a deadline that was less than even one month and strongly requested that the Company indicate its course of actions by the deadline (also, Mr. Fukushima contacted us by stating that "because currently, Mr. Murakami is in Japan, we would like to hold a meeting with CEO Yamada with respect to this matter at a date and time convenient for you from among August 1 (Tues.), August 2 (Wed.), and August 3 (Thurs.)" unilaterally). Thereafter, in a phone call with the Company's person in charge on July 11, 2023, Mr. Fukushima stated that although he understood the Company's request ("the Company would like Mr. Fukushima to leave dialogue up	general direction and progress of any discussions that were to take place. It was a natural assumption that if the contents of this report contained undisclosed material information, we would comply with the Fair Disclosure Rule by signing a confidentiality agreement with a clause prohibiting sale in advance (City Index Eleventh's July 14 letter to the Company also stated, "In compliance with the Fair Disclosure Rule, we would be willing to sign a confidentiality agreement for a specified period to temporarily receive material information"), which is not a problem in relation to said rule or the principle of shareholder equality, etc. The proposal was also in the common interest of shareholders as it would contribute to improving the Company's shareholder value and corporate value. (2) With regard to (ii) Firstly, as stated in (1) above, the premise that the Purchasers sought to "directly intervene in business negotiations between the Company and 'the company' involving insider information" is factually incorrect. Next, the Purchasers filed the Statement of Intent because they expected that the Company's management would not take the Proposal seriously and would continue to put self-preservation ahead of increasing shareholder value, leaving the share price of the Company undervalued. It is factually incorrect that the Company refused to allow them to be involved in the negotiations etc. (3) With regard to (iii) In the large-volume holdings statement and the tender offer regulations, the equity percentages and ownership holding ratio of joint holders and specially related parties, respectively, are aggregated, and both are approximately 20%, so there is nothing wrong with the statement "since we also own 20% of the Company" or

	to the two companies" and "the Company would like Mr. Fukushima not to make a press release in the middle of the dialogue"), he would like the Company to report progress on consultations between the two companies, and the Company's person in charge expressed concerns that such a report of the progress would cause a problem regarding insider trading. In response, Mr. Fukushima requested that the Company make a report, not on specific details of the dialogue, but at least on the circumstances in broad terms while stating that "**we recognize that we already have certain insider information when we made this proposal**." Further, on July 13, 2023, the Company's person in charge conveyed to Mr. Fukushima the Company's concern that intervention in the consultations between the two companies may be continued effectively by stating that, even if a report is made, "intervention will not be ended by the Company's unilateral report, and some opinions regarding the course of actions will be provided by you. Further, the report will not be concluded by only making a report once, and deadlines would be set each time, such as by requesting that the next report be made by a certain date." In response, no excuse or rebuttal was made by Mr. Fukushima. As above, **on the surface,** Mr. Murakami, Mr. Fukushima of City Index Eleventh, and other parties **made a statement as if they respected direct communication between the two companies, i.e., the Company and the company. On the other hand, they continued to insist on Mr. Murakami's direct intervention in the negotiations, and interrupted the Company's action by stating that "it is unreasonable that the Company will negotiate with the company arbitrarily." Further, while they appeared to care about insider information, they showed willingness to intervene and become actively involved in negotiations between the two companies, which may include unannounced material facts, such as by stating that "we recognize**	"to shareholders who own 20% of the Company." If the Company believes that they should not be aggregated, then the Company's takeover defense measures would be baseless (the Company itself uses the above aggregation provisions in the large-volume holdings statement and tender offer regulations in its takeover defense measures). Meanwhile, there are no such aggregation provisions for major shareholders. Please refer to the text of Article 27-23, Paragraphs 4 and 5, Article 27-2, Paragraphs 1 and 7, and Article 163, Paragraph 1 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act.

that we already have certain insider information" and "we would like you to report on the course of actions and progress in broad terms," even though they are outside shareholders. The Company were suspicious of potential conflicts of interest and had strong concerns about violation of the principles of equal rights for shareholders and the fair disclosure rules.

However, regarding the circumstances above, the Large-scale Purchasers and Others published a press release titled "Submission of the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. to Cosmo Energy Holdings Co., Ltd." dated July 28, 2023, on the Internet and mentioned the circumstances as follows:

- ✓ On June 29, 2023, City Index Eleventh made a "certain proposal" to the Company [the Company's note: this refers to the Company and the same applies hereinafter] to contribute to improvement of the shareholder value of all shareholders of the Company.
- ✓ In response, on July 7, 2023, City Index Eleventh received a response from the Company that as a result of the discussion between the directors, the Company would like to talk with the parties related to the proposal.
- ✓ However, there was no specific progress thereafter; furthermore, through the letter dated July 14, 2023, City Index Eleventh informed the Company that if the Company has no specific measure to improve the shareholder value, since the price of shares of the Company is undervalued, City Index Eleventh would like to submit the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.

To summarize the circumstances above, we understand that as the Company's shareholders, the Large-scale Purchasers and Others and Mr. Murakami who leads them persisted in trying to intervene in the negotiations between the parties, the

	Company and the relevant company, involving insider information (on the surface, they made it appear as if they respected direct communication between the two companies); however, once they determined that there was no specific progress, they unilaterally submitted the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. Based on the circumstances above, we would like to ask the Large-scale Purchasers and Others three questions: (i) Please indicate your perception, 'yes' or 'no,' as to whether the acts by the Large-scale Purchasers and Others to persist in intervening in the negotiations between the Company and the relevant company involving insider information can be considered appropriate by general shareholders, particularly from the viewpoints of concern that the acts violate the principles of shareholders' common interests and equal rights for shareholders and fair disclosure rules. (ii) Please provide the reason why the Large-scale Purchasers indicated their intention to acquire additional shares of the Company and finally submitted the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. after they realized the Company's desire not to allow Mr. Murakami to be involved in the negotiations (in other words, the reason why you finally submitted the Statement of Intent for Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc. as a result of your being refused to directly intervene in the business negotiations between the Company and the "company" involving insider information) specifically so that it is easy for the Company's general shareholders to understand. (iii) Furthermore, regarding the details stated by the Large-scale Purchasers and Others in the Response (2) that "your explanation that 'the Large-scale Purchasers and Others actually satisfy conditions for [major shareholders] under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act' lacks evidence and is wrong,"	

	please inform us specifically based on what evidence the Large-scale Purchasers and Others believe that "they do not actually satisfy conditions for major shareholders." In the meeting on May 23, 2023, Ms. Nomura said, "**Since we own as many as 20% of the Company's shares**, we would like to receive a proper explanation (of the consolidated medium-term management plan announced in March 2023)" [underline and emphasis added by the Company] and "It would be good to have an opportunity to show your vision of improving the Company to **shareholders who own as many as 20% of the Company's shares** and have them vote for the proposal to elect directors" [underline and emphasis added by the Company]. In this statement, Ms. Nomura herself, the Large-Scale Purchaser, treated the Large-Scale Purchasers as a single entity, and stated and admitted that they were major shareholders holding 20% of the Company's shares, which is inconsistent with the above response. With respect to this, please provide us with consistent explanation. Considering the fact that the "major shareholder holding as many as 20% of the Company's shares" is actively trying to intervene in business negotiations between the Company and "the company" involving insider information as described above, it is extremely important to explain in a manner that is easy for general shareholders to understand easily.	

Part 5 Management policies, business plans, capital policies, and dividend policies of the Company and the Company Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the response to 3. of **Part 4. in II** of the Information List (2), you stated that "We believe that there are several factors, and we do not necessarily believe that 'we can reasonably conclude that the Company's general shareholders' will with respect to the	We answered that "we do not necessarily believe that we can 'reasonably conclude,' but we do take the results seriously." We do not believe there is any inconsistency. We ask that you exercise restraint, as we believe that convenient cut-offs and subjective

	listing of the renewable energy business subsidiary has been confirmed substantially.'" On the other hand, in the meeting held on June 29, 2023, regarding the split and listing of our renewable energy business subsidiary, Mr. Murakami stated that "We proposed that Ms. Atsumi be appointed as an Outside Director in order to participate in discussion regarding this matter at the Board of Directors meeting, but it is fact that our proposal was not accepted" and that "Shareholders do not approve of the proposal for the split and listing." He admitted that their proposal was rejected by the general shareholders at the 2023 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Company, and clearly stated that they would withdraw the proposal. In that case, the response as stated above is inconsistent with Mr. Murakami's statement at the time of the meeting, so please provide a logically consistent response to this point.	statements are not only meaningless to shareholders, but are also harmful to them.

Part 6 Tax treatment, etc. by the Large-scale Purchaser Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	In the response to 2. of **Part 6. in II** of the Information List (2) (a part of the inquiry reposted below in italics), you stated that "It is not true that City Index Eleventh has not paid any corporate tax, inhabitants tax, or enterprise tax ("Corporate Tax and Others")" Despite the fact that in the public notice of account closing the Corporate Tax and Others was reported to be 0 yen from the 13th term through the 17th term, it is obvious that your response stating that "not paid any corporate tax, inhabitants tax, or enterprise tax" is contradictory. If you persist in this response, either the public notice of account closing of City Index Eleventh for the13th term through the 17th term or the response itself, as stated above, is considered to be incorrect. Please inform us of which is correct. If City Index Eleventh paid Corporate Tax and Others during this time, please provide us with the amount paid for each fiscal year.	The financial statements are correct, public notices are shown in millions of yen, and corporate, inhabitants', and enterprise taxes are only shown as 0, and metropolitan inhabitant taxes are paid. We do not believe that the specific amount is necessary information for shareholders to make a decision. Further, this is due to the fact that no taxable income has been generated as a result of the calculation of income from accounting profits in accordance with other provisions of the Corporate Tax Act (including but not limited to the following, specifically Articles 23 and 24).

	In addition, in relation to the above, you stated that "City Index Eleventh pays taxes in accordance with the corporate, local, and other relevant tax laws in an appropriate manner," but you did not respond to the following inquiry at all. We would like to ask you again to respond to this inquiry. Further, if there was no or a significantly small payment of Corporate Tax and Others compared to the net profit before tax, please provide a specific reason therefor. 2. *"**If it has not actually made payment, please explain according to what tax treatment it has not made payment, together with the specific reason**. In particular, if tax benefits (that cannot be enjoyed by individuals and foreign corporations) obtained through exclusion of dividends from taxable gross revenue regarding deemed dividends for the tender and sale in the TOB by an issuer regarding 11. through 20. of **Part 10.** of the Information List is involved, in relation thereto, please explain according to what treatment it has not paid the Corporate Tax and Others, together with the specific reason."*	
2	In the response to 3. of **Part 6. in II** of the Information List (2), you stated that for City Index Eleventh's fiscal years, each period of the15th term (June 1, 2021 to January 31, 2022), the 16th term (February 1, 2022 to July 31, 2022), and the 17th term (August 1, 2022 to February 28, 2023) was less than one year. You simply stated that the reason for these fiscal years being consistently less than one year was for "efficient fund management." Please explain the reason these fiscal years are less than one year, and provide specific details of the "efficient fund management," including when it took place and the facts on which it was based, for each fiscal year.	This information is completely unnecessary for shareholders. This series of useless questions in itself is a clear illustration of the fact that the Company is not requesting information from the Information List for the benefit of its shareholders. How does the Company believe that the answer to this question is necessary information for its shareholders?
3	In the response to 4. of **Part 6. in II** of the Information List (2) (the inquiry reposted below in italics), regarding the status of payment of the Corporate Tax and Others for the Large-scale Purchaser Group other than City Index Eleventh, you stated that they	This is due to the fact that no taxable income has been generated as a result of the calculation of income from accounting profits in accordance with other provisions of the Corporate Tax Act (including but not limited to the following, specifically Articles

	"pay taxes in accordance with the corporate, local, and other relevant tax laws in an appropriate manner." If the Large-scale Purchaser Group other than City Index Eleventh did not pay Corporate Tax and Others at all, or paid a significantly small amount of tax compared to the net profit before tax, even if the tax was paid in an appropriate manner, please provide the reason therefor. In addition, regarding the fact that the amounts of Corporate Tax and Others for each term are extremely small compared to the net profits before tax of Minami Aoyama Fudosan, you responded that "we believe that there are differences between taxable income and accounting profit." Please provide more specific details about these differences. **The Company presumes that the situation regarding which you stated "there are differences between taxable income and accounting profit" specifically means that "if the shares are sold at a high price through TOB by an issuer, capital gains are realized in accounting, while the capital gains are deemed dividends and not included in taxable gross revenue, and on the contrary, if the balance obtained by subtracting the deemed dividends from the value of the shares sold is less than the book value for tax purposes, losses on a sale of shares are generated for tax purposes.**" Please confirm that our presumption is correct. In particular, if the reason for this situation is due to the tax benefits (which cannot be enjoyed by shareholders that are individuals or foreign corporations, and the percentage of the exclusion of dividends from taxable gross revenue which domestic corporate shareholders holding only less than 5% can enjoy is significantly small) obtained through the exclusion of dividends from taxable gross revenue regarding deemed dividends for the tender and sale in the TOB by an issuer regarding 11. through 20. of **Part 10** of the Information List, please answer 'yes' or 'no'. *4. "In relation to 1. Above, please explain the status of payment of the Corporate Tax*	23 and 24). Of course that is not all the information set forth herein by you, but we recognize that it is a factor behind the difference between accounting profit and taxable income. Therefore, the presumption that this is a question that can be answered with a 'yes' or 'no' is incorrect.

	and Others of the Large-scale Purchaser Group other than City Index Eleventh. Also, if such payment has not been made at all or is a significantly low amount, please explain the reason why such payment has not been made at all or is a significantly low amount. In particular, regarding Minami Aoyama Fudosan, which is the Large-scale Purchaser, according to the profit and loss statements provided (from the 17th term to the 19th term), ***the amounts of Corporate Tax and Others for each term are extremely small compared to the net profits before tax*** *as follows:* ***the 17th term*** *(from October 1, 2021 to November 30, 2021):* *net profits before tax: 1,570,808,814 yen; Corporate Tax and Others: 11,600 yen;* ***the 18th term*** *(from December 1, 2021 to November 30, 2022):* *net profits before tax: 5,126,639,871 yen; Corporate Tax and Others: 70,000 yen; and* ***the 19th term*** *(from December 1, 2022 to February 28, 2023):* *net profits before tax: 2,177,561,717 yen; Corporate Tax and Others: 17,500 yen.*	
4	In the response to 5. Of **Part 6. In II** of the Information List (2), regarding the fiscal year of Minami Aoyama Fudosan being variously several months or more than one year long (for example, only two months for the 17th term and more than one year for the 19th term), you stated that the reason for inconsistent periods for each fiscal year is "for efficient fund management." As it is objectively irregular for the period of a fiscal year to fluctuate from year to year for "efficient fund management," please break down the specific details of "efficient fund management," including when it took place and the facts on which it was based, into terms the Company's general shareholders can understand easily.	Similarly to the inquiry of 2. above, this information is completely unnecessary for shareholders. How does the Company believe that the answer to this question is necessary information for its shareholders?

Ⅱ New questions or information that we ask you to respond or provide (in relation to the Response)

Part 1 Examples of investment by the Large-scale Purchaser Group

No.	The Company's Inquiries	The Large-scale Purchasers' Responses
1	According to publicly available information, Reno Co., Ltd. ("Reno"), one member of the Large-scale Purchaser Group, started to purchase a large number of shares in MCJ Co., Ltd. ("MCJ") in the second half of 2012 and held 4,994,100 shares (shareholding ratio of 9.82%) as of March 22, 2013. Combined with the shareholdings of the representative director of Reno at that time and Attorney Fuminori Nakashima ("Atty. Nakashima"), who were the joint holders with Reno, the number of shares held by Reno in total was 9,928,600 shares (shareholding ratio of 19.52%). After cancelling the agreement regarding joint shareholding with the representative director of Reno at that time and Atty. Nakashima, Reno submitted to MCJ a letter of intent on a large-scale purchase action of MCJ shares (the "Large-scale Purchase Action by Reno") dated October 8, 2013. According to the press release of MCJ titled "Notice of the Receipt of a Letter of Intent on a Large-scale Purchase Action of Company' Shares" dated the same day, Reno stated in the letter of intent that "The purpose of the purchase of the Company[the Company's note: refers to MCJ]'s shares was a pure investment, which was to be made for the purpose of realizing the potential value of the Company's shares and seeking capital gains from the medium to long-term enhancement of its corporate value." MCJ's share price on the same day was 191 yen (based on closing price; the same applies hereinafter), and following the release, the price reached the daily price limit on the following day (October 9) and rose to 241 yen at the close of on-floor trading on the same day.	Firstly, in its response to 3. of **Part 10**. of the First Information List, the Purchaser explained that "Reno, in its investment in MCJ, submitted a letter of intent on a large-scale purchase action dated October 8, 2013, stating that 'The purpose of the purchase of the company's shares was a pure investment, which was to be made for the purpose of realizing the potential value of the company's shares and seeking capital gains from the medium- to long-term enhancement of its corporate value', etc., and when it submitted it, there was a possibility (only a possibility, not a declaration of purchase) that it might purchase MCJ's shares in the medium to long term" (Reno's letter of intent to MCJ stated, "We are submitting this letter of intent in advance because we may make a purchase in the future, taking into account trends in the stock market and other factors, in which case our ownership or voting rights in the company may exceed 20%." In response to MCJ's request for information, Reno responded, "Our investment in the company's shares is a pure investment and we may choose to sell the company's shares without making a large-scale purchase if the price exceeds our anticipated potential price in the future."); nevertheless, the Company's assertion in this inquiry that "As such, although Reno expressed its intention regarding the Large-scale Purchase Action by Reno, once the target company expressed its intention to accept it, Reno changed its stance completely and sold a significant amount of the shares it held in the market, seizing the opportunity of a price surge due to the expressed acceptance. This action could be considered a type of market manipulation, and was regarded as highly

	After that, according to publicly available information, the board of directors of MCJ evaluated and analyzed the Large-scale Purchase Action by Reno on and after November 28, 2013, and then MCJ issued a press release titled "Notice of Receipt of Recommendation of the Independent Committee and the Finalization of the Evaluation and Analysis Results of the Board of Directors of the Company Concerning the Large-scale Purchase Action of the Company's Shares" on December 12, 2013. In this press release, MCJ announced to the effect that "the board of directors of the Company[the Company's note: refers to MCJ] does not intend to trigger any countermeasures against the Large-scale Purchase Action proposed by Reno, and will continue to monitor the investment trend of Reno and changes in the situation for the time being." According to publicly available information, the closing price of MCJ shares immediately before the announcement mentioned above (on December 12, 2013) was 268 yen, and the closing price rose sharply to 348 yen on the next day (December 13) following the announcement. On the next trading day (December 16), MCJ shares traded at 395 yen at the opening and subsequently dropped to 296 yen, but continued to close at a high price of 303 yen. As stated above, MCJ announced that it would approve the performance of the Large-scale Purchase Action by Reno, and would not take any countermeasures. Immediately before the announcement was made, on December 12, 2013, the MCJ's share price was 268 yen(based on closing price), and in response to the announcement, on the following day (December 13), it surged to 348 yen. On December 16, the following business day, trading started at 395 yen. Although the price dropped to 296 yen at one point, it continued to keep a high level, with a closing price of 303 yen. **According to publicly available information, although MCJ approved the performance of the Large-scale Purchase Action by Reno, only two business days after the announcement, on December 16, 2013, Reno sold 3,244,200 MCJ shares**	problematic from the perspective of securing market fairness" harms Reno's good name, and attempts to sow a bad impression of the Purchasers. The Company should immediately withdraw this question and apologize to Reno. Next, with respect to the Purchase as well, the Statement of Intent clearly states that "it is highly regrettable that the Company has forced the MoM resolution even though there was ample time to confirm the shareholders' will. The inevitable conclusion is that the Company's management is acting in self-preservation by keeping the share price of the Company at an undervalued level well below a PBR of one. Because the Company's management is putting self-preservation ahead of improving shareholder value in this way and the share price of the Company remains undervalued, Minami Aoyama Fudosan etc. decided to make the Purchase." Therefore, if the share price is not undervalued as described above, there would be no reason to make the Purchase, and the Company could sell its shares instead of executing the Purchase. However, we do not believe that the sale was made "to take advantage of a temporary spike in prices due to the non-implementation of takeover defense measures" as alleged by the Company. Firstly, since this response itself will be publicly announced, market participants, including the Company's shareholders, will expect a sale by the Purchasers as described in this response, and in the first place, it is practically impossible to take advantage of such a temporary surge to sell a large number of shares, approximately 20% of the total number of issued shares. The Purchasers sell the Company's shares when the Company's shares are properly valued by the increase in the Company's corporate value and shareholder value, and the share price had reached reasonable level that could not be considered undervalued.

	from its shareholding (equivalent to a shareholding ratio of 6.38%) in the market . This was contrary to its own letter of intent stating that Reno had the intention to purchase MCJ shares until its shareholding ratio or the percentage of voting rights reached 20% or above, taking into consideration, among other factors, the future trend of the stock market to realize the potential value of MCJ shares and to enhance the its medium- to long-term corporate value. As such, although Reno expressed its intention regarding the Large-scale Purchase Action by Reno, once the target company expressed its intention to accept it, Reno changed its stance completely and sold a significant amount of the shares it held in the market, seizing the opportunity of a price surge due to the expressed acceptance. This action could be considered a type of market manipulation, and was regarded as highly problematic from the perspective of securing market fairness. Please provide a response with your view on this matter as the Large-scale Purchasers, with respect to the fact that Reno (in relation to the Company, it was a joint holder of you and may be added again as a joint holder in the future). Also, in connection with the procedures under the Response Policies for this matter, which commenced with the submission of the Statement of Intent, there is a concern that as Large-scale Purchasers, you will take a similar action to Reno in the circumstances described above. Please inform us if the share price of the Company surges following the Company's announcement of its response to the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., whether the Large-scale Purchaser Group may seize this opportunity by selling in the market a large amount of the shares it holds in the Company.	
2	(i) In 12. of **Part 10.** of the Information List, regarding the Sanshin Electronics investment case, the Company pointed out that "**at the time of the own-share TOB, for the purpose of securing a distributable amount to be used to purchase its own**	As for the first part of the question, we do not believe that we should explain anything more than what is publicly available, since it also concerns other companies. However, even if there were discussions, the final decision on capital policy is made

	shares, Sanshin Electronics reduced its general reserve, capital reserve, and retained surplus, transferred the amount reduced from the capital reserve to other capital surplus, and transferred the amounts reduced from the general reserve and retained surplus to retained earnings brought forward. As a result, the upper limit of the number of shares to be purchased in the own-share TOB was determined to be 7,000,000 shares (equivalent to approximately 28.83% of the then-current total number of issued shares of Sanshin Electronics), which was slightly more than the total number of Sanshin Electronics shares held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group immediately before the announcement of the own-share TOB (i.e., 6,709,100 shares)"; (ii) in 16. of **Part 10.** of the Information List, regarding the Daiho investment case, the Company pointed out that "**Daiho eventually (i) transferred 7.5 billion yen in capital reserves to other capital surplus for the purpose of securing a distributable amount to be used for an own-share TOB, (ii) as a result, implemented the own-share TOB in which the upper limit on the number of shares to be purchased was 8,850,000 shares, which was slightly more than the total number of shares in Daiho held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group immediately before the announcement of the own-share TOB (i.e., 7,614,831 shares), using a price with a premium of 29.06% on the closing market price of shares in Daiho on the business day before the announcement date, and then (iii) announced on March 24, 2022, that Daiho would issue to Aso new shares representing 8,500,000 shares by third-party allotment**." In the response to 1. of **Part 6 in I** of the Information List (2), it is stated that "regarding Sanshin Electronics at that time, we recognize that the amounts of general reserve, capital reserve, and retained surplus were obviously large compared to the amount of capital surplus due to any past circumstance," "regarding Daiho, we recognize that although 7.5 billion yen in capital reserves was transferred to other capital surplus, the amount of capital reserves	by each company, and the Purchasers are in a position to accept or, moreover, to be forced to accept if it will contribute to improving shareholder value for all shareholders, and this is also true from the objective standpoint of holding ownership interests. In the last sentence, "less than 100 million yen" is just one of the brainstorming topics that were mentioned, keeping in mind the tax rules applicable to small and medium-sized corporations for tax purposes, etc., and the Company's concern is completely misplaced.

	was increased shortly thereafter by 20.0 billion yen through the third-party share issuance capital increase to Aso," and "we believe each company determined that there were no financial obstacles with respect to Sanshin Electronics and Daiho… and that they had no problem from the viewpoints of liquidity on hand and total financial stability." However, since we have not received responses to whether there were any requests or discussions with Sanshin Electronics and Daiho, or the details thereof, please inform us again of the details of this point. In addition to the investment cases above, considering the fact that **in a meeting between the Company, City Index Eleventh, and Mr. Murakami on May 25, 2022, Mr. Murakami made a proposal to change the amount of the Company's stated capital to 100 million yen or less**, there is a concern that after implementing the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc., the Large-scale Purchasers and Others will request that the Company reduce the amounts of capital reserves and stated capital, and secure a large distributable amount and implement a large-scale TOB by an issuer at a premium price. Please inform us of whether there is a possibility that the Large-scale Purchasers will make such request to the Company after implementing the Large-scale Purchase Actions, etc.	
3	In 3. of **Part 6. in I** of the Information List (2), regarding the Daiho investment case, we asked you a question as to why the Large-scale Purchaser Group rejected the share transfer scheme by Aso purchasing shares from Daiho's existing shareholders (including the Large-scale Purchaser Group) through the TOB and making Daiho a consolidated subsidiary, as follows: "**since we believe that even through the scheme that was revealed to have been proposed in the letter dated January 13, 2022 by the Large-scale Purchaser Group itself to implement a TOB by an issuer by Daiho and a capital increase through third-party allotment to Aso, a company would still "become a consolidated subsidiary of other companies while remaining listed" and**	We do not see anything from the previous responses that should additionally be answered. As with the response to 2. of **Part 1** of II, the Purchasers have indicated their view and each company will make its decision with regard to it, and the Purchasers are in a position to accept or, moreover, to be forced to accept if it will contribute to improving shareholder value for all shareholders. We do not understand at all the thought process by which the Company alleges "can reasonably be assumed to be due to an approach." As stated in the previous response, please provide a clear background and purpose as to why the Company is fixated on this case.

	the proposal for the scheme "means that the purchasers themselves act against this basic idea," please explain your specific opinion on the inconsistency such explanation with approval." In your response to the inquiry above, you reiterated the formal conclusion that the Large-scale Purchaser Group did not "propose" the scheme above, and did not clarify at all why the Large-scale Purchaser Group rejected the share transfer scheme and accepted "the scheme of implementing a TOB by an issuer via Daiho and a capital increase through third-party allotment to Aso." Regarding your response to 15. of **Part 10.** of the Information List that "since we believe the purchasers should tender shares in other company's TOB only if it is confirmed that it will create the largest value for the existing shareholders in an auction format," you supplemented an explanation in the response to 3. of **Part 6. in I** of the Information List (2), but even though the effect would be substantially the same, in that Aso will acquire a number of shares equivalent to the number of shares held by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, the substantial reason why the Large-scale Purchaser Group rejected the share transfer scheme which they can enjoy such effect and accepted "the scheme of implementing a TOB by an issuer via Daiho and a capital increase through a third-party allotment to Aso" has not been indicated. **If it is through the share transfer scheme, the amount paid by Aso will be relatively small compared to the capital increase through a third-party allotment (considering that the allotment price of the actually implemented capital increase through a third-party allotment is higher than the price of TOB by an issuer), and Daiho will not bear a significant financial burden by itself, and there will be no burden related to the procedures of decreasing capital reserves, submission of a tender offer statement due to a TOB by an issuer, or a securities report due to a capital increase through a third-party allotment. Therefore, since we believe that there is no reason why Aso and Daiho chose "a scheme with a capital increase**	

	through a third-party allotment and a large-scale TOB by an issuer" above intentionally, and the reason for adopting such scheme can reasonably be assumed to be due to a (written or unwritten) approach by the Large-scale Purchaser Group, please inform us why the Large-scale Purchaser Group took such approach and whether the actual purpose is for the Large-scale Purchaser Group to enjoy tax benefits arising from deducting dividend income in regard to the deemed dividends.	

End

Attachment of the Response from the Large-scale Purchasers
(excerpted from Response (1))

【Attachment】

1. Financial results for the last three financial years for Minami Aoyama Fudosan

the 19th period（2022/12/1~2023/2/28）

Balance sheet

As of February 28, 2023

Minami Aoyama Fudosan （UNIT： yen）

Assets		Liabilities	
Account item	Amount	Account item	Amount
【Current assets】	7,373,262,707	【Current liabilities】	62,746,141
Cash and deposits	5,349,245,592	Income taxes payable	17,500
Land for sale	88,455,072	Advances received	62,370,000
Buildings for sale	94,030,056	Deposits received	358,641
Accrued payments	1,841,531,987	Total liabilities	62,746,141
【Non-current assets】	1,700,000	Net assets	
【Property, plant, and equipment】	1,700,000	【Shareholders' equity】	7,312,216,566
Land	1,700,000	Share capital	200,000
		Retained earnings	7,312,016,566
		Legal capital surplus	50,000
		Other retained earnings	7,311,966,566
		Retained earnings brought forward	7,311,966,566
		Total net assets	7,312,216,566
Total assets	7,374,962,707	Total liabilities and net assets	7,374,962,707

Profit and loss statement

(2022/12/1~2023/2/28)

Minami Aoyama Fudosan (UNIT： yen)

Account item		Amount
【Cost of sales】		
Beginning merchandise inventory	547,455,384	
Cost of real estate lease revenue	701,388	
Total	548,156,772	
Ending inventory of merchandise	547,455,384	
Cost of goods sold		701,388
Cost of sales		701,388
Gross loss		701,388
【Selling, general, and administrative expenses】		
Salaries and allowances	150,000	
Entertainment expenses	100,000	
Commission expenses	185,174	
Sales fee	871,187	
Taxes and dues	4,330,347	
Fee expenses	693,550	
Total selling, general, and administrative expenses		6,630,258
Operating loss		7,331,646
【Non-operating income】		
Interest income	4,641	
Dividend income	12,052,638,750	
Gain on sale of securities	85,524,553	
Total non-operating income		12,138,167,944
【Non-operating expenses】		
Interest expenses on bonds	2,352,452	
Total non-operating expenses		2,352,452
Ordinary profit		12,128,483,846
【Extraordinary loss】		
Loss on sale of investment securities	9,950,922,099	
Total extraordinary loss		9,950,922,099

Profit before income taxes		2,177,561,747
Income taxes - current		17,500
Profit		2,177,544,247

the 18th period（2021/12/1~2022/11/30）

Balance sheet

As of November 30, 2022

Minami Aoyama Fudosan （UNIT： yen）

Assets		Liabilities	
Account item	Amount	Account item	Amount
【Current assets】	2,213,472,954	【Current liabilities】	62,689,591
Cash and deposits	8,223,442	Accounts payable	249,591
Land for sale	88,455,072	Income taxes payable	70,000
Buildings for sale	94,030,056	Advances received	62,370,000
Accrued payments	2,022,764,384	【Non-current liabilities】	11,387,604,446
【Non-current assets】	14,371,493,402	Bonds payable	11,387,604,446
【Property, plant, and equipment】	1,700,000	Liabilities	11,450,294,037
Land	1,700,000		Net assets
【Investments and other assets】	14,369,793,402	【Shareholders' equity】	5,134,672,319
Investment securities	14,369,793,402	Share capital	200,000
		Retained earnings	5,134,472,319
		Legal retained earnings	50,000
		Other retained earnings	5,134,422,319
		Retained earnings brought forward	5,134,422,319
		Total net assets	5,134,672,319
Total assets	16,584,966,356	Total liabilities and net assets	16,584,966,356

Profit and loss statement

（2021/12/1~2022/11/30）

Minami Aoyama Fudosan （UNIT： yen）

Account item	Amount	
【Cost of sales】		
Real estate lease revenue	2,070,000	
Total net sales		2,070,000
【Cost of sales】		
Beginning inventory of merchandise	182,485,128	
Cost of real estate lease revenue	563,700	
Total	183,048,828	
Ending inventory of merchandise	182,485,128	
Cost of goods sold		563,700
Cost of sales		563,700
Gross loss		1,506,300
【Selling, general, and administrative expenses】		
Salaries and allowances	650,000	
Entertainment expenses	2,400,000	
Commission expenses	1,289,001	
Sales fee	1,931,267	
Taxes and dues	15,102,603	
Fee expenses	583,550	
Total selling, general, and administrative expenses		21,956,421
Operating loss		20,450,121
【Non-operating income】		
Interest income	9,328	
Dividend income	13,306,294,931	
Interest income	100,896	
Gain on sale of securities	1,258,218,623	
Interest on securities	4,242,370	
Total non-operating income		14,568,866,148
【Non-operating expenses】		
Interest expenses	5,689,601	
Interest expenses on bonds	249,591	

Total non-operating expenses		5,939,192
Ordinary profit		14,542,476,835
【Extraordinary loss】		
Loss on sale of investment securities	9,415,836,961	
Extraordinary loss		9,415,836,961
Profit before income taxes		5,126,639,874
Income taxes - current		70,000
Profit		5,126,569,874

the 17th period（2021/10/1~2021/11/30）

Balance sheet

As of November 30, 2021

Minami Aoyama Fudosan （UNIT： yen）

Assets		Liabilities	
Account item	Amount	Account item	Amount
【Current assets】	2,523,854,809	【Current liabilities】	62,663,671
Cash and deposits	42,349,433	Income taxes payable	11,600
Land for sale	88,455,072	Advances received	62,600,000
Buildings for sale	94,030,056	Deposits received	52,071
Accounts receivable - other	59,967	Total liabilities	62,663,671
Short-term loans receivable	1,269,894,286	Net assets	
Accrued payments	1,029,065,995	【Shareholders' equity】	5,297,410,950
【Non-current assets】	2,836,219,812	Share capital	200,000
【Property, plant, and equipment】	1,700,000	Retained earnings	5,297,210,950
Land	1,700,000	Other retained earnings	5,297,210,950
【Investments and other assets】	2,834,519,812	Retained earnings brought forward	5,297,210,950
Investment securities	2,834,519,812	Total net assets	5,297,410,950
Total assets	5,360,074,621	Total liabilities and net assets	5,360,074,621

Profit and loss statement

（2021/10/1~2021/11/30）

Minami Aoyama Fudosan （UNIT： yen）

Account item	Amount	
【Cost of sales】		
Real estate lease revenue	460,000	
Total net sales		460,000
【Cost of sales】		
Beginning inventory of merchandise	182,485,128	
Total	182,485,128	
Ending inventory of merchandise	182,485,128	
Cost of goods sold		0
Gross loss		460,000
【Selling, general, and administrative expenses】		
Salaries and allowances	200,000	
Entertainment expenses	200,000	
Commission expenses	117,700	
Fee expenses	561,000	
Total selling, general, and administrative expenses		1,078,700
Total operating loss		618,700
【Non-operating income】		
Dividend income	6,655,997,359	
Interest income	59,967	
Total non-operating profit and loss		6,656,057,326
【Non-operating expenses】		
Interest expenses	875,938	
Total non-operating expenses		875,938
Ordinary profit		6,654,562,688
【Extraordinary loss】		
Loss on sale of investment securities	5,083,663,844	
Total extraordinary loss		5,083,663,844
Profit before income taxes		1,570,898,844
Income taxes – current		11,600

Profit		1,570,887,244

2. Financial results for the last three financial years for City Index Eleventh

the 17th period（2022/8/1~2023/2/28）

Balance sheet

As of 28 February, 2023

(UNIT: thousand yen)

Assets		Liabilities	
Account item	Amount	Account item	Amount
(Current assets)		(Current liabilities)	
Cash and deposits	24,400,136	Accrued interest	64,509
Advances paid	11	Accounts payable	895,594
Suspense payments	1,792,701	Income taxes payable	41
Accrued payments	3,916,471	Accrued consumption taxes	152
Accrued interest	102,363	Advances received	240
Total current assets	30,211,682	Deposits received	2,859,024
Non-current assets		Total current liabilities	3,819,559
Property, plant, and equipment		Non-current liabilities	
Buildings	15,418	Bonds payable	115,099,290
Structures	0	Leasehold deposits received	436
Land	34,580	Deferred tax liabilities	5,897,667
Total property, plant, and equipment	49,998	Total non-current liabilities	120,997,393
Investments and other assets		Total liabilities	124,816,952
Investment securities	121,576,469	(Net assets)	
Purchased receivables	0	Shareholders' equity	
Shares of subsidiaries	11,920,000	Share capital	1,000

and associates			
Total investments and other assets	133,496,469	Retained earnings	
Total non-current assets	133,546,467	Legal retained earnings	250
		Other retained earnings	76,804,845
		Retained earnings brought forward	76,804,845
		Treasury shares	-49,017,440
		Total shareholders' equity	27,788,655
		Valuation and translation adjustments	
		Valuation difference on available-for-sale securities	11,152,541
		Total net assets	38,941,197
Total assets	163,758,149	Total liabilities and net assets	163,758,149

Profit and loss statement

(2022/8/1~2023/2/28)

(UNIT: thousand yen)

Account item	Amount	
Net sales		1,526
Cost of sales		628
Gross profit		898
Selling, general, and administrative expenses		9,887
Operating loss		8,989
Non-operating income		
Dividend income	25,683,621	
Interest income	78,963	
Foreign exchange gains	0	25,762,583
Non-operating expenses		
Interest expenses	63,329	
Miscellaneous loss	42,488	105,816
Ordinary profit		25,647,777
Extraordinary income		
Other extraordinary loss	1,007,500	1,007,500
Extraordinary loss		
Loss on sale of investment securities	2,200,858	
Other extraordinary loss	194,000	2,394,858
Profit before income taxes		24,260,419
Income taxes – current	41	41
Profit		24,260,378

the 16th period（2022/2/1~2022/7/31）

Balance sheet

As of 31 July 2022

City Index Eleventh （UNIT： yen）

Assets		Liabilities	
Account item	Amount	Account item	Amount
【Current assets】	37,241,571,581	【Current liabilities】	3,421,486,466
Cash and deposits	28,638,047,056	Short-term borrowings	1,034,255,821
Advances paid	10,924	Accrued interest	57,382,406
Prepaid expenses	4,180	Accounts payable	2,328,381,466
Accrued payments	776,733,026	Income taxes payable	35,000
Income taxes refund receivable	7,647,711,057	Accrued consumption taxes	130,500
Suspense payments	3,300,000	Advances received	239,800
Accrued interest	175,765,338	Deposits received	1,061,473
【Non-current assets】	132,593,571,181	【Non-current liabilities】	125,973,246,958
【Property, plant, and equipment】	50,626,240	Bonds payable	118,054,216,792
Buildings	16,046,479	Security deposit	436,000
Structures	4	Deferred tax liabilities	7,918,594,166
Land	34,579,757	Total liabilities	129,394,733,424
【Investments and other assets】	132,542,944,941	Net assets	
Investment securities	131,802,944,940	【Shareholders' equity】	25,466,276,803
Purchased receivables	1	Share capital	1,000,000
Shares of subsidiaries and associates	740,000,000	Retained earnings	52,544,716,803
		Legal retained earnings	250,000

		Other retained earnings	52,544,466,803
		Retained earnings brought forward	52,544,466,803
		Treasury shares	-27,079,440,000
		【Valuation and translation adjustments】	14,974,132,535
		Valuation difference on available-for-sale securities	14,974,132,535
		Total net assets	40,440,409,338
Total assets	169,835,142,762	Total liabilities and net assets	169,835,142,762

Profit and loss statement

（2022/2/1~2022/7/31）

City Index Eleventh （UNIT： yen）

Account item	Amount	
【Net sales】		
Lease revenue	1,308,000	
Total net sales		1,308,000
【Cost of sales】		
Cost of lease revenue	1,160,487	
Total	1,160,487	
Cost of lease revenue (current term)		1,160,487
Total cost of lease revenue		1,160,487
Gross profit		147,513
【Selling, general, and administrative expenses】		
Total selling, general, and administrative expenses		5,934,875
Operating loss		5,787,362
【Non-operating income】		
Interest income	3,575	
Dividend income	45,130,307,455	
Interest on securities	72,381,677	
Foreign exchange gains	510	
Total non-operating income		45,202,693,217
【Non-operating expenses】		
Interest expenses	110,171	
Interest expenses on bonds	59,415,026	
Miscellaneous loss	159,922,636	
Total non-operating expenses		219,447,833
Ordinary profit		44,977,458,022
【Extraordinary loss】		
Loss on sale of investment securities	8,587,219,875	
Other extraordinary loss	10,927,272,199	
Total extraordinary loss		19,514,492,074
Profit before income taxes		25,462,965,948

Income taxes - current		35,000
Profit		25,462,930,948

the 15th period（2021/6/1~2022/1/31）

Balance sheet

As of January 31, 2022

City Index Eleventh （UNIT： yen）

Assets		Liabilities	
Account item	Amount	Account item	Amount
【Current assets】	11,519,054,571	【Current liabilities】	1,089,710,830
Cash and deposits	7,458,180,932	Accrued interest	6,494,973
Accounts receivable	110,000,000	Accounts payable	1,075,041,496
Income taxes refund receivable	3,842,780,835	Income taxes payable	46,600
Accrued interest	108,092,804	Advances received	239,800
【Non-current assets】	110,218,441,566	Deposits received	7,887,961
【Property, plant, and equipment】	51,157,527	【Non-current liabilities】	103,983,088,984
Buildings	16,577,766	Bonds payable	102,405,764,387
Structures	4	Security deposit	436,000
Land	34,579,757	Deferred tax liabilities	1,576,888,597
【 Investments and other assets】	110,167,284,039	Total liabilities	105,072,799,814
Investment securities	97,102,511,839	Net assets	
Purchased receivables	1	【Shareholders' equity】	13,682,785,855
Shares of subsidiaries and associates	13,064,772,199	Share capital	1,000,000
		Retained earnings	27,081,785,855
		Legal retained earnings	250,000
		Other retained earnings	27,081,535,855
		Retained earnings brought forward	27,081,535,855
		Treasury shares	-13,400,000,000

		【Valuation and translation adjustments】	2,981,910,468
		Valuation difference on available-for-sale securities	2,981,910,468
		Total net assets	16,664,696,323
Total assets	121,737,496,137	Total liabilities and net assets	121,737,496,137

Profit and loss statement

（2021/6/1~2022/1/31）

City Index Eleventh （UNIT： yen）

Account item	Amount	
【Net sales】		
Land rent received	770,000,000	
Lease revenue	1,918,400	
Gain on investments	1,264,129,469	
Total net sales		203,647,869
【Cost of sales】		
Cost of lease revenue	717,166	
Total	717,166	
Cost of lease revenue (current term)		717,166
Total cost of lease revenue		717,166
Gross profit		2,035,330,703
【Selling, general, and administrative expenses】		
Total selling, general, and administrative expenses		12,568,202
Operating loss		2,022,762,501
【Non-operating income】		
Interest income	800	
Interest on securities	95,972,049	
Dividend income	25,907,347,669	
Foreign exchange gains	57,979,516	
Miscellaneous income	1,356,368	
Total non-operating income		26,062,656,402
【Non-operating expenses】		
Interest expenses	59,142,505	
Interest expenses on bonds	57,683,357	
Miscellaneous loss	124,929,440	
Total non-operating expenses		241,755,302
Ordinary profit		27,843,663,601
【Extraordinary loss】		
Loss on sale of investment securities	5,837,768,987	

Total extraordinary loss		5,837,768,987
Profit before income taxes		22,005,894,614
Income taxes - current		46,600
Profit		22,005,848,014